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Connick v. Thompson
09-571
Ruling Below: Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated, 578 F.3d 293 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. granted, Connick v. Thompson, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2612 (2010).
In 1985, John Thompson (plaintiff-appellee) was convicted of attempted armed robbery and
murder and was sentenced to death. After sitting on death row for fourteen years, an investigator
in Thompson's habeas proceedings discovered that prosecutors had failed to turn over a crime
lab report in the attempted armed robbery case that contained exculpatory blood evidence.
Thompson was retried for murder in 2003 and found not guilty. After his release, Thompson
brought suit alleging various claims against the District Attorney's Office and individual
government employees (defendants-appellants), including a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
wrongful suppression of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district
court entered a judgment awarding Thompson damages of $14 million and attorneys' fees of
approximately $1 million and the DA's office appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision, finding that in establishing deliberate indifference, Thompson
demonstrated that it was obvious that training about Brady was necessary and that a highly
predictable consequence of failing to train attorneys about Brady was the infringement of the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. In 2009, the appellate panel decision was vacated by
an equally divided en bane court, thereby affirming the decision of the district court.
Questions Presented: (1) Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district attorney's office
for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous culpability and causation standards of
Canton and Bryan County? (2) Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district attorney's
office for a single Brady violation undermine prosecutors' absolute immunity recognized in Van
de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009)?
John THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Harry F. CONNICK, in his official capacity as District Attorney; Eric Dubelier, in his
official capacity as Assistant District Attorney; James Williams, in his official capacity as
Assistant District Attorney; Eddie Jordan, in his official capacity as District Attorney;
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed August 10, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PER CURIAM: court, the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The panel opinion was vacated
By reason of an equally divided en banc by the grant of rehearing en banc.
PRADO, Circuit Judge, with whom KING,
WIENER, STEWART, and ELROD, Circuit
Judges, join:
"The right of jury trial in civil cases at
common law is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal
jurisprudence which is protected by the
Seventh Amendment. A right so
fundamental and sacred to the citizen,
whether guaranteed by the Constitution or
provided by statute, should be jealously
guarded by the courts."
The panel opinion thoroughly explains why
the evidence the jury heard in this case is
sufficient to support its verdict. See
Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836 (5th
Cir. 2008). Judge Clement's dissent ("the
dissent") to this court's order affirming
based on a tie en banc vote, however,
overlooks much of the evidence the jury
heard and ignores the standard of review
that we apply to jury verdicts.
By reading the dissent, one would be hard
pressed to even realize that a jury rendered
the verdict in this case. At the outset, the
dissent attempts to explain the standard of
review but fails to acknowledge the
deference we must accord to a jury's verdict.
We have repeatedly admonished that
our standard of review with respect
to a jury verdict is especially
deferential. As such, judgment as a
matter of law should not be granted
unless the facts and inferences point
so strongly and overwhelmingly in
the movant's favor that reasonable
jurors could not reach a contrary
conclusion.
"A jury verdict must be upheld unless there
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for
a reasonable jury to find as the jury did." We
must view the evidence the jury heard with
this deferential standard in mind.
A review of the full record-as laid out in
the panel opinion-reveals that the dissent is
merely quibbling with the jury's factual
findings. This oversteps our bounds as an
appellate court. The dissent presents nothing
more than a skewed version of the facts in
favor of the District Attorney's Office. Its
approach is directly contrary to the rule that
we must view all evidence and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's
verdict.
At bottom, the dissent seeks to retry this
case through the appellate process. This
approach abdicates this court's duty to
uphold a jury's verdict unless the facts point
so strongly in Connick's favor that no
reasonable jury could rule to the contrary.
Indeed, the fact that reasonable judges on
this court view the evidence differently
suggests that these factual disputes were for
the jury to resolve. As the extensive
discussion in the panel opinion
demonstrates, there was ample evidence to
allow the citizens of this New Orleans jury
to find for Thompson. Of course, this is an
extraordinary case with extraordinary facts.
Allowing this judgment to stand will not
subject municipalities to widespread
liability, as a holding that the need for
training was "so obvious" and the lack of
training "so likely" to create a constitutional
violation will apply only in the rare instance.
This is that rare case. The jury heard
substantial evidence that the District
Attorney's Office provided no Brady-
specific training, despite the known risk of
the exact type of systemic nondisclosure that
the failure to train caused here.
Acknowledging the proper standard of
review and viewing the jury's verdict in the
correct deferential light compels us to
uphold the jury's decision.
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit
Judge, with whom JONES, Chief Judge, and
JOLLY, SMITH, GARZA, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges, join, would reverse the
district court for the following reasons:
We believe it imperative to explain why the
result in this case should not encourage the
extension of single incident municipal
liability under Monell. John Thompson, the
plaintiff-appellee, was convicted of murder
and spent fourteen years on death row for a
crime he did not commit because
prosecutors failed to turn over a lab report in
a related case. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case,
he sought compensation for the years spent
in prison and on death row. The jury
awarded Thompson $14 million against the
Orleans Parish District Attorney in his
official capacity. This appeal asks whether
Harry Conmick, the District Attorney, was
deliberately indifferent to an obvious need to
train his assistants on their obligations under
Brady v. Maryland; it further asks whether a
lack in Brady training was the moving force
behind Thompson's constitutional injury.
The district court, and a panel of this court,
held that the evidence was legally sufficient
to support both of these claims. The panel
opinion was vacated by our order for en
banc rehearing.
Only under the most limited circumstances
may a municipality be held liable for the
individual constitutional torts of its
employees. Considering the strict standards
of culpability and causation applicable here,
we conclude that the evidence supporting
Thompson's claim was legally inadequate to
hold the District Attorney's Office liable for
this employee failure. Along similar lines,
we also conclude that the jury instructions
given on "deliberate indifference" were
plainly erroneous.
FACTS
In 1985, a few weeks before his murder trial,
John Thompson was tried and convicted of
attempted armed robbery. Because of the
attempted armed robbery conviction,
Thompson decided not to testify in his own
defense in his trial for the murder of
Raymond T. Liuzza, Jr. Thompson was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
Fourteen years later, in 1999, an investigator
in Thompson's habeas proceedings
discovered that prosecutors had failed to
turn over a crime lab report in the attempted
armed robbery case. That lab report
indicated that the perpetrator had type B
blood. Because Thompson has type 0 blood,
the attempted armed robbery conviction was
vacated. In 2002, the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted post-
conviction relief and reversed Thompson's
murder conviction, holding that the
improper attempted armed robbery
conviction had unconstitutionally deprived
Thompson of his right to testify in his own
defense at his murder trial. Thompson was
retried for Liuzza's murder in 2003 and
found not guilty.
After his release, Thompson brought suit
alleging various claims against the District
Attorney's Office, Connick, James
Williams, Eric Dubelier, and Eddie
Jordan-the District Attorney in 2003-in
their official capacities; and Connick in his
individual capacity (collectively,
"Defendants"). The only claim that
proceeded to trial was a claim under § 1983
for wrongful suppression of exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland.
Thompson presented two theories of liability
to the jury: (1) that the Brady violation was
due to an unconstitutional official policy of
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the District Attorney's Office, and (2) that
the Brady violation was caused by
Connick's deliberate indifference to an
obvious need to train, monitor, or supervise
his prosecutors. The jury found that the
Brady violation was not due to an official
policy of the District Attorney's Office, but
was due to a failure to train. The jury
awarded Thompson $14 million in damages.
Defendants filed timely motions for
judgment as a matter of law-before and
after the verdict-as well as a motion to
amend or alter the judgment and a motion
for a new trial. The district court denied all
of these motions, and Defendants appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
APPLICABLE LAW
. . . Judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate if "the court finds that a
reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the
party on that issue.".. . "[A] jury's freedom
to draw reasonable inferences does not
extend so far as to allow the jury to draw an
inference which amounts to mere
speculation and conjecture."...
Because we are reviewing a Monell verdict
against a government entity, our evidentiary
review must take into account that § 1983
Monell liability is fundamentally different
from an entity's vicarious liability,
predicated on respondeat superior, for its
employees' ordinary misconduct. Thus,
when a plaintiff seeks to impose § 1983
liability on a municipality for its failure to
train its employees, normal tort standards
are replaced with heightened standards of
culpability and causation. Liability will only
attach if the municipality was deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional rights of
citizens-a showing of negligence or even
gross negligence will not suffice. Errors of
judgment do not alone prove deliberate
indifference, nor is such heightened
culpability established simply by showing
that a municipality could have ordered more
or different training or even misjudged
whether training was necessary. Similarly,
to satisfy causation, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the failure to train was the
moving force behind the constitutional
violation--"but for" causation is not
enough. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
cautioned that if we neglect these stringent
standards, we risk collapsing the distinction
between vicarious liability and direct
liability. Heightened standards also guard
against the potentially "endless exercise of
second-guessing municipal employee-
training programs," a task for which federal
courts are ill suited.
To summarize, the requirements for
imposing liability upon a municipality for
the individual acts of its employees are
demanding. Relaxing these heightened
requirements would cause significant harm
to the interests underlying this demanding
evidentiary principle: "adopt[ing] lesser
standards of fault and causation would open
municipalities to unprecedented liability,"
"would result in de facto respondeat
superior liability," and would "engage the
federal courts in an endless exercise of
second-guessing municipal employee-
training programs." Therefore, we can hold
a municipality liable only where the
evidence demonstrates "unmistakable
culpability and clearly connected causation"
for the unconstitutional conduct of an
individual employee.
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the
Culpability
Evidence-
The Brady violation here was a failure of
one or more of the four assistant district
attorneys involved with Thompson's armed
robbery prosecution to turn over the crime
lab report to Thompson's counsel. It is
undisputed that the District Attorney's
Office did not provide formal in-house
training regarding Brady. It is also
undisputed that the assistant district
attorneys were familiar with the general rule
of Brady that evidence favorable to the
accused must be disclosed to the defense.
Thompson's burden was to prove that
Connick, the policymaker for the Orleans
Parish District Attorney's office, was
deliberately indifferent to the need to train
prosecutors in their Brady disclosure
obligations.
As this circuit has recently recognized, "it is
not enough for [Thompson] to show that the
[District Attorney's Office's] training
program is, in a general sense, wanting."
Instead, "the identified deficiency in a city's
training program must be closely related to
the ultimate injury." The plaintiff must
prove an affirmative to the question: "Would
the injury have been avoided had the
employee been trained under a program that
was not deficient in the identified respect?"
Every prosecutor understood his general
duty under Brady, so the identified
deficiency was not a failure to train on this
general duty, but was instead a failure to
train on how to handle specific types of
evidence such as the crime lab report at
issue.
There was evidence that some prosecutors
doubted whether Brady itself obligated the
production of evidence that was not
necessarily exculpatory. This confusion
seems to have arisen because the report
itself had the potential to be either
exculpatory or inculpatory--depending on
whether it matched Thompson's blood type.
Accepting that there was no training on the
Brady obligations pertaining to potentially
exculpatory crime lab reports, we must
determine whether the need for that training
was "so obvious" that a reasonable jury
could find that Connick was "deliberately
indifferent" to that need.
Thompson did not show any pattern of
similar Brady violations, and instead relies
exclusively on this single incident where
prosecutors failed to disclose his crime lab
report. In another case before this court, we
sustained the district court's conclusion that
twenty-five years of records involving this
District Attorney's Office (covering the time
period of Thompson's trial) revealed no
pattern of Brady violations. Connick
testified that the District Attorney's Office
handled tens of thousands of cases annually
around this time, and that in the ten years
prior to Thompson's case, only four
convictions were overturned based on Brady
violations, none of which was similar to the
violation at issue. So in only a minute
number of cases were convictions
overturned based on Brady violations, and
there was not a single instance involving the
failure to disclose a crime lab report or other
scientific evidence. Connick was not alerted
to a need for further Brady training-
especially not this specific type of Brady
training-by previous violations at the
District Attorney's Office.
Nor has Thompson been able to refer us to a
single reported opinion, issued before this
1985 prosecution, from the Supreme Court,
any of the circuit or district courts, or any
state court that involved a similar Brady
violation and thus might have alerted
Connick to the need for Brady training in
this area.
Thompson instead points to the following as
substantial evidence that the need for
training in this area was "so obvious" that a
failure to train constituted deliberate
indifference. First, Thompson argues that
Connick testified that he knew his
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prosecutors would frequently come into
contact with Brady evidence. Second, many
prosecutors testified that the law regarding
Brady contains "gray areas." Third,
Thompson noted that several of the assistant
district attorneys were only a few years out
of law school. Thompson also points to
intra-office discussions and opinions of
various assistant district attorneys from 1999
and later about whether the lab report was
evidence covered by Brady.
This type of evidence amounts to no more
than general observations that would apply
to any area of law and any number of district
attorney's offices throughout the country.
All district attorneys know that Brady
issues-along with many other areas of
constitutional law-are routine matters that
their assistants handle every day. Every
district attorney knows that nearly all issues
he deals with are shaded with "gray areas,"
whether they concern Brady, search and
seizure, Miranda, evidence of a defendant's
other crimes, expert witnesses, sentencing,
or many more. Incorrect prosecutorial
decisions in any of these areas may lead to
later reversal of convictions. Nearly all
district attorney's offices employ
prosecutors only a few years out of law
school. That there were different opinions
about Brady evidence, or any other issue
that may be raised among lawyers, should
surprise no one. All of this evidence
involves generic generalizations-not the
type of exacting evidence required to show
that Connick and the District Attorney's
Office were deliberately indifferent to an
obvious need to further train its professional
prosecutors. To the extent that this evidence
could be used to show that the
municipality's training was, in a general
sense, wanting, similar evidence could also
support a deliberate indifference finding
against any prosecutor's office for nearly
any error that leads to a reversal of a
conviction.
We cannot accept the argument that
generalized failure to train evidence sustains
a finding of official deliberate indifference.
[City of Canton v. Harris displayed] utmost
caution toward generalized failure to train
evidence:
Neither will it suffice to prove that
an injury or accident could have been
avoided if an officer had had better
or more training, sufficient to equip
him to avoid the particular injury-
causing conduct. Such a claim could
be made about almost any encounter
resulting in injury, yet not condemn
the adequacy of the program to
enable officers to respond properly
to the usual and recurring situations
with which they must deal. And
plainly, adequately trained officers
occasionally make mistakes; the fact
that they do says little about the
training program or the legal basis
for holding the city liable.
Because this case concerns the actions of
licensed attorneys who have independent
professional obligations to know and uphold
the law, there is even more reason than in
City of Canton... not to rely on generalized
statements about lack of training. Training is
what differentiates attorneys from average
public employees. A public employer is
entitled to assume that attorneys will abide
by the standards of the profession, which
include both ethical and practical
requirements. Thus, prosecutors are
personally responsible as professionals to
know what Brady entails and when to
perform legal research to understand the
"gray areas." To hold a public employer
liable for failing to train professionals in
their profession is an awkward theory. By
analogy, it is highly unlikely that a
municipality could be held liable for failing
to train a doctor it employed in diagnostic
nuances. Mere nostrums about training in
Brady, a basic due process principle of
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criminal procedure, will not suffice.
As a matter of probability, if violations were
the "highly predictable consequence" of a
failure to train, then we would expect to see
more than just one violation in hundreds or
thousands of cases. Thompson has, as a
legal matter, failed to prove that his
violation was the "highly predictable
consequence" of failing to train prosecutors.
This means that the need for training was
not "so obvious," and thus that Connick was
not "deliberately indifferent" to Thompson's
constitutional rights.
. . . Because the District Attorney's Office
had a policy of disclosing all crime lab
reports, there was no need to train on the
specifics of which reports would or would
not be covered by Brady. Just as a municipal
policymaker could not be found deliberately
indifferent to citizens' Brady rights if the
policymaker established clear policies-
such as an open-file policy-to protect those
rights, Connick cannot be considered
"deliberately indifferent" to a Brady
violation based on a failure to disclose a
crime lab report when his employees
generally understood that they had to
disclose exactly those types of reports.
For these reasons, under Monell, City of
Canton, and Bryan County [v. Brown], the
evidence in this record does not support the
conclusion that Connick was deliberately
indifferent to an obvious need for training.
Consequently, the District Attorney cannot
be held liable for the failure by his
employees to disclose this crime lab report.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence-
Causation
Nor does the diffuse evidence of Brady
misunderstanding among several assistant
district attorneys satisfy the causation
requirements relating to the violation at
issue here. The specific question we ask is
whether Connick's failure to provide in-
house training was the moving force behind
the failure to turn over the lab report .... If
Thompson did not submit substantial
evidence that the failure to produce the lab
report was caused by confusion over Brady,
the jury could not have reasonably
concluded that the lack of training was the
direct cause of Thompson's injury, and
judgment as a matter of law is required.
Thompson based his case upon a single
causation theory: that one or more of the
assistant district attorneys involved in
Thompson's prosecution decided not to turn
over the report because they did not know
that they were legally obligated to produce it
and that training sessions on Brady would
have avoided this incident. To prove his
theory, Thompson must present substantial
evidence from which a jury reasonably
could conclude that the failure of Connick to
provide training sessions on Brady was the
actual cause of and the moving force behind
the failure to produce the report. The
precedents require substantial evidence of
direct causation. This standard demands
more than evidence of confusion over
Brady's "gray areas" in the District
Attorney's Office. Finally, Thompson must
establish that this lack of understanding
would have been remedied by an in-house
training program.
Thompson's brief fails to point out any such
evidence to sustain municipal liability. As
best we understand his brief, the only
arguments he makes regarding causation are
these: (1) the record supports the conclusion
that these four prosecutors knew about the
blood evidence and yet failed to disclose it;
and (2) the jury was free to reject Connick's
theory of a single rogue prosecutor. Even if
we accept both of these assertions as correct,
they still fail completely to establish that the
Brady violation was caused by unfamiliarity
with Brady. And because Thompson bore
the burden of proof, he had to do more than
simply assert that the jury was free to reject
Connick's explanations for the violation.
Thompson had to put forth substantial
evidence supporting his own theory of
causation: that the assistant district attorney
(or attorneys) responsible for the
constitutional violation did not understand
Brady, that this lack of understanding
caused the failure to produce the report, and
that Brady training could have resolved this
lack of understanding.
The record fails to establish, by substantial
evidence, that the actual cause and moving
force behind the constitutional violation of
not producing the lab report was the failure
of the District Attorney to have in-house
training sessions on Brady. For example, an
assistant district attorney's confusion
regarding whether Brady applied to
impeachment evidence may show a need for
enlightening this assistant but is irrelevant
here because the lab report clearly was not
impeachment evidence and would not have
been turned over on that basis. The policy
manual, although incomplete in its
instructions on Brady evidence and post-
dating Thompson's trial by several years,
does little to establish the necessary direct
causal link, and the jury concluded in its
verdict that the violation was not due to an
established municipal policy.
Thus, even assuming that Connick was
deliberately indifferent to a need for
training, Thompson failed as a matter of law
to show that the lack of training was the
actual cause of the constitutional violation.
Therefore the judgment should be reversed
and rendered for the defendant.
C. Jury Instructions
CONCLUSION
* . . The Supreme Court has stated clearly
and emphatically that the liability of
municipalities is limited to cases where a
municipal action caused the constitutional
violation. The plaintiff must show the
"requisite degree of culpability" on the part
of the municipality-deliberate indifference
to an obvious need for training-and must
demonstrate a "direct causal link" between
the failure to train and the constitutional
violation.
Thompson failed to produce substantial
evidence to support his claim that the
District Attorney was deliberately
indifferent to an obvious need for training of
his staff. And he failed to produce adequate
evidence of causation to show that the
failure to train was the actual cause and
moving force behind the failure to produce
the lab report. Thompson has, in short, failed
to meet the heightened standards for
culpability and causation imposed by
Monel!, City of Canton, and Bryan County,
and we would therefore reverse the district
court's judgment.
John THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Harry F. CONNICK, in his official capacity as District Attorney; Eric Dubelier, in his
official capacity as Assistant District Attorney; James Williams, in his official capacity as
Assistant District Attorney; Eddie Jordan, in his official capacity as District Attorney;
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed August 10, 2008
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PRADO, Circuit Judge:
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
held that due process requires the
prosecution in a criminal case to turn over
evidence that is favorable to the accused
when the evidence is material to guilt or
punishment. The Supreme Court later
expanded the Brady rule to require the
disclosure of evidence that is relevant to the
credibility of key government witnesses. In
the criminal proceedings that prompted this
lawsuit, it is undisputed that Brady evidence
was not turned over to the defense. As a
result, Plaintiff-Appellee John Thompson
("Thompson") was convicted of an
attempted armed robbery of which he was
actually innocent. Attorneys in the Orleans
Parish District Attorney's Office ("the DA's
Office") then used the attempted armed
robbery conviction to help secure a
conviction and death sentence for Thompson
in an unrelated murder case. Eighteen years
later-and one month before his scheduled
execution-Thompson's investigators
uncovered the exculpatory evidence that
indisputably cleared Thompson of the armed
robbery charge. Thompson was then retried
for the murder and found not guilty.
Thompson now seeks damages for the
eighteen years he spent in prison, fourteen of
which were in solitary confinement on death
row. After a jury trial tasting several days,
the jury determined that the DA's Office
was deliberately indifferent to the need to
train, monitor, and supervise its attorneys on
Brady principles. The jury awarded
Thompson $14 million in damages, and the
district court added approximately $1
million in attorneys' fees. Defendants
challenge that result on multiple grounds.
Finding no reversible error for the majority
of Defendants' arguments, we AFFIRM in
large part. Because the district court
erroneously included non-liable defendants
in the judgment, we REVERSE in part and
REMAND with instructions to remove those
defendants from the judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
III. DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendants next contend that the evidence
admitted at trial does not support a finding
of deliberate indifference .... [O]ur standard
of review with respect to a jury verdict is
especially deferential. We can reverse the
jury's verdict only if "the facts and
inferences point so strongly and
overwhelmingly in the movant's favor that
reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary
conclusion." . . . We may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence.
Here, the jury rejected Thompson's
argument that Connick's Brady policy was
unconstitutional but accepted the argument
that Connick was deliberately indifferent to
the need to train on Brady issues. On appeal,
Defendants set forth numerous arguments as
to why the jury could not reasonably have
concluded that Connick, acted with
deliberate indifference.
1. No Pattern of Similar Violations
Defendants first argue that there was no
evidence of a pattern of similar Brady
violations and that such a pattern is
necessary to establish deliberate
indifference. Thompson does not argue that
there was evidence of a pattern, but instead
contends that evidence of a pattern is not
always necessary for a finding of deliberate
indifference.
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court set the
degree of fault for a failure-to-train case as
deliberate indifference. In elaborating on
that standard, the Court stated that
it may happen that in light of the
duties assigned to specific officers or
employees the need for more or
different training is so obvious, and
the inadequacy so likely to result in
the violation of constitutional rights,
that the policymakers of the city can
reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need.
The Court then included an example in a
footnote:
"For example, city policymakers
know to a moral certainty that their
police officers will be required to
arrest fleeing felons. The city has
armed its officers with firearms, in
part to allow them to accomplish this
task. Thus, the need to train officers
in the constitutional limitations on
the use of deadly force can be said to
be "so obvious," that failure to do so
could properly be characterized as
"deliberate indifference" to
constitutional rights. It could also be
that the police, in exercising their
discretion, so often violate
constitutional rights that the need for
further training must have been
plainly obvious to the city
policymakers, who, nevertheless, are
"deliberately indifferent" to the need.
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized two
possible methods of showing deliberate
indifference: (1) when the need for training
is obvious based on the nature of the
conduct at issue and the potential for harm
and (2) when there is a pattern of violations
that makes it obvious to city policymakers
that more training is necessary.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that a pattern of constitutional
violations is not always a prerequisite to a
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showing of deliberate indifference.
However, the Court has limited those
situations to circumstances in which the
need for training is "obvious" and when the
violation of rights is a "highly predictable
consequence" of the failure to train.
. . . [T]his court has explicitly recognized
that a single incident of misconduct can, in
the right circumstances, give rise to a claim
of deliberate indifference. Consequently, the
fact that Thompson did not establish a
pattern of Brady violations by the DA's
Office is not dispositive of his claims.
Further, the evidence developed at trial
clearly demonstrates that this case falls
within the Supreme Court's description of
the narrow range of situations that do not
require a pattern of misconduct before
deliberate indifference can be shown. Here,
there was evidence that Connick was aware
that the attorneys in the DA's Office would
be required to confront Brady issues on a
regular basis and that failure to properly
handle those issues would result in
constitutional violations for criminal
defendants....
There was also evidence that the need to
train about Brady was obvious. Many of the
attorney witnesses in this case testified that
Brady was a "gray" area, subject to
interpretation....
Besides the difficulty in interpreting Brady,
there was evidence that many of the
attorneys in the DA's Office were only a
few years out of law school, and thus
lacking the legal experience that could have
helped them clarify Brady issues without
additional training.
Thus, the jury heard evidence that attorneys,
often fresh out of law school, would
undoubtedly be required to confront Brady
issues while at the DA's Office, that
erroneous decisions regarding Brady
evidence would result in serious
constitutional violations, that resolution of
Brady issues was often unclear, and that
training in Brady would have been helpful.
Consequently, Thompson has met his
burden of demonstrating that it was obvious
that training about Brady was necessary and
that a highly predictable consequence of
failing to train attorneys about Brady was
the infringement of the constitutional rights
of those accused of crimes, such as
Thompson. No pattern of similar violations
was necessary to put Connick on notice that
training on Brady's requirements was
needed. Therefore, under the tests set out in
City of Canton and Board of the County
Commissioners v. Brown, Thompson did not
need to prove a pattern of Brady violations
to demonstrate that the failure to train was
deliberately indifferent, and the district court
did not err in denying Thompson's motion
for judgment as a matter of law on that
ground.
2. Deegan's Act Broke Causation
Defendants next contend that Deegan's
unanticipated action in intentionally hiding
the blood evidence in violation of Connick's
policy requires the conclusion that Connick
was not deliberately indifferent and breaks
any causal link between the alleged failure
to train and Thompson's injury. Thompson
responds that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclude that Deegan was not
solely responsible for the constitutional
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violations in this case.
Defendants first argue that there must be
evidence that Connick knew of and failed to
control Deegan's "known propensity" for
violating the constitutional rights of others
to demonstrate deliberate indifference. This
assertion is incorrect. . . . [F]ailing to
demonstrate that Deegan had a known
propensity for hiding Brady material is not
dispositive of Thompson's claim; he did not
pursue that theory of liability but rather
alleged a failure to adequately train,
supervise, and monitor.
Defendants next cite the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Shaw v. Stroud for the
proposition that a supervisor cannot
reasonably be expected to guard against the
deliberate criminal acts of his properly
trained employees when he has no basis
upon which to anticipate the misconduct.
Although we have no grounds to disagree
with that statement, the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning is not entirely applicable in this
case. Shaw refers to anticipating misconduct
from "properly trained employees." As
discussed later in this opinion, there was
evidence that the attorneys in this case were
not trained on Brady's requirements.
Therefore, Shaw does not mandate a verdict
for Defendants.
Defendants also generally allege that
Deegan's confession to Riehhnann
exculpates them from any failure to train
because Deegan intentionally acted against
his training in suppressing the evidence.
However, Defendants read more into
Deegan's statement to Riehlmann than is
actually there....
[A]lthough there was evidence that
Deegan acted alone, there is also evidence
from which the jury could have believed that
others had a hand in failing to turn over the
exculpatory evidence.
In sum, then, drawing all inferences in favor
of Thompson, a reasonable jury could have
believed that the constitutional violations in
this case were not solely attributable to
Deegan's alleged criminal conduct, but
instead were the result of confusion over
Brady by various attorneys in the DA's
Office....
3. The Blood Evidence Was Obviously
Exculpatory
Next, Defendants assert that because the
blood evidence was obviously exculpatory
and withholding the evidence was such a
clear violation of the law, no training could
have helped in this instance....
The problem with Defendants' argument in
this case is that several of Defendants' own
witnesses contended that the blood
evidence' was not Brady material in the
absence of knowledge of Thompson's blood
type ....
Therefore, despite Defendants' current
argument on appeal, Defendants' position at
trial was less than clear about whether the
evidence at issue was obviously exculpatory.
Given Defendants' conflicting claims, there
is no cause to overturn the verdict on the
ground that the material was obviously
exculpatory.
4. Connick Provided Adequate Training,
Supervision, and Monitoring
Defendants' next contention is that Connick
provided adequate training in the form of
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on-the-job training, Saturday training
sessions, dissemination of memos and case
opinions, and counseling. Further, each
attorney had received training in law school
and participated in self-training after law
school....
Although there was some evidence in this
case that attorneys in the DA's Office might
have received some training, the jury was
entitled to believe the ample evidence that
the attorneys received no training on
Brady's requirements. None of the three
prosecutors involved in Thompson's
prosecutions recalled receiving any Brady-
specific training....
Other attorneys in the DA's Office at the
time of Thompson's prosecutions testified
consistently. . . . Indeed, the government
stipulated that "[n]one of the district
attorney witnesses recalled any specific
training session concerning Brady prior to or
at the time of the 1985 prosecutions of Mr.
Thompson." That is, no prosecutor testified
about a specific example of Brady-related
on-the-job training, Brady-related Saturday
training sessions, Brady-related advance
sheets, or counseling or pretrial of a case
that resulted in Brady-specific discussions.
This evidence supported the jury's finding
that Connick failed to adequately train his
attorneys on Brady and lent credence to the
district court's conclusion that Thompson
did not need to prove a pattern of similar
violations, as discussed above.
5. Miscellaneous Arguments
C. Jury Instructions
D. Exclusion of Guilt-Related Evidence
E. Amount of Damages
Defendants next argue that the $14 million
in damages awarded by the jury is excessive
and not warranted by the evidence....
Given the entirety of the testimony about
Thompson's experiences and suffering as a
result of his wrongful incarceration, we
cannot say that the jury clearly erred in
awarding him $14 million in damages or
that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to order a remittitur.
Defendants also make a passing assertion
that similar cases have resulted in awards of,
at most, $400,000 a year, whereas here,
Thompson received over $700,000 a year
for his eighteen years of imprisonment.
However, Defendants fail to cite to a single
Louisiana case in which the appropriate
amount of damages for a wrongful
incarceration was at issue. Further, neither
case cited by Defendants concerned an
individual who had been wrongfully
sentenced to death. Therefore, we find this
claim unavailing and affirm the decision of
the district court to deny Defendants'
request for a remittitur.
F. Attorneys' Fees
IV. CONCLUSION
Giving due deference to the district court's
decision and the jury's verdict, we find no
reversible error in this case other than the
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naming of non-liable parties in the
judgment. Therefore, we REVERSE IN
PART and REMAND with instructions to
remove the non-liable defendants from the
judgment. However, we AFFIRM the
remainder of the district court's judgment.
Costs shall be borne by Defendants.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, and REMANDED.
"Supreme Court to Rule on
Prosecutorial Immunity"
The Blog of LegalTimes
March 22, 2010
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court agreed this morning to
rule on a Louisiana dispute that could be an
important test of prosecutorial immunity in a
death penalty case.
In Connick v. Thompson, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed a lower
court verdict that awarded accused murderer
John Thompson $14 million for the district
attorney's failure to train its lawyers about
so-called Brady violations, a failure that led
to his wrongful conviction and death
sentence in 1985.
Current Orleans Parish District Attorney
Leon Cannizaro Jr. appealed the ruling to
the Supreme Court, asserting that upholding
the 5th Circuit's decision "exposes district
attorney's offices to vicarious liability for a
wide range of prosecutorial misconduct."
The National District Attorneys' Association
filed a brief also expressing concern that
liability based on a single failure-to-train
claim create the "alarming prospect" that the
strong tradition of prosecutorial immunity
will be eroded.
Thompson was accused of an unrelated
armed robbery in addition to murder in the
1984 death of Raymond Liuzza Jr. The
armed robbery trial preceded the murder
trial, and prosecutors hoped a conviction in
the first case would preclude Thompson
from testifying in his murder trial.
Thompson's lawyers later learned that
prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence
in the robbery trial that the perpetrator had a
different blood type from Thompson's. He
was found guilty of robbery and did not
testify at his murder trial. Thompson's
lawyers claim the prosecutors' failure to
reveal the evidence-a violation of
prosecutors' obligation under Brady v.
Maryland-deprived him of the right to
testify in his murder trial. Lower courts
agreed and a trial ensued that resulted in the
jury award against the prosecutor.
The Supreme Court faced a major
prosecutorial misconduct case earlier in the
term-Pottawattamie County v. McGhee-
but the parties reached a settlement after oral
argument, removing the case from the
docket. The case granted today will be
argued in the fall....
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"Blood Money"
Best of New Orleans
January 12, 2009
David Winkler-Schmit
New Orleans District Attorney Leon
Cannizzaro has enough on his plate trying to
put today's criminals in jail with scant
resources, but now he also has to clean up a
mess left by some of his predecessors.
For starters, the DA's office may have to
pay a $15 million civil judgment awarded
after a prosecutor under former DA Harry
Conmck Sr. admitted he withheld evidence
in a murder trial more than 20 years ago. In
that case, John Thompson spent 14 years on
death row at Angola and was later acquitted
of the murder after a second trial. The case
could have been settled long ago for
substantially less, but former DA Eddie
Jordan refused to negotiate. Now
Cannizzaro has to figure out how to pay for
those mistakes.
Financially, the Thompson case is the
largest of its kind in New Orleans history
and could lead to taxpayers paying for more
prosecutorial misconduct. Last month, a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a jury decision
awarding Thompson $14 million in damages
and $1 million in attorney fees because the
DA's office failed to properly train, monitor
and supervise its attorneys on evidence
disclosure.
Last week, Cannizzaro reportedly began
exploring the possibility of asking the state
to let his office declare bankruptcy. The only
other alternative is to ask taxpayers to pick
up the tab.
The Thompson case is a cautionary tale of
prosecutorial misconduct.
On Jan. 17, 1985, Thompson was charged
with the murder of hotel executive Ray
Liuzza, who was robbed and killed a month
earlier. Before that case went to trial,
Connick's office convicted Thompson of
armed robbery in an unrelated case.
Thompson's attorneys in the murder case,
knowing that prosecutors would use the
armed robbery conviction against him if he
testified in his own defense, advised him not
to take the stand in the murder trial, which
lasted three days. Thompson, who had 4-
year-old and 6-year-old sons at the time, was
convicted and sentenced to death.
Fourteen years later-just one month before
he was scheduled to be executed by lethal
inj ection-investigators working for
Thompson discovered the DA's office had
withheld blood evidence that would have
exonerated him of the armed robbery. It took
another four years for Thompson to win a
new trial on the murder charge, on grounds
he was deprived of his constitutional right to
testify in his own defense. Thompson
testified in the second trial, and his attorneys
presented other DA-withheld evidence-
including police and incident reports,
witness statements, and eyewitnesses to the
crime. This time, a jury deliberated 35
minutes before acquitting Thompson.
In July 2003, Thompson filed a civil suit
against the Orleans DA's office, seeking
damages for the time he spent in prison. His
attorney, Michael Banks, who has worked
on the case with Gordon Cooney since 1988,
says their goal wasn't to win a big check for
Thompson. All the two attorneys hoped for
was enough money to get Thompson back
on his feet with a place to live, education
and some job training.
"One of the things about death row, as you
can imagine, there's no vocational training,"
Banks says. "What are you going to train
for? To die? You're trained to have a needle
stuck in your arm and injected with fatal
chemicals."
Before filing the suit, Banks says he and
Cooney contacted Jordan's office and made
it very clear they were willing to negotiate.
Jordan's office rebuffed them repeatedly.
"Not $10,000 ... $100,000... $1 million-
not anything," Banks says.
In early 2007, jurors in the civil suit deemed
the DA's office under Connick had shown
"deliberate indifference" to training
attorneys in policies and procedures with
regard to "Brady material"--a legal
reference to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in the case of Brady v. Maryland,
which requires prosecutors to turn over
evidence favorable to a defendant when it is
material to the defendant's guilt or
punishment.
During Thompson's trial for the unrelated
armed robbery, assistant DA Gerry Deegan
knowingly withheld evidence-a pant leg
that had the perpetrator's blood on it. The
blood on the pant leg was type B, but
Thompson is blood type 0. Years later, on
his deathbed in 1994, Deegan admitted his
misconduct to another attorney. He died
shortly thereafter of cancer.
Cannizzaro has asked the appellate court for
a rehearing, but he admits Thompson was
wronged. He maintains, however, that
Connick did provide training with regard to
Brady material and that the office shouldn't
be held liable. Cannizzaro spent the early
part of his career as a prosecutor in
Connick's office; he was elected judge at
Criminal District Court several years before
the Thompson case.
"This is the most egregious of
circumstances," Cannizzaro says. "I don't
know if training would necessarily have
helped anyone here, because someone opted
to go out and literally break the law."
Thompson, who now directs the nonprofit
Resurrection After Exoneration, which helps
wrongfully convicted people adjust to life
outside of prison, disagrees with
Cannizzaro. He says the DA's office was
more concerned with convictions than
making sure the right person was
incarcerated.
"This is what we hired Harry Connick to do
as a prosecutor," Thompson says. "We
asked him to train his people to make sure
they protect our rights. I don't care if
[Connick had a problem with murders]-I
don't want him to send an innocent man to
jail."
So far, the courts have agreed with
Thompson. In addition to asking for a
rehearing before the three-judge appellate
panel that unanimously ruled against the
DA's office, Cannizzaro will request all the
Fifth Circuit judges to hear the case. Banks
says such an "en banc" hearing is rare and
that Cannizzaro's chances of prevailing are
slim.
"When you get a unanimous opinion like
this, it is much less likely," Banks says.
As for individual responsibility for
prosecutorial misconduct, federal and state
courts traditionally have accorded
prosecutors wide-ranging immunity from
civil lawsuits. In 2005, however, the
264
Louisiana Supreme Court suspended former
Orleans Parish assistant DA Roger Jordan
for withholding testimony from the defense
in the 1995 murder trial of Shareef Cousin.
In that trial, Cousin was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death. After
the evidence was produced two years later,
Cousin's conviction was overturned and he
was removed from death row. The court
gave Roger Jordan a three-month suspended
sentence for his misconduct.
Dane Ciolino, a Loyola University law
professor, notes that Brady cases take a long
time to develop, so it is possible more will
surface from the Connick era. Innocence
Project New Orleans, a nonprofit group,
recently released a damning report on
Connick's 29-year tenure that claimed four
innocent men were sentenced to death
because prosecutors withheld evidence. Still,
Ciolino says the Thompson case doesn't set
a legal precedent. The fiscal ramifications,
however, are substantial.
"Fourteen million (dollars) is huge," Ciolino
says. "Keep in mind these weren't the
actions of a few rogue prosecutors; rather
they were a pattern of practice in the DA's
office at the time.
If the Thompson judgment is upheld, it will
be the largest-but not the only-civil
judgment hanging over Cannizzaro's office,
which has an annual budget of about $11
million. In 2005, 40 former DA employees
were awarded $1.9 million in a federal racial
discrimination suit against Eddie Jordan for
firing them after he took office. The DA
dragged out the appeals process, and the
$1.9 million grew with interest to $3.7
million by late 2007. The state and the city
agreed to lend the DA's office $2.7 million
for the judgment-$1.7 million from the
state and $1 million from the city-but the
office must pay both the city and state
$100,000 a year until the loan is repaid. The
first payment to the state is due in 2010; the
city's repayment process starts in December
of this year.
Cannizzaro says he has a legal obligation to
try to overturn the Thompson decision,
adding he will appeal the case all the way to
the Supreme Court if necessary. Once the
appeal process is exhausted, Cannizzaro
says he would consider negotiating a
settlement with Thompson. Cannizzaro filed
a request with the state for permission to file
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, but as of Friday
he had withdrawn that request. Banks says
he sympathizes with Cannizzaro and is
willing to negotiate a settlement, but time is
running out.
"[Cannizzaro] is cleaning up a mess that was
created in part by predecessors, but now he's
the guy with the broom," Banks says. "You
can sit around and complain all you want
that there's a mess on the floor of your
kitchen, but if it's your kitchen, you have to
clean it."
"Prosecutor Conduct Case Before
Supreme Court Is Settled"
Los Angeles Times
January 5, 2010
David G. Savage
A Supreme Court case testing whether a
prosecutor can be sued for framing suspects
for a murder ended Monday when an Iowa
county agreed to pay $12 million to two men
who were freed after spending 26 years in
prison.
In the past, the high court had said
prosecutors could not be sued for doing their
jobs, even if they sometimes convicted the
wrong defendant. And in November, an
Obama administration lawyer argued on
behalf of Pottawattamie County, asserting
that there is no constitutional "right not to be
framed."
But several justices said they found that
argument appalling. They signaled they
were not prepared to shield prosecutors who
knowingly fabricated a case against a
suspect.
Over the holidays, the county and its
lawyers offered to settle the case by paying
$12 million to Terry Harrington and Curtis
McGhee, who were convicted as teenagers
in 1978 of murdering a night security guard.
Both men are black.
On Monday, the Supreme Court said it was
dismissing the case because it was settled.
"We're delighted to have this settled. It has
been a long time coming for them," said
Doug McCalla, a lawyer who sued on behalf
of Harrington. "Cases like Terry's make it
very clear that we need the powerful
remedies provided by this country's civil
rights statutes."
Harrington was a high school football star in
Omaha when a retired police officer was
shot and killed at a car dealership in nearby
Council Bluffs, Iowa, in the summer of
1977.
A white suspect was identified by a witness,
and after he was arrested, he failed a lie
detector test.
But police changed direction after they
picked up a 16-year-old black youth for
stealing cars. When pressed for information
on the Council Bluffs killing, he fingered
Harrington and another black youth.
Although his initial statements were
inaccurate on key details, including the
weapon, police and prosecutors relied on the
16-year-old to build a murder case.
Despite their claims of innocence, the two
men were convicted before an all-white jury
and sentenced to long prison terms.
Decades later, they were able to obtain
official files showing that police and
prosecutors Dave Richter and Joe Hrvol
coaxed the witness to implicate them, while
ignoring evidence that pointed to the white
suspect. The sole witness against the two
men recanted his testimony.
The Iowa courts overturned their
convictions five years ago. Harrington and
McGhee then sued the county, prosecutors
and police in federal court for violating their
civil rights, alleging that the prosecutors
knowingly used false testimony to convict
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them.
The prosecutors said they still believed
Harrington and McGhee were guilty.
In the Supreme Court, a lawyer for the
prosecutors agreed that police could be sued
for fabricating evidence, but not prosecutors,
even if they worked together.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said that was
''a strange proposition."
Justice John Paul Stevens called it
"'perverse."
Facing a likely loss in the high court, the
county moved to settle the case.
267
"Supreme Court Will Hear another Prosecutorial
Misconduct Case (and May Even Get
to Rule This Time)"
Reason
March 23, 2010
Jacob Sullum
Yesterday the Supreme Court agreed to hear
a challenge to a $14 million award that a
wrongly convicted Louisiana man won after
serving 18 years in prison, 14 of them in
solitary confinement on death row. New
Orleans prosecutors who tried John
Thompson for armed robbery in 1985 failed
to turn over blood evidence that would have
exonerated him. Then they used the robbery
conviction to prevent Thompson from taking
the stand in his murder trial and to obtain a
death sentence (by noting that he had
already been sentenced to 50 years without
parole for the armed robbery). After an
investigator working for Thompson's
attorneys discovered the blood evidence in
1999, Thompson received a new trial on the
murder charge and was acquitted.
A federal jury concluded that the district
attorney's office was liable because it failed
to properly train its prosecutors, who should
have known they were constitutionally
obligated to share exculpatory evidence with
the defense. A 5th Circuit panel
unanimously upheld the verdict on appeal,
and the full court split evenly on the
question, allowing the jury's decision to
stand. Asking the Supreme Court to review
the case, former Orleans Parish District
Attorney Harry Connick Sr. argued that his
office should not be held responsible for
depriving Thompson of his right to due
process because Thompson had not shown a
pattern of misconduct or demonstrated a
direct connection between a lack of training
and the error that led to his conviction. (If
the prosecutors deliberately withheld the
evidence, meaning that lack of training was
not really the issue, would that make their
office less culpable or more?) More
controversially, Connick claimed the
rationale for granting prosecutors personal
immunity-that the threat of lawsuits would
have a chilling effect on their ability to do
their jobs-also applies to the government's
liability. The implication seems to be that
the proper pursuit of justice requires
preventing victims of injustice like
Thompson, who was nearly executed on
several occasions, from recovering any
damages at all.
• . . Another recent Supreme Court case,
Pottawattamie County v. MeGhee and
Harrington, involved the related but distinct
question of when prosecutors can be held
personally liable because they screwed over
defendants while functioning as
investigators rather than prosecutors. That
case . . . was settled for $12 million before
the Court issued a ruling.
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"Questioning Protection: U.S. Supreme Court Agrees
to Take another Look at Prosecutorial Immunity"
Pennsylvania Law Weekly
April 13, 2010
Matthew T. Mangino
John Thompson spent 18 years in prison for
a robbery and murder he did not commit.
In fact, he was only months away from
execution while on Louisiana's death row.
Thompson's fight for freedom was a long
and tortured story of misdeeds, wrongful
convictions and delay.
Thompson's case included after-discovered
evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, a death-
bed confession, a last-minute stay of
execution, exoneration and a multi-million
dollar verdict. It had all the makings of a
Hollywood blockbuster. In fact, The Nine
Lives of John Thompson, starring Matt
Damon, is already in production.
The full story of John Thompson and the
legacy of his prosecution, conviction and
exoneration, is unfinished, however.
Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
to hear the Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office appeal to John
Thompson's $14 million verdict in Connick
v. Thompson. The suit alleged that
Thompson's civil rights were violated when
the district attorney's office failed to train
prosecutors regarding their responsibilities
under Brady v. Maryland.
n Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that the failure to disclose evidence
favorable to the accused violated due
process where the evidence was material to
either guilt or punishment. In the 1972 case
Giglio v. United States, the high court
expanded on Brady, holding that a
prosecutor's failure to disclose a promise of
leniency made to a material witness that
could be used for purposes of impeachment
violated due process.
In this case, the Brady question is raised in
the context of absolute immunity for
prosecutors. Absolute immunity has long
protected prosecutors from litigation
attacking the exercise of their core public
functions. Without absolute immunity, a
prosecutor may be subject to an unnecessary
depletion of resources and the unavoidable
distractions that come with defending
countless challenges to the decision-making
process.
Last term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein. The court
unanimously extended absolute immunity to
claims that supervising prosecutors failed to
train subordinate prosecutors on their
obligation to disclose impeachment evidence
as required by Giglio. The high court held
individual prosecutors are immune from
suits alleging failure to "adequately train and
supervise deputy district attorneys" on
disclosure obligations, and "failure to create
any system" for managing impeachment
evidence.
The Supreme Court is now being asked to
decide whether a single-incident failure-to-
train claim that is covered by absolute
immunity for an individual prosecutor
pursuant to Van de Kamp can stand against a
district attorney's office pursuant to a 42
U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action.
The facts of Thompson are compelling.
Thompson and an accomplice were arrested
for the 1984 robbery and murder of a man
outside his New Orleans home. As a result,
Thompson's photograph was in the
newspaper.
The victim of a separate robbery identified
Thompson, through the newspaper, as her
assailant. Thompson was arrested for the
second robbery. The robbery investigation
revealed blood on the clothing of one of the
victims. The blood was earmarked for
testing.
The same two assistant district attorneys
were assigned to Thompson's pending
murder and robbery trials. They made a
tactical decision to try the robbery before the
murder. The rationale was that a robbery
conviction against Thompson would keep
him from testifying at his murder trial. A
robbery conviction could also be useful in
obtaining a death sentence at the murder
trial.
The blood from the robbery was tested on
the eve of trial and found not to be that of
Thompson. The blood test was not provided
to the defense as required by Brady. Instead,
the test was buried and a third prosecutor
actually removed the blood stained clothing
from the evidence room.
The trials proceeded as planned by the
district's office. Thompson was convicted of
robbery, he did not testify during his murder
trial and the robbery victims testified during
the penalty phase following his murder
conviction. Thompson was sentenced to
death.
A BURIED BLOOD TEST
Fast forward 14 years and Thompson was on
death row. He was scheduled for execution
when a defense investigator found the buried
blood test. A subsequent test of Thompson's
blood eliminated him as the offender in the
robbery. It was then revealed that the
assistant district attorney who removed the
blood evidence was stricken with terminal
cancer and made a death bed confession
regarding the disposal of the evidence.
Thompson's murder conviction was
overturned by the Louisiana Court of
Appeals due to the fact that his robbery
conviction-now overturned-deprived him
of his right to testify in his own defense
during his murder trial. Thompson was
awarded a new trial and subsequently found
not guilty.
He sued the Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office. The jury found that the
district attorney's office showed "deliberate
indifference" to establishing policies and
procedures to avoid unconstitutional Brady
violations. The jury awarded Thompson $14
million and an additional $1 million in legal
fees. A divided en banc panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the verdict.
The issue before the Supreme Court is
whether a single-instance of failure-to-train
gives rise to municipal liability, in this
instance a district attorney's office, and
whether such a claim is compatible with the
court's previous decision affirming absolute
immunity for failure-to-train as it applied to
the occupants of that municipal body.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
municipal liability for failure-to-train under
Monell v. Department of Social Services,
City of Canton v. Harris and Board of the
County Commissioners of Bryan County v.
Brown.
Beyond the issue of municipal liability, the
U.S. Supreme Court has shown a recent
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interest in prosecutorial immunity.
Last term, it was Van de Kamp and another
major prosecutorial immunity case,
Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, was
argued earlier this term before the parties
reached a settlement.
The limits of prosecutorial immunity have
garnered the attention of prosecutors across
the country. The National District Attorneys
Association filed a brief expressing concern
that liability based on a single-incident of
failure-to-train created an "alarming
prospect" that the strong tradition of
prosecutorial immunity may begin to erode.
Why are prosecutors concerned?
Holding an office liable for the conduct of
its occupants, when those occupants
individually have absolute immunity seems
to abrogate the very holding of Imbler v.
Pachtman and Van de Kamp. If a district
attorney's office were subject to the same
litigation that is barred against its
employees, how are those individual
prosecutors protected from the "judgment-
distorting burdens of litigation" protected
through Imbler and Van de Kamp?
In Thompson, the very prosecutors who
committed the egregious acts of withholding
and destroying exculpatory evidence would
be protected by absolute immunity. Their
office, on the other hand, would not be
protected by immunity on the premise that
the office failed to train when, in fact, there
is scant evidence that training would have
had any impact on preventing the intentional
misdeeds by the prosecutors involved in this
glaring injustice.
Elected district attorneys need to take heed
of the growing volume of civil rights suits
alleging, among other things, "deliberate
indifference" to training and establishing
office policies regarding the intricacies of
Brady and Giglio, and the constitutional
implications of failing to meet those
standards, and the liability issues that could
follow.
"John Thompson Acquitted of Murder Charges after
Disclosure from Orleans Parish DA's Office"
New Orleans City Business
June 4, 2007
Richard A. Webster
John Thompson was 40 years old when he
walked out of the Angola State Penitentiary
in 2003 after spending nearly 18 years on
death row for the 1984 murder of Ray
Liuzza.
A jury acquitted him of all charges after a
stunning disclosure from Orleans Parish
District Attorney Harry Connick's office.
In 1995, lead prosecutor Jerry Deagan told
fellow prosecutor Mike Riehlmann he was
dying of liver cancer and had a confession-
he had concealed blood evidence that could
possibly prove Thompson's innocence.
After Deagan died, Riehlmann said nothing
of his friend's confession for five years
while Thompson sat in a cell waiting for his
date with the electric chair.
Riehlmann eventually went public with
Deagan's confession in 1999 and was briefly
suspended by the Louisiana Supreme Court
for his inaction.
Thompson, 44, spent 14 of 18 years in
Angola on death row and survived seven
execution dates.
Connick and Riehlmann did not respond to
repeated calls for comment.
In April, Thompson won a $14-million civil
suit against the Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office, which has appealed the
verdict.
Thompson left Angola with a small bag of
possessions and $10 given to exiting inmates
by the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections for bus fare.
"I went to prison normal but I'll be damned
if I came out normal," Thompson said. "No
way in the world you're gonna tell me 18
years didn't have some type of damage."
Echoing Green, a New York-based
foundation that supports social
entrepreneurs, invested more in Thompson
than Louisiana did. It gave him a two-year,
$60,000-grant to establish Resurrection
After Exoneration, an organization designed
to give wrongfully convicted victims the
financial, emotional and job skills needed to
live a successful post-prison life.
"What we're going through out here is all
about what we went through in there,"
Thompson said. "It's hurt all of us. Don't
get me wrong, it hurt but it's history. And
until we put it to sleep, it's gonna keep
haunting us. So we have to deal with the
effects of it and look for solutions."
'Broken human beings'
In April, the 200th person in the United
States was exonerated based on DNA
evidence. Louisiana has the fourth-highest
rate of DNA exonerations in the country,
and 24 people since 1990, including non-
DNA cases, have been released from state
penitentiaries based on new evidence,
according to the New Orleans Innocence
Project.
Rob Warden, executive director for
Northwestern University's Center for
Wrongful Convictions in Chicago, said
wrongfully convicted victims experience the
same problems as the guilty upon release
from prison, including high rates of drug and
alcohol abuse, mental health difficulties and
recidivism.
Warden's book, "A Promise of Justice,"
detailed the case of four wrongfully
convicted Chicago teenagers who spent
nearly two decades in prison.
"It took 17 years to exonerate them and
when they emerged, they were absolutely
broken human beings," Warden said.
An innocent man released from prison is not
eligible for state probation and parole re-
entry services such as education, counseling
and job training-services meant for
offenders only, not the wrongfully
convicted, said Warden.
"If you're guilty, there are some government
services. They're usually inadequate but at
least there are services," Warden said. "But
there's nothing to aid the wrongfully
convicted. It's typically, 'Bye. Get the hell
out of here.' There is a great reluctance to
acknowledge a mistake. Let's just ignore it
and sweep it under the rug."
Thompson said the government needs to
provide services because it is responsible for
releasing human time bombs back into
society.
"I guarantee you if one of those guys was
raped or molested in that prison, he's going
to bring that home," Thompson said. "You
get it so twisted in there that you develop
hate toward the same people you got to
come home to."
Services available
State Sen. Joel Chaisson, D-Destrehan, said
Louisiana provided more service to the
wrongfully convicted through the Innocence
Compensation Fund in 2005, which gives up
to $150,000 to the exonerated and job
training, counseling services and college
tuition.
Thompson said the wrongfully convicted
have a hard time finding a place to live
where they can be at peace. Most are forced
to move in with family members, which can
cause turmoil. Former inmates often have
difficulties communicating because no one
understands what they've been through and
the effect it's had on their psyche.
"You can't communicate with your family.
You don't know what you're supposed to be
doing," Thompson said. "You're supposed
to get a job but because of your record or
attitude you can't. It's not what we wanted
to come home to but we have no choice.
And that's the worst-being a grown man
having to depend on someone else for help.
And it all goes back to that one thing-what
I experienced in that prison but no one wants
to recognize it."
Resurrection After Exoneration will offer
the wrongfully convicted a place to live,
jobs and courses in how to manage finances.
Participants will be asked to set aside at least
25 percent of their paychecks in savings
accounts. After a year, RAE will match the
savings to help find independent housing.
'Pride and joy'
Thompson said it is difficult to shake the
memory of 18 long years spent in a death
row cell as a "dead man walking" for a
crime he didn't commit.
He opens a 5-inch-thick, three-ring binder
stuffed with legal papers and copied
newspaper articles. Thompson points to a
picture of a large white man standing behind
an expensive mahogany desk. The man is
attorney Jim Williams, the senior prosecutor
who oversaw Thompson's trial.
The sleeves of Williams' white button-down
shirt are rolled up revealing a gold watch on
his left wrist. He is wearing thin wire framed
glasses. Williams' lips are tightly pursed and
his broad chest puffed outward.
"Look at that picture," Thompson said of the
layout in Esquire magazine in the 1990s.
"Look at it good."
Standing on the corner of Williams' desk in
the photo is a small model of an electric
chair. Seated in the toy execution device are
pictures of five African-American men
spread out like a deck of cards. The largest
picture, dead center, is of Thompson.
"I was (Williams') pride and joy,"
Thompson said.
Williams sent all five men to death row and
had the model electric chair made as a
trophy to celebrate his accomplishments.
Of the five men in the miniature electric
chair, none remain on death row. Two have
been exonerated, one awaits a new trial and
the other two had death sentences commuted
to life.
Williams, now a private attorney in Gretna,
refused repeated calls for comment.
"You done prosecute us, put us on death
row, with lies you knew were lies,"
Thompson said, standing and gesturing at
the photo. "Every time we got an execution
date, you was in front of the judge trying to
push it. They try to straight up execute me
when they know I didn't commit the crime
and yet they still trying to kill me. And this
is not premeditated murder?
"They call it malfeasance of office and get a
slap on the wrist while I'm up at Angola on
death row for 18 years. Somebody help me
understand this."
"Free After 14 Years on Death Row, Man Seeks to
Help Other Falsely Accused Ex-Prisoners"
The Times-Picayune
September 12, 2009
Lolis Eric Elie
When John Thompson's lawyers arrived at
Angola State Penitentiary for a somber
meeting more than a decade ago, he didn't
ask for much detail about his case. He only
asked them for a date-the day the state
would put him to death.
May 20, 1999, they told him-one day
before his youngest son was to graduate
from high school in New Orleans.
Lots of dates had been set before then. Amid
those dates and the appeals that separated
them, Thompson had grown close to
Michael Banks and Gordon Cooney, his
Philadelphia lawyers. Their conversations at
times drifted from life-and-death legal
questions to more ordinary subjects: the
New Orleans Saints and Philadelphia
Eagles.
It was on the basis of that friendship that
Thompson made this request: "You guys
have to promise me that you're going look
out for my son," Thompson told the lawyers.
"He's a good kid. You have to promise me
you're going to keep an eye out for him."
Next, Thompson reassured the lawyers that
he didn't hold them responsible for his
impending death, although they had
inadvertently missed a deadline for filing a
challenge that might have spared his life.
His lawyers saw in Thompson a dignity and
grace, long after the former parking-lot
attendant and petty drug dealer was wrongly
sent to death row for allegedly killing a New
Orleans hotel executive.
And Thompson's supporters find the same
traits in him today, six years after he was set
free, having been exonerated in a second
murder trial.
John Thompson, who is married now, is
developing an organization to assist people
newly released from prison, and he is
speaking widely on injustices he sees in the
criminal justice system.
But Thompson, 46, is best known as the man
who is trying to collect on a $14 million
federal court judgment against the Orleans
Parish district attorney's office, after he
spent 14 years on death row.
The civil penalty came after a finding that a
systematic training failure in the office,
under former District Attorney Harry
Connick, contributed to his prosecutors
withholding of crucial evidence that could
have kept Thompson out of prison. The $14
million court judgment is likely to be
appealed by the DA's office to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The evidence-hiding episode was hardly
isolated: The Louisiana Supreme Court has
reversed seven convictions as a result of the
failure of Connick's office to turn over
relevant evidence to defense attorneys,
according to Innocence Project-New
Orleans.
Current District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro
and others rail against a legal judgment that
would deal a devastating financial blow to
an office that has an annual budget of about
$11 million.
Louisiana Attorney General James "Buddy"
Caldwell, meanwhile, is balking at the
release of a $150,000 payment that may be
due Thompson under a state program that
compensates individuals who were wrongly
imprisoned.
Caldwell argues that the DA's office is a
subdivision of the state and, therefore, the
state may be giving Thompson double
compensation if the civil judgment is paid.
A state appeals court has rejected that
position, and Caldwell is appealing to the
Louisiana Supreme Court.
Malice toward none
Even as he waits to see whether he will
collect, Thompson is moving on with his
life's work.
Cooney detected a certain selflessness in
Thompson back in 1999, during his most
fearful time, when he was given the new
execution date.
"His first concern was not, 'What else can
you do to save my life?' His first concern
was about his son. His second concern was
about us," the lawyer said. "Having been
through that, nothing surprises me about
John."
Thompson's story has, indeed, taken
surprising twists since his 14 years on death
row.
While many exonerated of crimes simply
struggle to make it on the outside,
Thompson has established the organization
Resurrection After Exoneration to help
former inmates.
Thompson displays no bitterness when he
talks about being railroaded. Perhaps his
cool derives from the influence of older
inmates during his years at Angola.
He was 22 when he was sent to Angola in
1985, and his youthful temper told him to
strike back at abusive guards. His mentors
told him to study the law and use the legal
process to gain his freedom.
"I had brothers telling me, 'Don't fight them
people like that. You can't win,"' he said.
"The ones that are locking you up are not
your enemy," the older inmates told him.
"They are oppressed just like you are. You
have to look higher than them."
"They taught me how to fight with a pen,"
he said.
Voice of innocence
Now that he's on the outside, he wants to
teach parallel lessons to exonerees and other
former inmates, lessons about how to
become contributing members of society.
While in prison, Thompson conceived of an
organization to help such people.
In 2007, Thompson received a two-year
fellowship from the Echoing Green
Foundation in New York that included
$60,000 in cash and more than $40,000 in
other support to help his build his
organization.
"He walked away from being in prison for
almost two decades with such an
unbelievable attitude of wanting to give
back and be of service," said Lara Galinsky,
senior vice president of the foundation. "His
heart was in absolutely the right place."
Thanks to a private donor, the organization
has a building on St. Bernard Avenue.
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Dubbed RAE House, it will provide housing
for up to three exonerees and space for
training classes, in addition to serving as a
headquarters.
"We have over 10,000 inmates being
released from jail in Louisiana per year,"1
Thompson said. "Out of that 10,000, 70
percent of them return (to prison) in one
form or fashion within the first six months,
or have some kind of interaction with the
police again.
"Nobody is there to guide them. RAE wants
to be there, to be that guidance."
RAE has already produced a play, "Voices
of Innocence," in which four exonerees tell
their stories.
"He's the first exoneree around the country
to do this," said Emily Maw, the director of
the Innocence Project New Orleans, an
organization that bills itself as an advocate
for "innocent prisoners with nonviolent
records" in Louisiana and Mississippi.
"The reason that John is doing what he is
doing, and is good at what he is doing, is
that no lawyer and no social worker can
relate to what these guys have been
through," said Maw, who chairs the board of
Thompson's organization.
Seeking stability
Thompson is more fortunate than most
former inmates. So many lawyers and other
supporters rallied to his cause during his 18
years in prison that Thompson had a support
system in place when he was released.
Even so, he faced big adjustments as a free
man.
"He didn't have a toothbrush or a clean pair
of underwear," Banks said. "He had never
used a cell phone or an ATM card."
Even something as mundane as food prices
were shocking to a man who had spent 18
years in prison.
"We'd go to Cooter Brown's. It'd be $8 for
a po-boy," said Nick Trenticosta, one of
Thompson's New Orleans lawyers.
"John thought that we were at Commander's
Palace. His idea of a po-boy was $3.50. For
a nice one!" said Trenticosta, who hired
Thompson right after his prison release.
"His first six months, frankly there was not a
lot of work," Trenticosta said. "The best
cure for trauma is talking, and that's what he
did; he talked constantly."
What Thompson felt he most needed was a
sense of stability-and new acquaintances.
Most of his former friends, he said, are
either in jail or dead. A "church woman"
was what he wanted most.
"I wanted somebody to keep that Godly type
manner around me," he said. Divine
providence, he believes, brought him
Laverne Jackson, a young woman he had
vaguely known when they grew up together
in Central City, and who attended church
with Thompson's mother.
Their first phone conversation lasted most of
the night. The first time he visited her home,
he looked it over carefully for whatever
information it could convey about her fitness
for matrimony.
Forty-four days after his prison release, John
and Laverne were married.
"We are so different it's a crying shame," he
said. "But she gives me so much stability."
As a teenager, Thompson had fathered two
sons by two different mothers. Though
young, Thompson said he took fatherhood
seriously, both in and out of prison. Many of
his conversations with his new wife were
about his sons.
"He would talk about how (before he went
to prison) his baby would fall asleep on his
chest, and how he would bring his sons to
the park, and how he would have them with
him, everywhere he went," Laverne
Thompson said.
Honor on death row
In prison, he had friends, lawyers and his
spiritual adviser bring his sons to see him.
As the date of his scheduled execution
loomed, Thompson focused on his youngest
son, John Jr., or "Tiger," as he used to be
known.
Tiger had typical senior year expenses such
as the prom and the class trip. "John really
wanted to be able to do something for that,"
said Carol Kolinchak, one of Thompson's
local lawyers.
"He started selling what meager possessions
he had on death row-cassettes and a tape
player and different things like that. He
asked me if I would sort of coordinate it. So
different guys on death row would have
money orders sent to me and John would tell
me how he wanted the money distributed."
Such commerce is one of the many facets of
life on death row that outsiders wouldn't
know about.
Thompson stresses the humanity of the men
with whom he'd shared the death row
experience. Some were undoubtedly crazy,
he said. Some had committed horrible
crimes. But some were innocent, he said,
and many were surprisingly compassionate.
"Do you know that when somebody is going
to be executed, everybody on death row
fasts that night?" he said, adding that the
inmates also hold a prayer vigil.
"That's a side of death row that most people
won't hear," he said. "Why? Because these
are supposed to be these wild madmen that
don't care about nothing."
Big plans
If he does get millions from the federal court
judgment, Thompson said he will use the
money to expand the work he is already
doing. Talking about his plans, he flits from
idea to idea exuberantly.
"My vision is bigger. If God gives me my
money, I just can't get over why we can't
have a trade school right in the city," he
said.
"Why can't we take one of these schools and
convert it and turn it into a university-type
setting?" he said. "What is so hard about
creating that?"
Thompson's larger vision also includes
trying to sensitize law enforcement officials
to the plight of people like him.
"I'm looking for accountability," he told a
class of LSU law students last month. "I
don't have no problem with anybody in here
wanting to be a district attorney. I want my
streets safe too.
"When y'all leave out of here and y'all start
working, y'all's ethics are going to be put to
a test," he said. "When y'all see that
decision and get to that point, just remember
what happened to me and to the rest of these
guys that we represent."
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Ruling Below: Humphries v. County of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, L.A.
County v. Humphries, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 1114 (2010).
Accused of abuse by a rebellious child, the parents were arrested, and had their other children
taken away from them. When a doctor confirmed that the abuse charges could not be true, the
state dismissed the criminal case against them. They then petitioned the criminal court, which
found them "factually innocent" of the charges for which they had been arrested, and ordered the
arrest records sealed and destroyed. Similarly, the juvenile court dismissed all counts of the
dependency petition as "not true." Nevertheless, the parents were identified as substantiated child
abusers and placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index (CACI). California offered no
procedure to remove their listing on the database as suspected child abusers, and thus no
opportunity to clear their names. The district court granted defendant county and law
enforcement officers' motion for summary judgment. The parents appealed. The appellate court
determined that the stigma of being listed in CACI plus the various statutory consequences of
being listed on the CACI constituted a liberty interest. The lack of any meaningful, guaranteed
procedural safeguards before the initial placement on CACI combined with the lack of any
effective process for removal from CACI violated the parents' due process rights. The grant of
summary judgment to the state and the county was reversed and the case was remanded.
Question Presented: Are claims for declaratory relief against a local public entity subject to the
requirement of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the constitutional violation was the result of a policy, custom or practice
attributable to the local public entity as determined by the First, Second, Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits, or are such claims exempt from Monell's requirement as determined by the Ninth
Circuit?
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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Leroy Baca, individually and in his official capacity as Los
Angeles County Sheriff; Michael L. Wilson, individually and in his official capacity as a
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Sheriff's Department; Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, in his official capacity as Attorney
General of the State of California, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Amended January 15, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Appellants Craig and Wendy Humphries are
living every parent's nightmare. Accused of
abuse by a rebellious child, they were
arrested, and had their other children taken
away from them. When a doctor confirmed
that the abuse charges could not be true, the
state dismissed the criminal case against
them. The Humphries then petitioned the
criminal court, which found them "factually
innocent" of the charges for which they had
been arrested, and ordered the arrest records
sealed and destroyed. Similarly, the juvenile
court dismissed all counts of the dependency
petition as "not true."
Notwithstanding the findings of two
California courts that the Humphries were
"factully innocent" and the charges "not
true," the Humphries were identified as
"substantiated" child abusers and placed on
California's Child Abuse Central Index
("the CACI"), a database of known or
suspected child abusers. As the Humphries
quickly learned, California offers no
procedure to remove their listing on the
database as suspected child abusers, and
thus no opportunity to clear their names.
More importantly, California makes the
CACI database available to a broad array of
government agencies, employers, and law
enforcement entities and even requires some
public and private groups to consult the
database before making hiring, licensing,
and custody decisions.
This case presents the question of whether
California's maintenance of the CACI
violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because identified
individuals are not given a fair opportunity
to challenge the allegations against them.
We hold that it does.
I. ANALYSIS
To establish a prima facie case under §
1983, the Humphries must establish that: (1)
the conduct complained of was committed
by a person acting under color of state law;
and (2) the conduct violated a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
insisted that even if there is a qualified
immunity issue, we must still consider the
threshold question of the "existence or
nonexistence of a constitutional right as the
first inquiry." There is no question that the
Humphries' listing on the CACI occurs
under color of state law. Thus, the issue in
this appeal is whether the initial and
continued inclusion of the Humphries on the
CACI deprives them of any rights secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. We find that it does. Accordingly,
after our discussion of the existence of a
constitutional violation we consider whether
the individual and institutional Appellees are
entitled to immunity for their acts.
A. Procedural Due Process
The Humphries argue that Appellees
violated their Fourteenth Amendment right
to procedural due process by listing and
continuing to list them on the CACI, without
any available process to challenge that
listing. In procedural due process claims, the
deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest "is not itself unconstitutional; what
is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such
an interest without due process of law." Our
analysis proceeds in two steps: "the first
asks whether there exists a liberty or
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property interest which has been interfered
with by the State; the second examines
whether the procedures attendant upon that
deprivation were constitutionally sufficient."
The district court found that the Humphries'
listing on the CACI did not deprive them of
any constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest. The court did not reach the
second step of the due process analysis.
1. Deprivation of a Protected Liberty
Interest
The Humphries contend that they have a
liberty interest under the "stigma-plus" test
of Paul v. Davis. The Humphries argue that
the stigma of being listed in the CACI as
substantiated child abusers, plus the various
statutory consequences of being listed on the
CACI constitutes a liberty interest, of which
they may not be deprived without process of
law. We agree.
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the Supreme
Court held that a liberty interest may be
implicated "where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to
him." The following year the Court stated
that a government employee's liberty
interest would be implicated if he were
dismissed based on charges that "imposed
on him a stigma or other disability that
foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of
other employment opportunities." In Paul v.
Davis, the Supreme Court clarified that
procedural due process protections apply to
reputational harm only when a plaintiff
suffers stigma from governmental action
plus alteration or extinguishment of "a right
or status previously recognized by state
law." This holding has come to be known as
the "stigma-plus test."
a. Stigma
As the district court found, being labeled a
child abuser by being placed on the CACI is
"unquestionably stigmatizing." We have
observed that there is "[n]o doubt . . . that
being falsely named as a suspected child
abuser on an official government index is
defamatory." Indeed, "no conduct so
unequivocally violates American ethics as..
. sexual predation upon the most vulnerable
members of our society." The horror
deepens when such abuse occurs at the
hands of the parents, who have an obligation
to protect their children.
b. Plus
The more difficult issue is whether the
Humphries can satisfy the "plus" test. The
Humphries must show that, as the result of
being listed in the CACI, "a right or status
previously recognized by state law was
distinctly altered or extinguished."
As the Court explained in Paul, when the
chief of police in Constantineau posted the
plaintiffs name on a list forbidding the sale
of alcohol to her, it "significantly altered her
status as a matter of state law" by depriving
her "of a right previously held under state
law[-]the right to purchase or obtain liquor
in common with the rest of the citizenry."
The Court concluded that "it was that
alteration of legal status which, combined
with the injury resulting from the
defamation, justified the invocation of
procedural safeguards."
In Paul itself, the Louisville Chief of Police
placed Davis' name on a flyer distributed to
Louisville merchants containing a list of
individuals thought to be active in
shoplifting. In contrast to the mandatory
nature of the statute in Constantineau, the
flyer merely "came to the attention" of
Davis' supervisor who warned him not to
repeat his actions in the future. The Court
found that this harm to Davis' reputation
was not sufficient to create a liberty interest.
Notably, no law had required the Chief of
Police to distribute this flyer, nor did any
law require employers to check the list.
Thus, although any impairment to Davis'
employment opportunities "flow[ed] from
the flyer in question," his injury only
occurred because the flyer happened to have
"c[o]me to the attention of [his] supervisor."
The Humphries allege more than mere
reputational harm-being listed on the
CACI alters their rights in two general ways.
First, state statutes mandate that licensing
agencies search the CACI and conduct an
additional investigation prior to granting a
number of rights and benefits. These rights
include gaining approval to care for children
in a day care center or home, obtaining a
license or employment in child care,
volunteering in a crisis nursery, receiving
placement or custody of a relative's child, or
qualifying as a resource family. These
benefits are explicitly conditioned on the
agency checking the CACI and conducting
an additional investigation. Second,
information in the CACI is specifically
made available to other identified agencies:
state contracted licensing agencies
overseeing employment positions dealing
with children, persons making pre-
employment investigations for "peace
officers, child care licensing or employment,
adoption, or child placement," individuals in
the Court Appointed Special Advocate
program conducting background
investigations for potential Court Appointed
Special Advocates, and out-of-state agencies
making foster care or adoptive decisions.
Although these agencies are not explicitly
required by CANRA to consult the CACI,
they may, as a practical matter, be required
to do so by their own regulations or
practices, as discussed below. Thus,
inclusion in the CACI alters the Humphries'
legal rights or status in a variety of ways that
Californians who are not listed on the CACI
are not subject to: applying for custody of a
relative's child, becoming guardians or
adoptive parents (inside or outside of
California), obtaining a license for child
care, becoming licensed or employed in a
position dealing with children, obtaining
employment as a peace-officer, and
involvement in adoption and child
placement. We have mentioned, and the
district court found, that the Humphries
were directly affected in their eligibility to
work or volunteer at a local community
center. The Humphries also introduced
evidence indicating that Wendy was affected
in her ability to renew her teaching
credentials.
We recognize that being listed on the CACI
may not fully extinguish the Humphries'
rights or status. Agencies that obtain
information from the CACI are responsible
for "drawing independent conclusions
regarding the quality of the evidence
disclosed." Thus, for example, inclusion on
the CACI does not necessarily bar the
Humphries from obtaining a license for
child care, but it does guarantee that the
licensing entity will conduct an investigation
anew before issuing or denying the license.
However, we need not find that an agency
will necessarily deny the Humphries a
license to satisfy the "plus" test. Outright
denial would mean that a listing on the
CACI has extinguished the Humphries'
legal right or status. Rather, Paul provides
that stigma-plus applies when a right or
status is "altered or extinguished."
We hold that where a state statute creates
both a stigma and a tangible burden on an
individual's ability to obtain a right or status
recognized by state law, an individual's
liberty interest has been violated. A tangible
burden exists in this context where a law
effectively requires agencies to check a
stigmatizing list and investigate any adverse
information prior to conferring a legal right
or benefit. As outlined above, California
created the CACI via CANRA and explicitly
requires agencies to consult the CACI and
perform an independent investigation before
granting a number of licenses and benefits.
This requirement places a tangible burden
on a legal right that satisfies the "plus" test.
We find that a tangible burden also exists
where the plaintiff can show that, as a
practical matter, the law creates a
framework under which agencies reflexively
check the stigmatizing listing-whether by
internal regulation or custom-prior to
conferring a legal right or benefit. CANRA
appears to create such a legal framework.
CANRA explicitly provides that a variety of
agencies will have access to the CACI, and
we cannot turn a blind eye to the actions of
these other agencies merely because they are
not explicitly required by statute to receive
CACI information.
Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Humphries, we conclude
that California has implemented a system
whereby the CACI is reflexively consulted
prior to the conferral of legal rights or
benefits under California law, even where
the statute does not necessarily require
agencies to check the list on its face. The
CANRA both stigmatizes the Humphries
and creates an impediment to the
Humphries' ability to obtain legal rights.
The Humphries have asserted the existence
of a sufficient liberty interest under the
stigma-plus test, of which they may not be
deprived without due process of law.
Thus, we conclude that the Humphries' legal
rights or status have been altered. First,
California has explicitly required some
agencies to search a stigmatizing listing and
conduct an additional investigation before
issuing a license or benefit under state law.
Second, California has made CACI
information available to a variety of other
agencies, and the Humphries have
introduced evidence that those agencies-
especially agencies charged with ensuring
the safety and well-being of children-
reflexively check the CACI before issuing a
government license or benefit. Thus, being
listed on the CACI places an added burden
on entities wishing to confer legal rights or
benefits, makes the chances of receiving a
benefit conferred under California law less
likely, and practically guarantees that
conferral of that benefit will be delayed.
Accordingly, we hold that the Humphries
have satisfied the first step of the procedural
due process analysis: They have a liberty
interest in both their good name and using it
to obtain a license, secure employment,
become guardians, volunteer or work for
CASA, or adopt. Listing the Humphries on
the CACI places a tangible burden on their
ability to exercise this liberty interest. We
proceed to consider whether they have been
deprived of this interest without due process
of law.
2. Adequacy of the Procedural Safeguards
The Humphries must show that the
procedural safeguards of their liberty
interest established by the state are
constitutionally insufficient to protect their
rights. California currently provides some
minimal safeguards against erroneously
listing someone on the CACI....
A person who believes he has been
wrongfully listed on the CACI has two
possible remedies under CANRA. First, a
listed person might try to get the agency
who originally reported the information to
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the CACI to correct its reports. As noted
above, it appears that California agencies
have a general duty to maintain accurate
records and to advise CA DOJ of any report
that subsequently proves unfounded.
CANRA does not identify how an agency is
to ensure that it has accurate records or who
is responsible for correcting any errors. The
CA DOD's responsibility is limited to
ensuring that the CACI "accurately reflects
the report it receives from the submitting
agency"-it does not appear to have any
duty to ensure the accuracy of the report
itself. At best, CANRA implies that reports
are subject to correction "by the investigator
who conducted the investigation." However,
California provides no formal mechanism
for requesting that an investigator review a
report or for appealing an investigator's
refusal to revisit a prior report. Thus, for this
first avenue of obtaining relief, at best an
informal process exists in which the person
seeking review must contact the agency
blindly and hope the investigator is
responsive. It is not clear what a person
seeking review is to do if the investigator
has transferred from the agency, retired, or
died.
Second, the person may rely on a licensing
or employing agency to conduct its own
investigation and to "draw[ ] independent
conclusions regarding the quality of the
evidence disclosed, and its sufficiency for
making decisions regarding investigation,
prosecution, licensing, placement of a child,
employment or volunteer positions with a
CASA program, or employment as a peace
officer." Indeed, no particular process is
required prior to the agency "drawing
independent conclusions." Unless the
agency unilaterally undertakes its own
detailed investigation, it may only
perpetuate any errors contained in the
original report, even as it draws its own
"independent conclusions." In addition, even
if the agency has the time, funding, and
resources to determine that the evidence
contained in the CACI is erroneous or
unfounded, it does not have power to
expunge the listing. Thus, in the best case
scenario for an innocent person placed on
the CACI, the only remedy under this
avenue for relief is that the agency might
still confer the government benefit after
taking the time to conduct an added
background investigation. The CACI listing,
however, remains.
We evaluate the process that California
provides persons listed on the CACI under
the three part test set out in Mathews v.
Eldridge. Mathews instructs us to balance
(1) the private interest affected by the
official action; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the probable value of
additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the
governmental interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens of additional
procedures. The procedural due process
inquiry is made "case-by-case based on the
total circumstances." We will consider the
private and governmental interests first,
followed by a discussion of the risk of error
in the procedures established by the state.
a. Private Interest
The Humphries' argument in support of
their private interest at stake is essentially
coextensive with their argument in support
of their liberty interest. From all we have
said, the Humpries have an interest in not
being stigmatized by having their names
included in a child abuse database that
places a tangible burden on legal rights, if
they have not committed the acts underlying
the reports that led to their inclusion. Thus,
they have an interest in pursuing
employment and adoption, seeking to obtain
custody of a relative's children, and securing
the appropriate licenses for working with
children without having to be subject to an
additional investigation, delays, and possible
denial of a benefit under California law due
to an incorrect listing on the CACI.
b. Governmental Interest
There is no doubt that California has a vital
interest in preventing child abuse and that
the creation or maintenance of a central
index, such as the CACI, is an effective and
responsible means for California to secure
its interest. Nevertheless, the operative
question is not whether California has a
significant interest in maintaining CACI-
no one doubts that it does-but rather
whether California has a significant interest
in having a limited process by which an
individual can challenge inclusion on the
CACI, and to what extent adding additional
processes will interfere with the overarching
interest in protecting children from abuse.
We do not question, for example, that
California has a significant interest in
maintaining even "inconclusive" reports,
which are reports that are neither
"substantiated" nor "unfounded." Such
reports that only hint at abuse, when coupled
with other information, can reveal patterns
that might not otherwise be detected and can
be useful to law enforcement. But it is
equally apparent that California can have no
interest in maintaining a system of records
that contains incorrect or even false
information. First, the effectiveness of a
system listing individuals that pose a danger
to children becomes less effective if a larger
and larger percentage of the population
erroneously becomes listed due to
unsubstantiated claims .... In addition, there
is a great human cost in California, as
elsewhere, to being falsely accused of being
a child abuser. These costs are not only
borne by the individuals falsely accused, but
by their children and extended families, their
neighbors and their employers. Indeed, with
the same passion that California condemns
the child abuser for his atrocious acts, it has
an interest in protecting its citizens against
such calumny.
California contends that requiring any
process beyond what it currently provides
will substantially impair the state's ability to
protect children because hearings are time-
consuming and drain limited resources,
resulting in less efficient delivery of primary
services such as protecting children. It is
true, of course, that giving individuals some
additional procedure by which they can
challenge their listing on CACI will impose
administrative and fiscal burdens on
California. However, generally these
burdens are precisely the sort of
administrative costs that we expect our
government to shoulder. The state has not
provided any evidence that the process
required to sort through claims of an
erroneous listing in the CACI is any more
burdensome than the process due in any
other context.
c. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The final, and perhaps most important,
Mathews factor is the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the probable value of
additional procedural safeguards. As we
evaluate this factor, we ask "considering the
current process, what is the chance the state
will make a mistake?" In this case, we ask,
"after examining the process by which
persons are listed on the CACI, what is the
risk of someone being erroneously listed?"
In light of the Humphries' allegations-and
keeping in mind that we are reviewing a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the
state-the answer is "quite likely."
Appellees argue that the current procedures
present little risk of erroneous deprivation
because an agency may transmit a child
abuse report only after it "has conducted an
active investigation and determined that the
report is not unfounded." We are not
assuaged. A determination that the report is
"not unfounded" is a very low threshold....
[It] is the reverse of the presumption of
innocence in our criminal justice system: the
accused is presumed to be a child abuser and
listed in CANRA unless the investigator
determines that the report is false,
improbable, or accidental. Incomplete or
inadequate investigations must be reported
for listing on the CACI.
We have no evidence in the record that
indicates exactly how many "false positives"
reporting agencies receive. However, given
the high stakes in child abuse cases,
presumably an agency investigation and
child abuse report can be triggered by as
little as an anonymous phone call. It is
apparent in such a system there is a real
danger of prank and spite calls. California
should investigate such reports, and it can-
and perhaps should-retain records on any
reports it cannot determine to be
"unfounded." When it retains all reports that
are "not unfounded," it assumes a
substantial risk that some of its reports are
false, even if the investigator cannot prove
to his own satisfaction that they are
"unfounded." We understand the need for
investigators who work off of hunches,
disparate patterns, and minute clues to
maintain files on unsubstantiated reports of
child abuse for their own investigative
purposes. But when such reports find their
way into the CACI, there is a real risk that
people, like the Humphries, will have to
explain publicly how their names ended up
on the state's child abuse database.
Any errors introduced at the time
information is posted to the CACI arguably
can be corrected. As we have noted, once
the information is posted, the CA DOJ must
notify the known or suspected child abuser
that he has been reported to the CACI. At
that point, if the person believes he has been
reported in error, he has three options. First,
he can try to informally persuade the
investigator who reported it in the first
place. Second, he can wait until an agency
or other entity that is required to consult the
CACI receives the information and rely on
the agency or other entity's "independent
conclusions regarding the quality of the
evidence disclosed, and its sufficiency for
making decisions." Third, once an agency
makes an adverse decision, some persons
have a right to appeal the decision in court.
None of these means for correcting
erroneous information in the CACI is well
designed to do so. We consider each in turn.
1. Persuading the investigator. First,
attempting to persuade the investigating
officer is not a satisfactory way to correct
the records. The Humphries received notice
that their names had been referred to the
CACI. They were not told what information
was there-although, given their recent
experience, they had a pretty good idea-
and were told, "If you believe the report is
unfounded . . . please address your request
to Detective M. Wilson." In other words, the
only recourse offered to the Humphries was
to try to get the investigator who had made
the original determination that their case was
"substantiated" to change his mind. Nothing
in CANRA instructs Detective Wilson how
to deal with the Humphries. He is not
required to respond to the Humphries or
address their concerns or pleas in any way,
he has been given no standard for
reevaluating his initial judgment, and no one
else other than Detective Wilson is required
to respond to the Humphries. If Detective
Wilson refuses to reconsider his original
evaluation, the Humphries have no statutory
recourse elsewhere within the LASD.
2. Reaching an independent agency
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conclusion. Appellees also argue that there
is little risk of erroneous deprivation because
an agency that has consulted the CACI must
base its decision regarding the listed person
on its own "independent conclusions."
Furthermore, California regulations make it
"the responsibility of authorized individuals
or entities to obtain and review the
underlying investigative report and make
their own assessment of the merits of the
child abuse report." The decision maker
"shall not act solely upon [CACI]
information."
First, we note that by the time the decision
maker has referenced the CACI and become
charged with undertaking an additional
investigation, the individual liberty interest
in avoiding stigma and alteration of a legal
right has already occurred....
Second, even if the agency conducts a
thorough investigation, nothing the agency
decides affects the CACI listing; that is,
even if an agency, conducting its own
investigation, decides that the claims against
a listed person are unfounded, the agency
has no power to correct the CACI listing.
The person is stuck in CACI-limbo. Thus,
the process proferred by Appellees fails to
address the stigma of being listed on the
CACI and resolve the fact that other
agencies will still be forced to consult the
CACI to confer other benefits under the law.
Disregarding these limitations temporarily,
it is not clear to us that an agency, in reality,
can or will regularly engage in the process
required to determine that charges against an
individual are unfounded. As a practical
matter, when a person's name appears on the
CACI, the agency must take that fact
seriously and presume that the person has
committed some kind of child abuse, even if
there is no record of conviction ....
In sum, any agency-and especially
agencies that deal with children-are likely
to presume the integrity of the information
found on the CACI, assume that individuals
listed on the CACI actually abused children,
and deny the license rather than risk
awarding, for example, a child care license
to a listed individual.
3. Seeking court review. Finally, Appellees
argue that some persons adversely affected
by decisions resulting from their listing on
the CACI may seek redress in the legal
system on a case-by-case basis. The
administrative review process offers some
check on the system. As we know from our
own experience, court review of agency
decisions can be a cumbersome process.
What is most troubling about the states'
argument, however, is that even court
review cannot solve the problem. Even if an
individual is ultimately successful and
obtains, for example, a child-care license,
the court's favorable disposition has no
apparent impact on the individual's listing
on the CACI. Thus, the judicial review
afforded by the statute faces the same
problem as the original agency
determination: It cannot end the stigma or
the tangible burden on government rights
that an individual listed on the CACI faces.
In sum, we are not persuaded that California
has provided a sufficient process for
ensuring that persons like the Humphries do
not suffer the stigma of being labeled child
abusers plus the loss of significant state
benefits, such as child-care licenses or
employment. The processes in place in
California do not adequately reduce the risk
of error. ...
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d. Balancing
Mathews requires that we consider the risk
of error in light of the individuals' interest
and the government's interest. In the end,
this is not a difficult case. The lack of any
meaningful, guaranteed procedural
safeguards before the initial placement on
CACI combined with the lack of any
effective process for removal from CACI
violates the Humphries' due process rights.
Undoubtedly, California has a strong interest
in protecting its youngest and most
vulnerable residents from abuse, but that
interest is not harmed by a system which
seeks to clear those falsely accused of child
abuse from the state's databases. CANRA
creates too great a risk of individuals being
placed on the CACI list who do not belong
there, and then remaining on the index
indefinitely.
B. Qualified Immunity
C. Monell Liability
Unlike Detective Wilson, the County is not
entitled to qualified immunity for acting in
good faith reliance on state law. Rather, the
County is subject to liability under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, if a "policy
or custom" of the County deprived the
Humphries of their constitutional rights. The
district court did not address the County's
liability under Monell because it found no
violation of the Humphries' constitutional
We have held that "[in order to avoid
summary judgment a plaintiff need only
show that there is a question of fact
regarding whether there is a city custom or
policy that caused a constitutional
deprivation." CANRA itself did not create a
sufficient procedure by which the
Humphries could challenge their listing on
the Index. Nothing in CANRA, however,
prevented the LASD from creating an
independent procedure that would allow the
Humphries to challenge their listing on the
Index. By failing to do so, it is possible that
the LASD adopted a custom and policy that
violated the Humphries' constitutional
rights. However, because this issue is not
clear based on the record before us on
appeal-and because the issue was not
briefed by the parties-we remand to the
district court to determine whether or not the
County is entitled to qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, CANRA
violates the Humphries' procedural due
process rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983. We therefore reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the
State and the County and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Detectives Wilson and Ansbery
and Sheriff Baca on the grounds of qualified
immunity.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part
and REMANDED.
rights.
"Parents Cleared of False Allegations Remain
on State's Child Abuser List"
Los Angeles Times
February 23, 2010
David G. Savage
Craig and Wendy Humphries of Valencia
have been "living every parent's nightmare,"
as a judge put it, since Craig's rebellious
teenager falsely accused them of abuse nine
years ago. They were arrested by Los
Angeles County sheriffs deputies and had
their other young children taken away from
them.
It continues today. Even though the state
courts agreed that the girl's original
complaint was "not true" and that the couple
were "factually innocent," the Humphrieses
are still listed as child abusers on the state's
Child Abuse Central Index.
A federal appeals court ruled that Los
Angeles County should pay damages to the
couple, but the U.S. Supreme Court
intervened Monday and said it would hear
the county's claim that it is the state that is
at fault.
California's Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Act requires various state and
local officers, including the police, to submit
reports of child abuse even if they are
"inconclusive." The list includes 800,000
names. When the Humphrieses first tried to
be removed from the index, they were told
to contact the deputy who filed the original
report. But he said the complaint was
"substantiated" at the time he filed it, and
therefore, could not remove their names.
Wendy Humphries, a special education
teacher, worried that being on the list could
prevent her state credentials from being
renewed.
"We're still trying to get them out of the
index, but it hasn't happened yet," said
Esther Boynton, a Beverly Hills lawyer who
has filed suits to challenge the law.
The Humphrieses had sued in federal court,
alleging that their constitutional rights were
violated. They won in 2008 before the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, which said the
system is unconstitutional because it does
not give innocent people a procedure to have
their names removed.
More than a year later, state officials say
they are still pondering the matter. "We're
still in the process of determining what is
needed to comply with the 9th Circuit's
decision," said Evan Westrup, a spokesman
for the California Department of Justice.
"There is no effective way for the
Humphries to challenge this listing, and no
way for them to be removed from the
listing," the appeals court said. Because L.A.
County played a role in their ordeal, the
appeals court said it too could be forced to
pay damages.
Timothy Coates, an L.A. lawyer who
represented the county in its appeal, argued
that the county did not devise the state index
and is not free to change it.
"We agree that once people get on the list, it
is very difficult to get off it. The question is:
Who is responsible for that? We don't have
the ability to change the law," he said. It was
that issue that the court agreed to hear
Monday.
In the meantime, the state remains obligated
under the 9th Circuit ruling to devise a
procedure to allow innocent people to have
their names removed.
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"State Child Abuse Database's Vague Method for
Delisting Violates Procedural Due Process"
Bureau of National Affairs
November 18, 2008
California's Child Abuse Central Index, a
database of known or suspected child
abusers, violates procedural due process in
failing to give listed persons a fair
opportunity to challenge the allegations
against them and obtain delisting, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
Nov. 5 (Humphries v. Los Angeles County,
9th Cir., No. 05-56467, 11/5/08).
Being listed on the CACI is stigmatizing in
itself, and it also makes access to certain
licenses, jobs, and benefits less likely, Judge
Jay S. Bybee said. But the state spells out no
procedure for getting delisted. Bybee thus
concluded that the innocent plaintiffs' being
listed on CACI resulted in the "stigma-plus"
needed under Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), for their reputational injury to be
actionable under the 14th Amendment's due
process clause.
The court followed Valmonte v. Bane, 18
F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994), interpreting a
similar New York statute, but rejected Smith
v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir.
2003), involving a variant Alabama law,
"[t]o the extent that the Eleventh Circuit
refuses to recognize a liberty interest [under
the due process clause] where the state
functionally requires agencies to consult a
stigmatizing list prior to conferring a
government benefit."
Under California's Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Act, Cal. Penal Code § § 11164-
11174, and implementing regulations, law
enforcement and child welfare agencies are
required to investigate reports of child abuse
or neglect and determine whether the
incident is "substantiated, inconclusive, or
unfounded." The incident must be reported
to the California Department of Justice and
included in the CACI unless it is determined
by the investigator to be "unfounded," that
is, "false," "inherently improbable," an
accidental injury, or not constituting child
abuse or neglect.
CACI data is made available to state and
local agencies and persons involved in
licensing or making background inquiries
regarding child care providers, peace
officers, adopting parents, or foster parents.
It is also made available for use in out-of-
state background checks in foster or
adoptive parent cases. Certain in-state
agencies are required by statute to check the
CACI before granting child care-related
licenses.
An agency forwarding an incident for listing
on the CACI must notify the listee. But the
statute provides no procedure for
challenging a listing, and, while indicating
that the state DOJ shall not retain a report
"which subsequently proves to be
unfounded," it does not specify who makes
that determination, although the court
surmised that it is the submitting agency.
Daughter Reports Abuse.
In this case, the plaintiffs' 15-year-old
daughter reported that they had abused her
for several months. Based on an emergency
room examination and a police report from
Utah (where the child had driven herself to
be with her biological mother), a Los
Angeles County Sheriff s Department
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detective obtained warrants and arrested and
booked the plaintiffs for cruelty to a child
and torture. The couple's other two children
were placed in foster care. The detective
identified the case as a "substantiated
report" of child abuse, and their names were
listed on CACI.
The criminal case against the couple was
dismissed, however, after the prosecutor
learned that a doctor had surgically removed
a melanoma from the daughter's shoulder
and had fully examined her during the
alleged period of abuse, but had found no
signs of it. The couple was found "factually
innocent" of the torture charge.
But when they asked the Sheriff's
Department to remove their names from
CACI, a sergeant told them that the fact that
charges were filed "would indicate to us that
some sort of crime did occur," and the
dismissal of the case "would not negate the
entries" into CACI. The couple then filed
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, alleging in part
that their initial and continued inclusion in
CACI violated procedural due process, and
seeking damages and injunctive relief
against the county and individual officials.
The defendants won summary judgment.
Stigma-Plus Test.
Reversing, the Ninth Circuit said that its
procedural due process inquiry has two
steps. It first asks whether a liberty or
property interest exists with which the state
has interfered. It then examines whether the
procedures used to deprive any such interest
were sufficient.
As for the first step, Paul v. Davis curtailed
a trend toward recognizing reputational
injury as implicating a protected liberty
interest. It "clarified that procedural due
process protections apply to reputational
harm only when a plaintiff suffers stigma
from governmental action plus alteration or
extinguishment of a 'right or status
previously recognized by state law,"' the
appeals court said, quoting in part from
Paul. This is known as the "stigma-plus
test," the court said.
Being placed on CACI is "unquestionably
stigmatizing," because child abuse is a
reviled offense, the court said. On the "more
difficult issue," it decided that listing altered
the plaintiffs' rights in two ways. First, state
law requires licensing agencies to search
CACI and conduct an additional
investigation before granting certain rights
and benefits, such as child care licenses.
Second, the state DOJ makes CACI data
available to other identified agencies. These
steps placed "both a stigma and a tangible
burden" on the plaintiffs' ability to obtain a
number of licenses and benefits-whether
the agencies "reflexively" check the list by
dint of "internal regulation or custom"-and
thereby violated the parents' liberty
interests, the court ruled.
The statute does not provide adequate
procedural safeguards against erroneous
listing, the court ruled. It offers at best a
vague, informal process for requesting an
investigator to correct a listing. While listees
have a significant interest in pursuing
employment and adoption and custody
rights unhindered by being listed, the state
has no interest in maintaining a list with
incorrect or false data, the court said. And
the risk of an erroneous listing is "quite
likely," given that a name remains listed as
long as the report is determined to be "not
unfounded," and the original lister is "tasked
with being investigator, prosecutor, judge,
and jury" with respect to a challenged
listing, making it unlikely that he "will, in
effect, reverse himself."
The court held that the state must "promptly
notify a suspected child abuser that his name
is on the CACI and provide 'some kind of
hearing' [not necessarily predeprivation, but
before someone other than the initial
investigator] by which he can challenge his
inclusion."
Despite finding a violation of procedural due
process, the court ruled that the individual
defendants all enjoyed qualified immunity,
either because they were not directly
involved in the violation or reasonably relied
on existing law. But the county could have
established an independent procedure for
handling listing challenges, and thus was not
entitled to summary judgment.
Judge Milan D. Smith Jr. and U.S. District
Judge Richard Mills, sitting by designation,
joined the opinion.
Esther G. Boynton, Beverly Hills, Calif.,
argued for plaintiffs. Lillie Hsu, Greines,
Martin, Stein & Richland, Los Angeles,
argued for individual defendants. Deputy
Attorney General Paul C. Epstein argued for
the state.
"Civil Rights Case Has Implications
for Schools"
Education Week
February 23, 2010
Mark Walsh
A case granted review this week by the U.S.
Supreme Court has implications for school
districts in lawsuits alleging violations of the
constitutional rights of students or district
employees.
The justices agreed to decide whether
plaintiffs suing local governmental agencies,
such as cities, counties, and school districts,
must show that a constitutional violation
was the result of a policy, custom, or
practice of the agency even when they are
merely seeking a court order to end the
violation, as opposed to monetary damages.
In a 1978 decision, Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, the Supreme
Court removed local governments' complete
immunity from suits under a federal civil
rights law known as Section 1983. That law
allows suits for damages when government
authority is used to deny a person's federal
constitutional or statutory rights.
In Monell, the high court ruled that cities,
counties, and school districts could not be
held liable merely because they employed
someone who violated a person's civil
rights. But local governments could be liable
if the deprivation of rights was tied to an
official policy or custom of the agency.
The federal courts of appeals are divided,
however, about whether a civil rights suit
merely seeking declaratory relief, such as a
court order, requires a showing that the
challenged violation was the result of a
policy or custom.
The Supreme Court granted review on
Monday in County of Los Angeles v.
Humphries (Case No. 09-350), which stems
from a lawsuit brought by a California
couple who were falsely accused of child
abuse by their rebellious 15-year-old
daughter and ended up on the state's child-
abuse index.
In what a lower court called a "parents'
nightmare," Craig and Wendy Humphries
found that there was no procedure for
removing their names from the index,
despite a court declaration that they were
"factually innocent" of the abuse charges.
The Humphries sued Los Angeles County
and its sheriff, as well as the state, alleging a
violation of their 14th Amendment right to
due process of law. Among the difficulties
the couple face, court papers say, is that
Wendy Humphries is a special education
teacher and her inclusion on the child-abuse
index threatens her ability to remain licensed
as a teacher.
Their suit sought damages as well as a
judicial order to remove their names from
the index and a finding that the state's
policies regarding the index were
unconstitutional because they provided
people with no means to challenge an unfair
listing.
A federal district court largely ruled against
the Humphries, but a panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in San
Francisco, held last year that the parents'
due-process rights were violated. It said the
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department
was potentially liable under Monell for not
adopting its own procedure for the falsely
accused to remove their names from the
child-abuse index.
The county's appeal to the Supreme Court
noted that several federal appeals courts
have applied Monell's policy or custom
requirement to non-damages claims. But the
9th Circuit has a line of cases, including the
one involving the Humphries, that exempts
such non-damages claims from the rule.
"The result is an end-run around this court's
repeated holdings that a public entity may
only be held responsible for inflicting a
constitutional injury where the conduct at
issue was the result of a custom, policy or
practice fairly attributable to the public
entity," the county's appeal said.
Perry A. Zirkel, a professor of law and
education at Lehigh University in
Bethlehem, Pa., said in an interview that
while the Monell issue is complicated, the
new case is potentially significant for school
districts. Districts are often sued in addition
to school or district administrators over
alleged constitutional violations. Districts
are often able to argue at an early stage that
a challenged action was due to an
overzealous principal or other administrator
but did not reflect the district's official
policies, he said.
The district will argue "that a principal did
this on his or her own, and [the plaintiff] has
not been able to show a policy or custom, so
we're off the hook," Zirkel said.
If the Supreme Court goes along with the
9th Circuit's approach, that could expose
districts to some lengthier and more costly
legal battles, at least where so-called
declaratory relief was the remedy being
sought, he added.
The Supreme Court will hear the case during
the term that begins next October.
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"Child Abuse List: 'Guilty
Until Found Innocent"'
Orange County Register
June 15, 2010
Teri Sforza
Nearly 800 Orange County residents landed
on the state's list of child abusers last year-
based on investigations that failed to
determine whether any abuse actually
occurred.
The names of these 792 maybe/maybe-not
abusers can remain on the California Child
Abuse Central Index for 10 years, and the
list can be seen by employers, schools, local
police departments, adoption agencies, etc.
"In a laudable attempt to protect children,
the CACI process jeopardizes the reputation
and employment status of thousands of
Orange County residents, the Orange
County Grand Jury says in "CACI: Child
Abuse Central Index: Guilty Until Found
Innocent."
"The process and guidelines for placing
someone on the Child Abuse Central Index
(CACI) based on an Inconclusive finding are
confusing, highly subjective and provide
little protection for those individuals falsely
accused of abuse."
Problem is, California law requires that
inconclusive investigations be reported to
the child abuse index. "This represents a
conflict with the American legal principle of
innocent until proven guilty," the grand jury
declares.
How to fix? "Orange County should join
other counties in supporting a revision of the
California Penal Code that would eliminate
or modify the Inconclusive finding," it says.
Which is sweet music to the ears of folks
like George and Bette McFetridge, an Irvine
couple who wound up on the child abuse list
after an adoption-gone-awry.
The McFetridges fought back, and were
ultimately removed from the list, but they're
suing the Orange County Social Services
Agency in an attempt to change a system
that they say shoots first and asks questions
later.
"I'm thrilled that they took the time to
investigate this, and they did a real good
analysis of the law," said George
McFetridge (who, incidentally, is a deputy
district attorney for Orange County). "The
'inconclusive' category has been eliminated
in most states. Theoretically, there are 792
other lawsuits out there, and that's just this
year. This could get very expensive.
"It's a great idea, you want to protect
children, but a list that's not accurate does
more harm than good."
Changing state law to eliminate the
"inconclusive" finding "is something that's
been long overdue," said Bette McFetridge.
The grand jury report comes at a time when
other courts in the nation are declaring
child-abuse registries like California's to be
unconstitutional, because alleged abusers
had no chance to defend themselves before
being listed.
The grand jury found that social workers are
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as frustrated with the system as the
McFetridges. It also recommends that:
9 Orange County's department of children
and family services should be the central
reporting agency for all county child abuse
index reports, and should conduct all
grievance hearings.
• Case files should reflect oral and written
notification of the suspects and any
unsuccessful contact should be noted.
- Registered mail should be considered for
written notifications.
The county has 90 days to respond.
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"Abuser List Tags Innocents, Too"
Los Angeles Times
December 7, 2008
Carol J. Williams
Accused of child abuse by a vindictive ex-
girlfriend 22 years ago, Bakersfield
stockbroker Scott Whyte ceased contact
with their son for years, fearing that another
allegation would land him in prison, before a
court cleared him.
Craig and Wendy Humphries went to jail
after a rebellious teenage daughter fled to
Utah and told police there that her father and
stepmother had abused her. While the
Valencia couple were locked up in Los
Angeles County on charges eventually ruled
groundless, their two younger children were
placed in foster care.
Esther Boynton, a Beverly Hills lawyer who
helped Whyte and the Humphrieses fight to
clear their names, had her own hellish
experience getting off the state's Child
Abuse Central Index, a database containing
819,000 names from which even a judgment
of innocence isn't enough to secure removal.
Unlike the better-known database created by
Megan's Law, which registers and tracks
63,000 named sex offenders, the child abuse
index is neither actively managed by the
state nor periodically purged of erroneous or
unsubstantiated entries--despite efforts by
the wrongly included to escape its shameful
stain.
The California Department of Justice has
been ordered in at least three court decisions
in recent years to create a standard way to
remove from the index the names of those
exonerated by courts or social service
investigations.
But in response to the latest judgment, a
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruling last
month that the Humphrieses' privacy rights
had been violated, the Office of the Attorney
General plans another appeal in defense of
the state's handling of the database.
Whyte, 59, looks back on a life irreparably
damaged by the abuser label and the threat
of punishment for a crime he didn't commit.
When the mother of his then-4-year-old son
made the false allegations against him in
1986 and Kern County authorities put his
name in the abuser index, Whyte said, his
initial anger "quickly gave way to complete
terror."
The mother's report was made during a
veritable witch hunt that grew out of child
abuse allegations against day-care workers
in the county throughout the 1980s.
"The atmosphere was such that if you were
accused, you might as well turn yourself in
to prison and look to spend the rest of your
life there," Whyte recalled.
For months after learning of the report,
Whyte so feared his arrest was imminent
that he left a blank check and the deed to his
house with a relative to post bond for him.
"I just couldn't believe that this could
happen to a person in this country, that
[authorities] would destroy families with
nothing but a phone call," said the father
who protected his liberty at the cost of any
relationship with his son. "There are not any
words strong enough to describe that
situation, the shame, the travesty. Somebody
ought to be shot."
The Humphrieses, still listed as abusers, "are
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living every parent's nightmare," the appeals
court said. It ruled the state in violation of
the 14th Amendment because people in the
index aren't given a chance to challenge the
allegations against them.
The couple's ordeal began in March 2001,
when Craig Humphries' 15-year-old
daughter from a previous marriage took their
car without permission and drove to Utah,
where her mother and stepfather lived. She
told them she had been abused since being
sent to California nine months earlier, and a
Utah emergency room doctor who examined
the teen reported to Los Angeles County
authorities that she had "non-accidental
trauma with extremity contusions."
On the basis of that one phone call, the
Humphrieses were arrested, jailed and
charged with felony torture. The arresting
sheriff s deputy filed a "substantiated" child
abuse report that got them entered in the
index. Their two younger children were
placed in protective custody.
"My clients didn't have any idea where their
kids were," said Boynton, who, because the
case is still in litigation, has advised the
couple against discussing their ordeal with
The Times.
The Humphrieses got their children back
about 10 days later, and California medical
records proved that the daughter's bruises
were the result of surgical removal of
melanoma.
"The Humphries have taken advantage of
every procedure available to them, including
the California courts," Judge Jay S. Bybee
wrote in the 9th Circuit Court opinion.
"They went to the dependency court, which
found that the allegations were 'not true'
and returned their children to them. They
went to the prosecutor, who dropped all the
charges against them. They went to the
criminal court, which declared them
'factually innocent' and sealed their arrest
records. None of this had any effect on their
CACI listing."
Wendy Humphries, a teacher, had to hire an
attorney to avoid losing her credentials,
because employers of people who work with
children are required to consult the index.
The list can be accessed by educational,
child-care, adoption, foster-care and child-
welfare agencies throughout the country and
is referenced about 400,000 times a year,
said Abraham Arredondo, spokesman for the
attorney general's office.
Boynton landed in the child abuse database
in 1990 after accidentally splashing her 17-
year-old daughter with hot coffee. She
learned three years later, when applying to
volunteer as a reading tutor, that the Los
Angeles Police Department had reported her
to the state based on her expressions of
remorse to emergency room personnel for
the burn on her daughter's shoulder.
It took two years and much expensive
litigation to get their names expunged from
the index, and Boynton remains suspicious
that distorted records of the incident still
linger elsewhere.
The state agreed to make individual changes
in its listing, notification and challenge
practices in Whyte and Boynton's cases and
in a negotiated settlement with Amelia
Gomez, a Los Angeles woman denied
custody of her grandchildren because of
index errors.
"We have an order requiring them to rewrite
the regulations. As far as we know, they
haven't done anything to comply with it,"
David Greene, a lawyer with the First
Amendment Project in Oakland, said of the
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state court ruling a year ago that the index
violated constitutional privacy guarantees.
Among the changes the state agreed to were
the rights of named individuals to see their
government dossiers, to challenge
inaccuracies and to have their versions
appended to the records.
"To the extent you want this index to serve
some function, to have usefulness, it has to
be accurate," Greene said.
The law now requires that anyone added to
the abuser index be notified, but the lawyers
say decades of secrecy in compiling and
maintaining the list created in 1965 probably
means many on it are unaware of their
inclusion and the need to pursue removal.
Those listed can now demand a hearing
among officials of the reporting agency,
whether a county child protective services
office or law enforcement.
But the standard of proof of wrongdoing
remains so low and the pressure to continue
identifying any potential abuser so high that
the hearings are often "almost worthless,"
said Peter Sheehan, a lawyer with the Social
Justice Law Project in the Bay Area.
Though the intent of the index was noble in
seeking to protect children, Sheehan said, its
value and reliability are compromised by its
flaws.
A halfhearted and piecemeal effort a few
years ago to update the index showed
significant error rates-more than 20% in
some counties-among the few reporting
agencies that carried out the reviews,
Sheehan said. The 9th Circuit Court ruling
in Humphries vs. County of Los Angeles
cited a 2004 review of listings from San
Diego County that suggested as many as
half were erroneous.
Sheehan called the state's request for 9th
Circuit rehearing of the Humphries ruling
and the possibility of an eventual appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court "the scary part," in
light of the high court's conservative
majority and its tendency to rule against
claims of government interference with
privacy rights.
"What happened to the Humphries could
happen again today," said Boynton, noting
the state's resistance to reforming its
administration of the index. "Ultimately
there will be critical mass, and the
government will have to fix the system."
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"System Branding People as
Child Abusers Under Attack"
Orange County Register
May 3, 2010
Teri Sforza
The County of Orange cannot be sued for
placing an innocent couple on California's
list of child abusers, its lawyers argue.
But the Irvine couple who successfully
battled to get off that list say that the county
must be held accountable-and that change
must come to a system that shoots first and
asks questions later.
"The abuse of children is a despicable act,"
say George and Bette McFetridge in a recent
court filing. "Adults who knowingly abuse
children are to be utterly reviled, and
rightfully so. And to be officially identified
as a child abuser, one of the most heinous of
labels, is the modern equivalent of being
branded with the scarlet letter A like Hester
Prynne in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The
Scarlet Letter. To be accused of child abuse
may be our generation's contribution to
defamation per se, a kind of moral leprosy..
"The central issue of this litigation is
whether a single social worker, acting as
judge and jury, may unilaterally stigmatize a
parent as a child abuser and forward their
name to an official government index,
without meeting any burden of proof
whatsoever, and without giving the parent
any prior notice or opportunity to be heard,
pursuant to a statute that violates due
process and constitutional rights."
"It happened to us before. It can happen to
us again."
"And if it can happen to us, it can happen to
any parent, grandparent, foster parent or any
individual who works with children."
"This lawsuit seeks to prevent that. For
ourselves and others."
Both sides are to argue their positions in
Orange County Superior Court at 9 a.m.
Monday. And it couldn't come at a more
interesting time-when other courts in the
nation are declaring child-abuse registries
like California's to be unconstitutional,
because alleged abusers had no chance to
defend themselves before being listed.
We told you recently about George and
Bette McFetridge, who took a 14-year-old
girl with beautiful long hair into their lives
as their daughter in 2007, after their son was
grown and gone. The girl's biological mom
had a drug problem and her biological dad
was in jail, but she liked to read, enjoyed
school and was doing well in her classes.
The McFetridges hoped to shower her with
love, show her what it's like to live in a real
family, and give her a better shot at
succeeding in life.
One can read wrenching details of the
McFetridges' life with their new charge in
the suit itself. Suffice to say their new
daughter did a lot of lying, ran away and
accused her new mother of striking her.
Bette McFetridge quit her job as a nurse to
tutor her daughter, and tried traditional
discipline-taking away privileges-to no
avail. The family is firmly opposed to
corporal punishment and never struck the
girl, she said, but one of the girl's
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complaints against them was, indeed, true.
After the girl returned home after running
away, Bette tried to find out where she had
been and what she had done. Bette warned
the girl not to lie; and after a time, said that
every lie would be paid for with a snip of the
girl's lovely, long hair. Locks were cut until
the girl began telling the truth.
An Orange County social worker was law-
bound to investigate the girl's complaints of
abuse. The social worker said that the claims
of physical abuse were "unfounded," but the
charge of emotional abuse was
''inconclusive."
And thus, both the McFetridges were placed
on the Department of Justice's Child Abuse
Central Index. And were informed about it
later.
George McFetridge is a lawyer, working for
the Orange County District Attorney's
office. He and Bette requested a hearing and
ultimately cleared their names. But not
everyone who winds up on the list is an
attorney, and not everyone knows how to
effectively fight back. That's the point of
their suit.
COUNTY RESPONDS
The county's lawyers argue that the
McFetridges are suing the wrong party-
that their beef is with the state and belongs
there.
"Under the Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Act (California Penal Code
section 11164 et seq., 'CANRA'), when a
child protective agency such receives a
report of suspected child abuse, it must
conduct an active investigation," the county
says. "If the agency determines the
allegations are not unfounded, then it must
submit a report to the DOJ. The DOJ
maintains an index of such reports."
The county also argues that any alleged
wrongs have been addressed-the
McFetridges are no longer on the child
abuse list-and that they therefore have no
more complaint. "Plaintiffs are seeking a
declaration that the County violated their
constitution rights. Such a declaration is
improper . . . Such a claim amounts to
nothing more than a claim for money
damages under causes of action that have
already fully accrued."
The McFetridges "also seek a declaration
that CANRA, the statutes that the County
followed in this case, are unconstitutional.
Again, such a declaration against the County
is improper. These statutes were enacted by
the California legislature. Any change to the
statutes must come from the state, not the
County. Plaintiffs simply have sued the
wrong entity in seeking the change they
desire."
And then there's this:
"A public entity cannot be held liable based
on vicarious liability for the alleged
wrongdoings of its employees," says the
county. "There must be an existing
unconstitutional municipal policy and a
causal connection between the
unconstitutional policy and the alleged
constitutional deprivation in order for a
public entity to be exposed to liability. ...
Alternatively there must be a failure to train
the public entity employees, where such
failure to train rises to the level of deliberate
indifference to the rights of the public.
Liability does not attach to a municipality
merely because a constitutional violation is
caused by a municipal employee, even one
acting within the scope of his or her
authority."
THE McFETRIDGES RESPOND
Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court, they say
that "One does not have to await the
consummation of threatened injury to obtain
preventive relief. If the injury is certainly
impending that is enough."
They conjure the case of Humphries v.
County of Los Angeles-a very similar case
that went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. That court determined that
California's child abuse index violates due
process laws.
Said the Ninth Circuit court:
Appellants Craig and Wendy
Humphries are living every parent's
nightmare. Accused of abuse by a
rebellious child, they were arrested,
and had their other children taken
away from them. When a doctor
confirmed that the abuse charges
could not be true, the state dismissed
the criminal case against them. The
Humphries then petitioned the
criminal court, which found them
"factually innocent" of the charges
for which they had been arrested,
and ordered the arrest records sealed
and destroyed. Similarly, the juvenile
court dismissed all counts of the
dependency petition as "not true."
Notwithstanding the findings of two
California courts that the Humphries
were "factually innocent" and the
charges "not true," the Humphries
were identified as "substantiated"
child abusers and placed on
California's Child Abuse Central
Index ("the CACI"), a database of
known or suspected child abusers.
As the Humphries quickly learned,
California offers no procedure to
remove their listing on the database
as suspected child abusers, and thus
no opportunity to clear their names.
More importantly, California makes
the CACI database available to a
broad array of government agencies,
employers, and law enforcement
entities and even requires some
public and private groups to consult
the database before making hiring,
licensing, and custody decisions....
This is the reverse of the
presumption of innocence in our
criminal justice system: The accused
is presumed to be a child abuser and
listed in CANRA unless the
investigator determines that the
report is false, improbable or
accidental. Incomplete or inadequate
investigations must be reported for
listing....
TRIPPING UP ACROSS AMERICA
An investigation by The Associated Press
found that the push to create a national
database of child abusers, as authorized by
Congress in 2006, "is barely progressing as
serious flaws come to light in the state-level
registries that would be the basis for a
national list."
* In North Carolina, an appeals court
ruled that the state's registry is
unconstitutional because alleged
abusers had no chance to defend
themselves before being listed.
* In New York, a class-action
settlement is taking effect on behalf
of thousands of people who were
improperly denied the chance for a
hearing to be removed from the state
registry.
And the U.S. Supreme Court will
hear a case this fall arising from the
California couple whose names
remain on that state's registry years
after they were cleared of an abuse
allegation made by their rebellious
teenage daughter.
"Nobody wants to be seen as soft on child
abuse-and that's gotten us where we are,"
Carolyn Kubitschek, a New York attorney
who has waged several court battles over the
registries, told AP. "In the state of New
York, it is still almost impossible to get off
the list."
The abuse lists aren't accessible to the
public, but are used by daycare centers,
schools, adoption agencies and other entities
to screen people who want to adopt, be
foster parents or get a job working with
children, the AP says.
The story continued:
Even critics of the registries say they
can serve a vital purpose in barring
perpetrators of serious abuse from
roles where they would interact
routinely with children. It's the
process underlying many of the
registries that has come into
question-and their potential to
entangle innocent people as well as
wrongdoers.
A person doesn't have to be
convicted or even charged with a
crime to get listed. Under the general
practice in most states, entries are
based on a child protection
investigator's assertion that the
person committed an act of abuse or
neglect; hearings or appeals, if
granted at all, often come long after
the name is entered.
"Anybody can call a child abuse hot
line and report abuse-anybody,
including your ex-spouse who hates
you, your landlord who's trying to
evict you," Kubitschek said.
Michigan v. Bryant
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Ruling Below: People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009), cert. granted, Michigan v.
Bryant, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2134 (2010).
At defendant's first-degree murder trial, the State introduced the victim's statement to police in
which the victim identified defendant as the person who shot him. On review of the appellate
court decision affirming defendant's second-degree murder conviction, the court held that,
because the victim's statements to the police were testimonial in nature under Crawford v.
Washington and Davis v. Washington, they were inadmissible. The police found the victim lying
on the ground outside a gas station; they asked him what happened, who shot him, and where the
shooting had occurred. The victim's responses related solely to events that had occurred in the
past and at a different location. None of the statements referred to events occurring at the time
the statements were made, none alleged any ongoing threat, and none asserted the possible
presence of the alleged perpetrator. As such, the circumstances indicated that the primary
purpose of the questioning was to establish the facts of an event that had already occurred and
not to enable the police to meet an ongoing emergency. As such, the statements were
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The judgment of the court
of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Question Presented: Should certiorari be granted to settle the conflict of authority as to whether
preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the perpetrator and circumstances of the
shooting are nontestimonial because "made under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency," that emergency including not only aid to a wounded victim, but also the prompt
identification and apprehension of an apparently violent and dangerous individual?
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Richard Perry BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant.
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided June 10, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH in this case constituted inadmissible
testimonial hearsay within the meaning of
MARKMAN, J. the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v.
We granted leave to appeal to consider Washington. The Court of Appeals held that
whether the victim's statements to the police the statements were non-testimonial under
the test set forth in Davis because they were
made "in the course of a police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating
that its primary purpose was to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."
Because we conclude on the basis of
Crawford and Davis that the "primary
purpose of the interrogation [was] to
establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution," we
respectfully disagree and hold that the
statements constituted inadmissible
testimonial hearsay. Moreover, we conclude
that the admission of these statements
constituted plain error requiring reversal.
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals
and remand for a new trial.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY
[The victim was shot in the abdomen during
a routine drug deal through the defendant's
back door at 3:00 a.m. Police found him
about 30 minutes later lying on the ground
outside of his vehicle at a gas station six
blocks away from the defendant's house.
Although the back door had remained
closed, the victim identified the defendant to
police by allegedly recognizing the
defendant's voice. The victim died several
hours later at the hospital.]
Defendant's first trial resulted in a hung
jury. Following a second jury trial, and after
two days of deliberations, defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder, being a
felon in possession of a firearm, and
possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial
court erred by admitting the victim's
statements to the police identifying him as
the shooter....
H. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the admission of the victim's
statements to the police violated defendant's
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is a
question of constitutional law that this Court
reviews de novo.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the admission of the
victim's statements to the police identifying
defendant as the shooter violated his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation. The
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. . . ." In Crawford the
United States Supreme Court held that
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent
from trial [are admissible] only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine." Although the Court left "for
another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,'
it did say that "[w]hatever else the term
covers, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony ... and to police interrogations."
The Court defined "[t]estimony" as "[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact." The Court explained that "[a]n accuser
who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a
sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not." The
Court recognized that "[v]arious
formulations of this core class of
'testimonial' statements exist," such as
"pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially" and "statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use
at a later trial." However, the Court
indicated that "[s]tatements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations are..
. testimonial under even a narrow standard."
The Court stated that "even if the Sixth
Amendment is not solely concerned with
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary
object, and interrogations by law
enforcement officers fall squarely within
that class." The Court further stated that it
was "us[ing] the term 'interrogation' in its
colloquial, rather than any technical legal,
sense."...
In Davis, the Supreme Court farther
expounded on the meaning of the term
"testimonial hearsay statements." The Court
held that "[s]tatements are nontestimonial
when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency." On the other hand, "[t]hey are
testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution." Davis farther
explained that "in the final analysis [it is] the
declarant's statements, not the
interrogation's questions, that the
Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate."
The statements in dispute in Davis were
made to a 911 emergency operator. The
victim told the operator, "[The defendant's]
here jumpin' on me again"; "He's usin' his
fists." The Court held that these statements
were non-testimonial. The Court asserted
that Davis was distinguishable from
Crawford because in Davis: (1) the victim
was "speaking about events as they were
actually happening, rather than [as in
Crawford] describ[ing] past events.., hours
after the events ... had occurred"; (2) thus,
in contrast to the victim in Crawford, the
victim "was facing an ongoing emergency";
(3) "the nature of what was asked and
answered . . . was such that the elicited
statements were necessary to be able to
resolve the present emergency, rather than
simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had
happened in the past"; and (4) the victim's
"frantic answers were provided over the
phone, in an environment that was not
tranquil, or even . . . safe," while, in
Crawford, the victim was "responding
calmly, at the station house, to a series of
questions . . . ." The Court held that the
"primary purpose" of the interrogation in
Davis "was to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency," and, thus, the
elicited statements were non-testimonial.
In Hammon, a companion case decided with
Davis, the police responded to a reported
domestic disturbance. When the police
arrived, the victim was sitting alone on the
porch and the defendant was inside. The
victim told the police that the defendant had
hit her and thrown her. The Court held that
because "the primary, if not indeed the sole,
purpose of the interrogation was to
investigate a possible crime," the victim's
statements to the police were testimonial.
The Court explained that Hammon was
distinguishable from Davis because in
Hammon: (1) "the interrogation was part of
an investigation into possibly criminal past
conduct"; (2) "[t]here was no emergency in
progress"; and (3) "[w]hen the officer
questioned [the victim], . he was not
seeking to determine (as in Davis) 'what is
happening,' but rather 'what happened."' As
the Court further explained:
The statements in Davis were taken
when [the victim] was alone, not
only unprotected by police (as [the
victim in Hammon] was protected),
but apparently in immediate danger
from [the defendant]. [The victim in
Davis] was seeking aid, not telling a
story about the past. [The Davis
victim's] present-tense statements
showed immediacy; [the Hammon
victim's] narrative of past events was
delivered at some remove in time
from the danger she described.
By contrast, the Court reasoned that
Hammon was similar to Crawford because:
(1) "[b]oth declarants were actively
separated from the defendant"; "[b]oth
statements deliberately recounted, in
response to police questioning, how
potentially criminal past events began and
progressed"; and (3) "both took place
sometime after the events described were
over." Accordingly, the statements in
Hammon, like those in Crawford, were
testimonial.
In the instant case, there is no question that
the victim is unavailable, and defendant did
not have a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the victim. Therefore, if the
victim's statements to the police were
testimonial in nature, they are inadmissible.
Accordingly, the only issue here is whether
the victim's statements were made in the
course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation was to
enable police assistance to meet an "ongoing
emergency," as defined by the United States
Supreme Court, or whether the primary
purpose of this interrogation was to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to a
later criminal prosecution.
On remand, the Court of Appeals held that
the statements in this case were non-
testimonial, and thus affirmed defendant's
convictions. We, however, agree with
defendant that the statements were
testimonial pursuant to Crawford and Davis
The police found the victim lying on the
ground outside a gas station. The police
asked him what had happened, who had shot
him, and where the shooting had occurred.
The victim told the police that defendant
shot him about 30 minutes earlier at
defendant's house, which was about six
blocks away, and that he drove himself to
the gas station. These statements related
solely to events that had occurred in the past
and at a different location. None of these
statements referred to events occurring at the
time the statements were made, none alleged
any ongoing threat, and none asserted the
possible presence of the alleged perpetrator.
The circumstances, in our judgment, clearly
indicate that the "primary purpose" of the
questioning was to establish the facts of an
event that had already occurred; the
"primary purpose" was not to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
The crime had been completed about 30
minutes earlier and six blocks from where
the police questioned the victim. The police
asked the victim what had happened in the
past, not what was currently happening. That
is, the "primary purpose" of the questions
asked, and the answers given, was to enable
the police to identify, locate, and apprehend
the perpetrator.
Davis stated that "in the final analysis [it is]
the declarant's statements, not the
interrogation's questions, that the
Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate." The declarant here (i.e., the
victim) made these statements while he was
surrounded by five police officers and
knowing that emergency medical service
(EMS) was on the way. Obviously, his
primary purpose in making these statements
to the police was not to enable the police to
meet an ongoing emergency of the type
identified by the United States Supreme
Court, but was instead to tell the police who
had committed the crime against him, where
the crime had been committed, and where
the police could find the criminal. That is,
the primary purpose of the victim's
statements to the police was to "establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution."
Further, the officers' actions do not suggest
that the officers themselves considered the
circumstances at the gas station to constitute
an "ongoing emergency," at least not as the
Supreme Court defines that term. None of
the officers testified to taking any actions to
secure the area, to search the station for the
possible presence of any armed individuals,
or to provide cover for other officers. None
of the officers indicated that he drew his
weapon at the gas station, took up a
defensive position out of concern that the
shooter might be nearby, or called for any
backup assistance to ensure the safety of the
officer himself or others in the area. And
none of the police officers questioned people
who were in or around the gas station (other
than the victim and the gas station attendant)
or searched in any way at the station for the
shooter. Rather, they acted in a manner
entirely consonant with officers who knew
that the crime had already been committed,
that it had been committed at a different
location, and that there was no present or
imminent criminal threat. Indeed, once the
EMS unit arrived for the victim, the police
left the gas station and immediately
proceeded to defendant's house, where they
then called for backup assistance because
they feared that defendant might still be
inside.
The primary purpose of the police
questioning of the victim at the gas station
was to determine who shot the victim and
where the shooter could be found so that
they could arrest him. The police were at the
gas station to investigate a past crime, not to
prevent an ongoing one, and the victim was
not "speaking about events as they were
actually happening, " as in Davis, but was
.'describ[ing] past events,"' as in Crawford
and Hammon. The primary purpose of the
victim's statements was not "to describe
current circumstances requiring police
assistance," as in Davis, but to "establish[]
the facts of a past crime, in order to identify
(or provide evidence to convict) the
perpetrator," as in Crawford and Hammon.
Equally unpersuasive is the Court of
Appeals argument that the police were
"responding to an emergency" because
"someone at the gas station was shot and
laying on the ground." Once again, this type
of "emergency" almost always exists when
the police respond to a victim who has been
seriously injured. That is, if we were to
adopt the Court of Appeals analysis, all
statements made while the police are
questioning a seriously injured complainant
would be rendered non-testimonial, and this
is also clearly inconsistent with the
commands of the Supreme Court by
confusing a medical emergency with the
emergency circumstances of an ongoing
criminal episode....
The hearsay statements at issue in the instant
case are significantly different from the
admissible hearsay statements in Davis i.e.,
the statements made to the 911 operator
while the defendant was still attacking the
victim, because, unlike in Davis, this victim
was describing past events, rather than
describing a criminal episode as it was
unfolding, and, unlike in Davis, this victim
was away from defendant and the crime
scene, and was in the protection of five
police officers. On the other hand, this case
is significantly similar to Hammon because
in both cases the police were seeking
through their questioning to determine what
had previously occurred, rather than what
was occurring at the time of the questioning,
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and the victims were separated from the
defendants and in the protection of the
police. That is, in both Hammon and this
case, (1) "[the] declarants were actively
separated from the defendant[s]"; (2) "[the]
statements deliberately recounted, in
response to, police questioning, how
potentially criminal past events began and
progressed"; and (3) "[they] took place
sometime after the events described were
over." Here, the officers were obviously
attempting to find out "what had happened
in the past," as evidenced by the fact that the
first question asked was "what happened."
The officers were not "seeking to determine
(as in Davis) 'what is [now] happening,' but
rather 'what happened."' Most importantly,
the victim's actual statements pertained to
what had happened previously, rather than
to what was actually happening at the time
of the interrogation. For these reasons, the
victim's statements to the police were
testimonial and, thus, inadmissible.
In addition, in our judgment, the error
clearly prejudiced defendant. The evidence
against him was far from overwhelming and
the victim's statement indicating that
defendant was the one who shot him was
obviously extraordinarily damaging. In fact,
the prosecutor essentially conceded that the
error was prejudicial when, at the
suppression hearing before trial, he
conceded that the admission of the victim's
statements to the police is a "crucial issue to
the prosecutor's case; ... if this court rules
that the excited utterance is not going to be
admissible, then we won't have a trial here..
." In addition, during his opening statement
to the jury, the prosecutor repeatedly
referred to the victim's statements to the
police and explained:
The most important piece of
evidence you will hear during this
trial is [the victim] in many respects
speaking to you. [The victim] will
tell you that it was the defendant
who shot him. Obviously he won't
be here to tell you that. But before he
died, the last-one of the last-
probably the last thing he was able to
say was that Rick shot, Rick shot me
... And ... the police, all of them,
heard [the victim] say Rick shot me.
The most important piece of
evidence you'll hear during this trial,
in other words, will be [the victim] in
a certain respect speaking to you
from the grave and telling you what
happened in this case and telling you
who's responsible. . . . All of the
evidence here but mainly [the
victim's] own words before he died
point to [defendant] having pulled
the trigger and having killed [the
victim].
The prosecutor also relied heavily on the
victim's statements in his closing statement
to the jury, stating:
The main reason we know enough
about what happened to be able to
decide beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the charges that have been
made out here, the main reason we
know is because of [the victim's]
words himself, his own words to you
through those police officers in the
early morning of April 29th, 2001.
[Emphasis added.]
Further evidence that the error was
prejudicial is the fact that defendant's first
trial resulted in a hung jury. Finally, the
error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." For these reasons, we believe
that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the victim's statements to the police
were inadmissible testimonial hearsay
statements pursuant to Crawford and Davis
and the admission of the statements
constituted plain error requiring reversal, we
reverse the Court of Appeals and remand
this case for a new trial.
DISSENT
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from this Court's decision to
reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for
a new trial. I would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated
in its unpublished opinion on remand,
specifically, that the declarant's statements
were made in the course of a police
interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the
interrogation's primary purpose was to
enable police assistance in an ongoing
emergency.
CORRIGAN, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The Court of Appeals
reasonably concluded that the victim's
statements-made within a half-hour of
being shot while he lay bleeding in a parking
lot-were non-testimonial for Confrontation
Clause purposes because they were elicited
by police officers addressing an ongoing
emergency....
As recounted in the majority opinion, police
officers arrived at a Detroit gas station at
3:25 a.m. within minutes after receiving a
report of a shooting. It appears that they did
not know how long ago the shooting had
occurred, where it took place, or whether the
shooter was at the gas station. They found
the gunshot victim lying on the ground,
bleeding, visibly in pain, and having trouble
talking. They asked him what happened. He
reported that defendant shot him about 3:00
a.m. at a residence six blocks away. The
majority concludes that the primary purpose
of the officers' questions "was to establish
the facts of an event that had already
occurred," not to "enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency." But the
majority considers the facts in hindsight,
rather than with an objective view of the
circumstances at the time the statements
were made. The United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Davis clearly establishes
that the statements must be viewed through
an objective assessment of the
circumstances surrounding them:
"Statements are nontestimonial when made
in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency."
In any event, even if we assume that the
reported shooting occurred a full 25 minutes
earlier at 3:00 a.m., this time lapse certainly
does not prohibit as a matter of law the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that an
emergency was ongoing. Rather, the officers
knew that an armed assailant had been
within six blocks of their location. They
could not be sure that the assailant would
not harm others or pursue the victim. One
could reasonably conclude that the assailant
posed an immediate, continuing danger.
Therefore, even if we assume that about 30
minutes had passed, this case does not
become automatically comparable to cases
such as Crawford, where police questioned
the declarant at the police station "hours
after" the relevant events occurred.
Contrary to the majority's assertions, Davis
does not establish an artificial threshold after
which all questions are assumed to be for
purposes of retrospective investigation and
all statements in response are presumed
testimonial. The semantic difference
between what is "actually happening" and
what has already "happened" is not so
simple when applied to the real world,
where context controls which legal labels
most aptly apply. The amount of time that
has elapsed between the onset of an
emergency and statements about that
emergency clearly must be considered in
context.
For similar reasons, I disagree with the
majority's presumption that the victim's
statements were not made during an ongoing
emergency as a matter of law because the
victim had escaped to the gas station. A
mere distance in space between an initial
event and the ensuing statements by a victim
is not dispositive. Neither Davis nor
Crawford states a bright-line rule
establishing that an emergency ends the
moment the assailant and victim are
physically separated to any extent. ...
This case seems to fall midway on a
spectrum between the facts of Crawford and
those of Davis. As the Davis Court
explained, in Davis the 911 caller "was
speaking about events as they were actually
happening, rather than 'describ[ing] past
events."' The call was "plainly a call for
help against [a] bona fide physical threat...
In Crawford, in contrast, the declarant's
statements were made during questioning at
the police station that took place "hours after
the events she described had occurred." The
Davis Court also described the "striking"
difference in the "level of formality between
the two interviews." The declarant in
Crawford was "responding calmly, at the
station house, to a series of questions, with
the officer-interrogator taping and making
notes of her answers." The declarant in
Davis, on the other hand, provided "frantic
answers . . . over the phone, in an
environment that was not tranquil, or even
(as far as any reasonable 911 operator could
make out) safe."
I agree with the majority that this case is not
precisely comparable to Davis because,
here, the victim was not facing an immediate
physical threat from an assailant, and the
police had arrived on the scene. But this
case is also by no means directly
comparable to Crawford because, here, the
shooting had just occurred, the statements
were made only blocks away from the
crime, the victim was in pain from untreated
wounds that would soon prove to be fatal
and was having trouble talking, and it was
uncertain whether he, the police, or the
public were out of physical danger. For
these reasons, I conclude that this case is
more similar to Davis than to Crawford.
And, most significantly, to the extent this
case's location on the spectrum presents a
close question, the Court of Appeals did not
clearly err when it concluded that the
emergency was ongoing and the victim's
statements were non-testimonial.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals did not
clearly err when it decided that the victim's
statements were admissible because they
were non-testimonial under Crawford and
Davis....
"U.S. Supreme Court Rules
on 'Dying Declaration'
The Detroit News
April 1, 2010
Joel Kurth
Why it matters
A one-paragraph announcement from the
U.S. Supreme Court that a Detroit case
could decide whether a dying man's
description of his alleged killer can help
convict a man for murder.
The chase
Anthony Covington was found bleeding in a
gas station lot April 28, 2001. A Detroit
Police officer asked what happened.
Covington said "Rick" shot him through a
door, and gave a description of the shooter.
Hours later, Covington died at a hospital.
His dying words led police to a home blocks
away where they discovered blood, a bullet
hole in a door, the victim's wallet and a man
named Richard Perry Bryant. The first trial
ended in a hung jury. In the second, Bryant
was convicted of second-degree murder.
But last year, the Michigan Supreme Court
overturned the conviction and ordered a new
trial. The divided court's rationale:
Covington's words couldn't be used against
Bryant because defendants have
constitutional rights to confront their accuser
in court. Covington, being dead, couldn't be
cross-examined.
A retrial date hasn't been set.
"Dying declarations"-statements made
during the last breaths of life-have been
allowed to convict and free the accused in
U.S. courts since at least 1770. That's when
then-lawyer and future president John
Adams used the last words of a Boston
Massacre victim to secure acquittals and
reduce charges for some of the accused
British soldiers.
But the deceased can't be cross-examined,
which some contend rubs against
constitutional protections against hearsay.
The U.S. Supreme Court in the past few
years has tweaked the standard for hearsay,
allowing it if the testimony comes during an
"ongoing emergency."
The Detroit case could help define what that
means. Prosecutors argue in court papers
''any human being . . . coming upon another
human being with blood pouring from a
gunshot wound to the stomach will be
painfully aware that the situation is an
emergency."
But defenders counter that statements to
police about a shooting that occurred 30
minutes prior don't meet that standard.
The Supreme Court agreed in March to
weigh the issue.
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The paper
"MSC Opinion: People v. Bryant"
One Court of Justice
June 11, 2009
Sarah Riley Howard
On June 10, 2009, the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in People v. Bryant, No. 133725,
in a 4-3 decision by Justice Markman, joined
by Chief Justice Kelly and Justices
Cavanagh and Hathaway. The Court
considered whether the Confrontation
Clause to the U.S. Constitution bars the
State from introducing hearsay statements
made by a witness dying of gunshot wounds,
who died prior to trial. The Court concluded
that under recent U.S. Supreme Court case
law, the statements at issue were
"testimonial," i.e., made pursuant to an
interrogation primarily motivated for later
criminal prosecution and not for securing
emergency assistance. Accordingly, the
Court held that it was plain error to admit
the statements through hearsay, and
remanded the case for a new trial, reversing
the Court of Appeals....
On October 31, 2006, the Michigan
Supreme Court remanded Bryant back to the
Court of Appeals for consideration in light
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
relating to the Confrontation Clause in Davis
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Davis
held that statements made in a 9-1-1 call by
a woman reporting a domestic violence
emergency and requesting immediate police
assistance were "non-testimonial," and thus
could be introduced through hearsay without
offending the Confrontation Clause. Davis
defined "testimonial" statements as those
made for the primary purpose of
investigation in securing a criminal
conviction, and not for the primary purpose
of securing police assistance in an
emergency.
On March 6, 2007, the Court of Appeals
reaffirmed Bryant's convictions for second-
degree murder, felony firearm, and being a
felon in possession of a firearm. It held that
the declarant's statements were not
"testimonial" in nature, and thus could be
introduced without offending the
Confrontation Clause. The Court of Appeals
determined that the witness statements were
not "testimonial" because he spoke to the
police as he lay injured in the parking lot of
a gas station from a gunshot wound. The
police asked the victim what happened, and
he responded that "Rick" shot him and
described the defendant's house a few
blocks away. The victim had purchased
cocaine from the defendant several times in
the past.
The Court of Appeals held that the police
questioning was primarily part of an
emergency response to ascertain whether the
witness with the gunshot wound was the
"victim," and where the shooter might be
and if he continued to pose harm to them
and the public. The statements were made
after an emergency call, while the man was
still on the ground, in acute distress and
awaiting medical attention. Even though the
information could also aid in the
investigation, the police's primary purpose
in asking the questions at the time was for
emergency response.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding in the
majority opinion that statements that
indicate what happened in the past, as
opposing to events currently happening as
with the 9-1-1 call in Davis, tend to be
"testimonial" and are typically made
primarily to aid in investigation. The Court
held that to be the case here, where it found
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the statements related only to past events,
did not indicate the presence of an on-going
threat or the possible presence of the
perpetrator. When the shooting had occurred
30 minutes earlier, in a house six blocks
away, the Court concluded that the primary
purpose of the questions asked and answers
given was to identify, locate and apprehend
the perpetrator. While the focus of the
inquiry is on the declarant's statements, and
not the interrogator's questions, facts
concerning the interrogation can be
considered to determine the primary purpose
of the declarant. The police questioned the
declarant while EMS was already on its way
to treat his injuries, and took no steps to
secure the area out of concern that the
perpetrator could be nearby. The police, as
the Court said, "acted in a manner entirely
consonant with officers who knew that the
crime had already been committed, that it
had been committed at a different location,
and that there was no present or imminent
criminal threat."
In a footnote, the Court rejected the
prosecutor's suggestion that the statements
might have been admissible under the
excited utterance exception in the Rules of
Evidence, noting that the Constitution
requires the defendant's ability to confront
witnesses against him in the case of
"testimonial" statements and trumps an
evidence rule.
Justice Weaver wrote a brief dissent,
indicating that she agreed with the Court of
Appeals' reasoning.
Justice Corrigan wrote a separate dissent, in
which Justice Young joined. Her dissent
concluded that most of the majority's
analysis was unnecessary because the
statements would have been admissible as
dying declarations. Justice Corrigan argued
that the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that
dying declarations could be a rare exception
to what was a new rule under the
Confrontation Clause, and historically
predated that Clause. Although the
prosecution abandoned the argument
because of the state of the law at the time of
trial, Justice Corrigan found that the issue
should have been considered in fairness to
the State. She also concluded that an
objective victim or police officer, at the time
of the events at issue, would very well have
considered the statements to be for the
primary purpose securing assistance, and
that the Court of Appeals should not be
overturned on such a close fact question.
She found that the estimated elapsed time
since the shooting was insignificant and
agreed that ascertaining the identity and
whereabouts of the shooter was for the
purpose of ensuring safety, and not
primarily for investigation.
"Michigan Supreme Court says Trial Court to Decide
if SANE Statements are Testimonial Hearsay"
Michigan Lawyers Weekly
August 3, 2009
Gary Gosselin
A recent Michigan Court of Appeals
decision could have wide-ranging
implications for prosecuting and defending
in sexual assault cases.
At issue is whether information gained from
victims during a medical forensic
examination and recorded on a forensic
form, are testimonial hearsay and excludable
from evidence, or can be used by
prosecutors.
In People v. Spangler, the court remanded
the case to the Ingham County Circuit Court
to consider the totality of the circumstances
relating to the complainant's statements.
In this case, a mother took her alleged
sexually assaulted son to the hospital, where
she "signed a permission form authorizing a
SANE [sexual assault nurse examiner] to
perform a medical forensic examination and
take medical forensic photographs."
There isn't a published case in Michigan
that gives trial courts direction on whether
SANE reports are testimonial or not, said
Herb Tanner, who is the Violence Against
Women Project training attorney for the
Prosecuting Attorneys Association of
Michigan.
Peter Van Hoek, assistant defender at the
State Appellate Defender Office, agreed,
saying there is lack of record and discussion
in trial court in Michigan dealing with
SANE reports.
Tanner cited People v. Bryant, as a similar
case that lays out circumstances of the
admissibility of taking information after the
fact or in the course of an ongoing
emergency.
In Bryant, the Michigan Supreme Court
held that a shooting victim's statements to
police "constituted inadmissible testimonial
hearsay within the meaning of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford [v.
Washington] and Davis [v. Washington]"
because the "primary purpose of the
interrogation [was] to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."
One argument is that the SANE exams are
for medical treatment, the other side argues
that the nurse examiner is nothing more than
a cop in a white coat and are gathering facts
for later, Tanner said.
In the face of Bryant, Van Hoek said, where
the statement was taken 39 minutes after the
incident-and still considered hearsay-it
would be hard in this case for prosecution to
say it was made during an ongoing
emergency.
"From my perspective it would be very
difficult for the prosecution to establish it
would be anything other than testimonial,"
Van Hoek said.
In the Spangler trial court, defense counsel
argued that the statements were testimonial
hearsay, relying on the fact that they had
been recorded on the forensic form.
Conversely, "The prosecution argued that
because the statements were made to a nurse
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for the purpose of obtaining medical
treatment, they were non-testimonial," Judge
Kirsten Frank Kelly wrote in the opinion.
"The trial court made no attempt to gain any
information regarding the process of the
examination, what prompted the
complainant's statements, or how the
forensic form was filled out. Rather, it
simply granted the motion to preclude any
testimony from the nurse, based solely on
the format of the forensic form[,]" added
Kelly, who was joined by Judges Mark J.
Cavanagh and Jane M. Beckering.
The distinction is whether the statement was
made describing as a passing event, like
testimony, as compared to a statement made
during an ongoing emergency, Van Hoek
said.
This is a situation where the subject may be
too young to testify at trial, he said.
But, if the witness could testify, there likely
would be no need to use the SANE forensic
form in court, and the whole confrontation
issue would not come up.
He pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Crawford, which held a wife's
statement to police could not be used against
her husband (because she could not testify
against her spouse), and would violate his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
"Likely they will determine this is forensic
and testimonial and inadmissible as far as
testimony," Van Hoek said of Spangler.
"The broader question is it looks like the
child who is the complainant may not
testify, so the question is, would admitting
the hearsay statement of the child violate the
right of the defendant [under the
confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment]," Tanner said.
"It's a long way from resolution, it's [likely]
not going to end at the trial court, and it may
not end at the Court of Appeals, depending
on how the facts develop," he added. "I
think there are arguments on both sides."
"The Interrogation Bugaboo"
The Confrontation Blog
January 20, 2005
Richard D. Friedman
Since Crawford v. Washington, some courts
have said that a statement is not testimonial
unless it is made in response to
governmental interrogation. And indeed,
some have gone further, refusing to
characterize a statement as testimonial
unless it meets a restrictive definition of
interrogation as "structured police
questioning." This idea has begun to distort
police practices, as police try to act in such a
way that prosecutors can later argue that
statements made to the police were not in
response to interrogation.
I believe that the whole supposed
interrogation requirement is entirely
mistaken. Interrogation is a factor that in
some contexts supports an inference that the
statement is testimonial, but the statement
may be testimonial even though it is not in
response to interrogation. In this post, I will
not contend against the less extreme
proposition that only if a statement is made
to a government agent can it be testimonial.
I believe that proposition is also erroneous,
but I will address it in a later post.
Those who contend that interrogation is
necessary for a statement to be deemed
testimonial have language they can point to
in Crawford, though it is quickly apparent
that the language does not really support
them. Sylvia Crawford's statements were
made in response to police interrogation,
and the Court held that, whatever else the
category of testimonial statements might
include, statements made in response to
police interrogation certainly are. Here are
the passages in question, with emphasis
added in each case:
The Clause's primary object is
testimonial hearsay, and
interrogations by law enforcement
officers fall squarely within that
class.
Statements taken by police officers
in the course of interrogations are
also testimonial under even a narrow
standard. Police interrogations bear
a striking resemblance to
examinations by justices of the peace
in England.
In sum, even if the Sixth
Amendment is not solely concerned
with testimonial hearsay, that is its
primary object, and interrogations by
law enforcement officers fall
squarely within that class.
Whatever else the term covers, it
applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations.
These are the modern practices with
to the abuses at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed.
There is no indication, then, that statements
not made during formal testimonial events-
a preliminary hearing, grand jury or a former
trial-must be in response to police
interrogation to be considered testimonial.
The Court is very clear that it is merely
listing a core class of testimonial statements,
a class that plainly includes the statements at
issue in the case, and is deciding no more
than that these statements are testimonial.
Left for another day is the question of what
additional statements, if any, shall be
considered testimonial. It is true that the
Court left open the possibility that it will not
consider any statements beyond this core
class to be testimonial. Indeed, the fact that
the Court took the care, in footnote 4, to
offer some elaboration on the meaning of
"interrogation" -saying that it was using
the term in a colloquial sense, that it did not
have to choose among definitions, and that
"Sylvia's recorded statement, knowingly
given in response to structured police
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable
definition"-confirms that the Court
preserved the possibility that the term would
in some circumstances be decisive. But that
is as far as the Court went in this direction.
It offered no intimation that a statement not
made in response to interrogation would not
be considered testimonial. And it certainly
did not suggest that if a statement was not
"knowingly given in response to structured
police questioning" it would not be
testimonial; it merely said that a statement
meeting that standard "qualifies under any
conceivable definition."
So Crawford does not tell us that a statement
must be in response to interrogation to be
characterized as testimonial. And common
sense tells us that there is no such
requirement. Suppose that at trial a
prosecutor gives an observer an opportunity
to come to the front of the courtroom and
then says, "Ms. Observer, I invite you to tell
us what you know about this incident." After
the witness does so, the prosecutor says,
"Thank you. You may go." Of course,
defense counsel objects because of a lack of
confrontation. "But," says the prosecutor,
"this was no witness. I did not subject her to
any interrogation." The prosecutor is right
that there was no interrogation, but of course
we would expect the legal argument to be
rejected sneeringly. What Observer was
doing was testifying. It does not matter that
her statement was not given in response to
questions; nor would it matter whether she
or the prosecutor took the initiative in
arranging for her to give the testimony.
So now suppose the invitation comes not at
trial but at the police station: "Ms. Observer,
if you care to make a statement, please feel
free to do so. I will videotape it, and when
we this perpetrator stands trial I will give the
prosecutor the tape so that she can play it in
front of the jury." I think it is equally
obvious that a statement made in response to
this invitation is testimonial. And now
suppose an observer walks into the police
station and says, "You don't know about a
crime that has been committed, but I am
now going to tell you, and I expect that you
will then want to prosecute. Please record
what I am about to say, because I expect you
will want to use it at trial-I do not like the
idea of being under oath and having to
answer questions by some aggressive
defense lawyer." I cannot see a plausible
basis on which this statement should not be
deemed testimonial. Or suppose the observer
walks in to the police station with an
affidavit completed, describing the crime.
Does anyone seriously contend that this is
not testimonial?
Now, of course, the statements in these
hypotheticals are less formal than in the
usual case, in which a witness makes a
statement to a police officer in the field,
perhaps before the officer is confident that a
crime has been committed. But, for reasons
that I have already analyzed in a post called
The Formality Bugaboo, formality is not
required to render a statement decisive. If
the declarant in that field situation
understands full well that, once the officer
receives the statement, it is likely to be used
for prosecutorial purposes, it is testimonial.
The declarant is creating evidence, and this
critical reality is unaffected by the facts that
the police officer was not confident until the
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moment that the statement was made that a
crime had been committed, and that
structured questioning by the officer was not
necessary to secure the statement.
The bottom line is that if the declarant is
making the statement with the reasonable
anticipation of prosecutorial use, it is
testimonial, even if it is made without
questioning by government authorities or
entirely on the witness's own initiative.
Interrogation may, however, be a significant
factor in indicating that the declarant did
have this anticipation, because if the
authorities are interrogating that is a factor
that would often convey to the declarant the
likelihood of prosecutorial use. But when
the declarant is reporting a crime this factor
is not necessary to characterize the statement
as testimonial; she knows that she is
conveying to the authorities information
about a crime, and presumably she
understands that they will use that
information to invoke the machinery of
criminal justice. To hold that such a
statement is not testimonial is merely to try
to avoid Crawford because it makes
prosecutions more difficult.
"911 Call Is Held as Evidence
if Victim Cannot Testify"
The New York Times
June 20, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
A crime victim's emergency call to 911 can
be introduced as evidence at trial even if the
victim is not present for cross-examination,
the Supreme Court ruled unanimously on
Monday.
At the same time the court held that
prosecutors cannot make similar use of the
transcript of a police interview that was
conducted principally for the purpose of
investigating a crime rather than responding
to a developing emergency.
The court addressed the two situations in
light of the Confrontation Clause in the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a
criminal defendant the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."
The court has interpreted this guarantee to
bar the use of "testimonial statements" by
witnesses who do not appear in court. The
question in the two cases, which the court
answered in a single opinion by Justice
Antonin Scalia, turned on whether a 911 call
on the one hand, or a statement given to the
police at a crime scene on the other,
qualified as "testimonial."
A call for help to 911 is not inherently
"testimonial" because the caller is not acting
as a witness, Justice Scalia said. "No
'witness' goes into court to proclaim an
emergency and seek help," he explained.
On the other hand, statements given to
police officers who are investigating the
scene of a crime, if similar to statements that
might be made in court, qualify as
testimonial and generally may not be
admitted, he said, at least to the extent that
they are "neither a cry for help nor the
provision of information enabling officers
immediately to end a threatening situation."
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from that
part of the opinion. Both the statements at
issue were "nontestimonial and admissible,"
he said. He added that in excluding the
statement to the police, the court "extends
the Confrontation Clause far beyond the
abuses it was intended to prevent."
It was something of a surprise that the court
decided the two cases in a single opinion.
They were appeals from separate courts and
had been argued separately in March.
In the 911 case, Davis v. Washington, No.
05-5224, the Supreme Court of Washington
permitted prosecutors to use the 911 call to
convict a man, Adrian M. Davis, of violating
a domestic protective order. His former
girlfriend, Michelle McCottry, had made a
frantic call to a 911 operator to say that Mr.
Davis was in the house and was beating her.
At the time of Mr. Davis's trial, the
authorities were unable to locate Ms.
McCottry. In the absence of witnesses, the
911 call was vital evidence for the
prosecution.
In the other case, Hammon v. Indiana, No.
05-5705, police responded to a report of a
domestic disturbance and found evidence of
a physical struggle between a husband and
wife, Amy and Hershel Hammon. After
interviewing Mrs. Hammon, they arrested
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her husband, who was charged with battery.
Ms. Hammon was subpoenaed but did not
appear at his trial. The officer who had
interviewed her testified about what she had
told him. Mr. Hammon was found guilty.
The Indiana Supreme Court, rejecting his
argument that the statement should not have
been admitted, upheld his conviction.
The two cases attracted attention from
groups concerned with domestic violence.
Several "friend of the court" briefs told the
justices that victims of domestic violence
were often afraid to appear in court, and that
prosecutions should not be lost under an
expansive interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause. When the cases were
argued, it was evident that some justices
were concerned about the potential impact
of such a ruling.
Addressing that concern in his opinion,
Justice Scalia said defendants who "seek to
undermine the judicial process by procuring
or coercing silence from witnesses and
victims" would forfeit the protection that the
Confrontation Clause would otherwise give
them.
"Justices Rule Against Statements
Made Out of Court"
The Washington Post
March 9, 2004
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
prosecutors may not introduce as evidence
witness statements made out of court even if
a judge has deemed them reliable,
overturning a 24-year-old precedent in favor
of a new standard likely to be more
favorable to criminal defendants.
The court ruled unanimously that the state of
Washington violated Michael Crawford's
constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against him at his 1999
trial for attempted murder when it played a
tape recording of his wife Sylvia's police
interrogation, in which she undermined her
husband's claim that he had acted in self-
defense. Sylvia Crawford could not testify in
person, because Michael Crawford had
invoked the spousal privilege to block her
appearance.
The state was able to do this because of a
1980 Supreme Court ruling that permitted
the introduction of a witness statement made
out of court if the trial judge finds specific
reasons why it is trustworthy. In this case,
the state argued that the reliability of Sylvia
Crawford's statement was established
because it overlapped with her husband's
version of events.
But yesterday, in an opinion written by
Justice Antonin Scalia, the court overruled
the 1980 case, Ohio v. Roberts, holding that
the language and history of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution clearly
require that witness testimony be challenged
on cross-examination.
"Dispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty," Scalia wrote.
"This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes."
Statements by absent witnesses should be
admissible in court only when the witness is
unavailable to testify and the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine,
Scalia wrote.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, wrote
separately to say that he agreed with the
result in the case, but that the court could
have reached it without overruling Roberts.
The court's decision "casts a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials,"
Rehnquist wrote.
Crawford had been supported in the case by
the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and the American Civil
Liberties Union, which argued in a friend-
of-the-court brief that Roberts was too vague
and was being inconsistently applied.
"The Supreme Court's decision will
fundamentally alter the way that criminal
defendants are tried across the nation,"
Crawford's lawyer, Jeffrey Fisher, said in a
prepared statement. "No more will
governments be able to convict people of
crimes on the basis of accusations that they
are unable to cross-examine."
In its brief, Washington state had maintained
that overturning the Roberts rule would
undermine the truth-seeking function of
trials. "The Roberts framework represents a
fair balance between a defendant's right to
confrontation and valid considerations of
public policy and should not be abandoned,"
the state argued.
The Bush administration had urged the court
to modify the Roberts rule, but not to bar all
out-of-court testimony. It proposed instead a
rule that would have permitted "inherently
reliable" statements.
But the court swept that proposal aside, with
a majority made up of the court's two
leading adherents to a "textualist" approach
to reading the Constitution, Scalia and
Justice Clarence Thomas, and its four most
liberal members, Justices John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy also joined Scalia's opinion in full.
The case is Crawford v. Washington, No.
02-9410.
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"Domestic Violence Cases Face New Test Ruling
that Suspects Can Confront Accusers Scares
Some Victims from Court"
The Dallas Morning News
July 6, 2004
Robert Tharp
Each day, up to one-half of all domestic-
violence cases set for trial in Dallas County
are thrown out because of a recent U.S.
Supreme Court ruling reasserting a suspect's
right to confront his accuser in court.
The ruling applies to all criminal trials, but
the county's two bustling courts devoted to
domestic-violence offenses are affected the
most. The reason: Domestic-violence
victims, usually wives or partners, often
refuse to cooperate with prosecutors out of
fear for their safety or because they
reconcile with their alleged attackers.
In the past, prosecutors rarely flinched when
a battered woman changed her mind about
prosecuting her mate. The widely accepted
practice was to hold a trial anyway, often
winning a conviction by having a police
officer recount what a victim said happened
at the scene of an assault.
But since the Supreme Court handed down
its ruling in the case of Crawford vs.
Washington in March, courts across the
country have found it much harder to use
those statements in trial unless the victim is
available to be cross-examined by the
defense.
"This is going to knock out a bunch of cases,
and it's too bad," said County Criminal
Court Judge Lisa Fox, who presides over
domestic-violence trials exclusively. "On
the other hand, in every other case a
defendant has a right to address, face and
confront his accuser."
The unanimous Supreme Court ruling
March 8 stems from a case in which a
Washington state man was convicted of
assault and attempted murder. At his trial,
prosecutors presented a recorded statement
made by the suspect's wife during a police
interrogation as evidence that the stabbing
was not self-defense.
In recent years, a battered woman's
cooperation often was not important in trial
because prosecutors would have police
officers testify about what victims reported
at the scene. The high court ruled that type
of hearsay testimony in most cases violates
the Sixth Amendment right to confront an
accuser.
In an opinion written by Justice Antonin
Scalia, which referred to Roman law and the
1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the
justices agreed that for hearsay testimony to
be allowed in a trial, the accusing witness in
most cases must be available for cross-
examination.
Convictions on hearsay
Defense attorneys, such as public defender
Susan Anderson, praise the ruling, saying it
levels the playing field. The reliance on the
use of police officers' hearsay statements to
win convictions had become an "epidemic"
across the country, she said.
"You can no longer convict based on the
word of a police officer," Ms. Anderson
said. "What it's saying is: We're not willing
to convict you on the word of someone else.
We want to look them in the face and
determine whether or not you're lying to me.
A lot of cases boil down to he said," she
said.
"A lot of times these people are convicted
on hearsay, and the DAs either won't or
don't call the complaining witness if they've
found that they've recanted or [it] is not
credible," Ms. Anderson said.
Public defender John Carlough, a former
Tarrant County family violence prosecutor,
said it had been too easy for prosecutors to
rely on testimony by police officers.
"Before Crawford, all we had to do was get
the officer to testify and then say that the
victim was too upset because of what had
happened," Mr. Carlough said. "You could
make an entire case with the testimony of a
police officer."
The new ruling makes it much harder to use
those statements, and individual judges are
being asked to determine whether the ruling
applies in each of the cases that comes
before them.
The determining factor: whether the victim
spontaneously blurted out what had
happened to the officer or whether the
information was gleaned in response to
direct questions from the officer.
Until the ruling, prosecutors rarely issued
subpoenas to compel domestic-violence
victims to testify. The idea was that forcing
a victim to testify could "revictimize" her,
placing her in danger if a defendant were not
convicted or did not receive jail time as
punishment.
Spontaneous statements can still be used in
court without the witness being available for
cross-examination, but information taken in
response to police questioning cannot.
Judges are drawing the line somewhere
between when a police officer's duties shift
from keeping the peace to investigating a
crime.
Showing up for trial
"This is a criminal case," Ms. Dyer said.
"The county has said this behavior is wrong.
The burden of proving it up is on the DA's
office on behalf of the community. It is not
on behalf of the victim."
For now, when a victim can't or won't show
up for a trial that falls under the ruling, the
charges are being dismissed in most cases..
The two domestic-violence courts are not
alone in the upheaval. Prosecutors are also
re-examining the way they have used
statements from criminal accomplices in
trial.
An appeals court has already overturned an
April 2002 aggravated robbery conviction of
a Dallas County man because prosecutors
used a statement taken by police from his
accomplice without making the man
available in the trial to be cross-examined.
The appeals court ordered a new trial in that
case.
Even so, many judges, attorneys and legal
experts such as Southern Methodist
University law professor Fred Moss
welcome the high court's ruling because it
adheres to long legal tradition as well as
constitutional law.
"Crawford means the Constitution trumps
evidence law," he said. "They totally
redesigned the rules because the rules as
they existed were absolute nonsense."
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Pepper v. United States
09-6822
Ruling Below: United States v. Pepper, 570 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Pepper v.
United States, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5375 (2010).
Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and was initially sentenced
to 24 months' imprisonment based on a 75% downward departure under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual. The sentence was remanded and the district court again imposed a 24-month
sentence based on a 40% downward departure and a downward variance based on factors
including defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation. The matter was remanded again because the
district court considered improper factors; that decision was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court,
and the court of appeals remanded once more. The district court then granted a 20% downward
departure and denied a downward variance. The court of appeals held that the law of the case did
not require a 40% downward departure, as the court of appeals did not limit the discretion of the
district court in resentencing defendant. The district court properly refused to consider
defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation and the cost of his incarceration, as those were not
permissible grounds for varying downward. Upon the third remand, the district court sentenced
defendant to 65 months' imprisonment. The defendant appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether a federal district judge can consider a defendant's post-
sentencing rehabilitation as a permissible factor supporting a sentencing variance under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) after Gall v. United States? (2) Whether as a sentencing consideration under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), post-sentencing rehabilitation should be treated the same as post-offense
rehabilitation? (3) When a district court judge is removed from resentencing a defendant after
remand, and a new judge is assigned, is the new judge obligated under the doctrine of the "law of
the case" to follow sentencing findings issued by the original judge that had been previously
affirmed on appeal?
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
V.
Jason PEPPER, Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed July 2, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
RILEY, Circuit Judge. abused its discretion in resentencing Jason
Pepper (Pepper). This is the fourth time our
At issue in this appeal is whether the district court has considered Pepper's case. We have
court exceeded the scope of our court's remanded the case for resentencing three
remand, committed procedural error, and times, and Pepper has been resentenced by
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two different district court judges after
pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine. Having carefully
reviewed the record, we now affirm the
sentence and judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 22, 2003, Pepper was charged
with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or
more of a mixture or substance containing
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Pepper
pled guilty to the charge pursuant to a plea
agreement. Based on Pepper's total offense
level of 30 and criminal history category I,
Pepper's advisory United States Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) range
was 97 to 121 months imprisonment.
Although the charge to which Pepper pled
guilty carried a mandatory minimum
sentence of 120 months imprisonment, the
mandatory minimum did not apply because
Pepper was eligible for safety-valve relief
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.
The government filed a motion for a
downward departure, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
5Kl.1, based on Pepper's substantial
assistance, and recommended a 15%
downward departure. The district court
judge assigned to Pepper's case at the time
sentenced Pepper to 24 months
imprisonment, resulting in an approximately
75% downward departure from the low end
of Pepper's advisory Guidelines range, and
5 years supervised release. The district court
explained it arrived at the sentence of 24
months imprisonment because this was the
minimum sentence Pepper could receive and
still be eligible for the drug treatment
program at the federal prison in Yankton,
South Dakota.
The government appealed, and we reversed
and remanded for resentencing, holding the
district court erred by considering a matter
unrelated to Pepper's assistance in granting
the downward departure, "namely its desire
to sentence Mr. Pepper to the shortest
possible term of imprisonment that would
allow him to participate in the intensive drug
treatment program at the federal prison in
Yankton." We also reasoned, "given the
pedestrian nature of Mr. Pepper's assistance,
it is far from certain that the district court
would have arrived at the same guidelines
sentence had it considered only assistance-
related elements."
On remand, the district court again
sentenced Pepper to 24 months
imprisonment. The district court arrived at
this sentence by first granting a 40%
downward departure based on Pepper's
substantial assistance, bringing the bottom
of Pepper's advisory Guidelines range to 58
months. The district court then granted a
downward variance from the 58 months to a
sentence of 24 months imprisonment. The
downward variance was based on Pepper's
lack of a history of violence, the disparity in
sentences between Pepper and his co-
defendants, and Pepper's post-sentencing
rehabilitation.
The government appealed this sentence, and
we again reversed and remanded for
resentencing. We concluded that, while it
was "a close call, we [could not] say the
district court abused its discretion by the
extent of the [U.S.S.G.] § 5Kl departure."
However, we held the district court abused
its discretion in granting the downward
variance because the district court
considered improper factors, namely
Pepper's post-sentencing rehabilitation, his
lack of a history of violence, and the
disparity in sentences among Pepper and his
co-defendants "without adequate foundation
and explanation." Based on statements the
district court made during Pepper's
resentencing hearing, expressing a
reluctance to resentence Pepper should the
case again be remanded, we remanded the
case for reassignment and resentencing by a
different district court judge.
In the district court, Pepper's case was
reassigned. On July 18, 2007, after giving
the parties an opportunity to file briefs, the
new district court judge issued an order on
the scope of the remand (Remand Order),
declaring, "The court will not consider itself
bound to reduce [Pepper's] advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range by 40%
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.l." The district
court also informed the parties, in
determining the appropriate downward
departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1, it
would not consider any evidence of
substantial assistance Pepper provided after
Pepper's first resentencing.
In the meantime, Pepper petitioned the
Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, and the
Supreme Court granted the petition on
January 7, 2008, vacating Pepper II and
remanding the case to our court for further
consideration in light of Gall v. United
States. In Pepper III, we "considered Gall's
impact on Pepper's case," and we again
reversed the sentence and remanded for
resentencing before a different district court
judge.
Pepper's case was again reassigned. The
district court convened a resentencing
hearing on October 17, 2008, at which time
the parties presented witness testimony and
other evidence, and counsel made
arguments. The district court informed the
parties, due to the extensive procedural
history in Pepper's case, the district court
intended to consider the arguments and
evidence, issue a sentencing memorandum,
and sentence Pepper at a later date.
On December 22, 2008, the district court
issued a twenty-seven page sealed
sentencing memorandum (Sentencing
Memorandum). The district court noted the
remand language of Pepper III was nearly
identical to the language in Pepper II, and
for the reasons stated in the earlier Remand
Order, the district court again determined it
was not "bound to reduce [Pepper's]
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by
40% for substantial assistance pursuant to
[U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1]." The district court
determined Pepper was entitled to a 20%
downward departure for his substantial
assistance. The district court next considered
Pepper's request for a downward variance
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) based upon
Pepper's characteristics and history, post-
offense and post-sentencing rehabilitation,
the disparity in sentences among Pepper and
his co-defendants, and the cost of Pepper's
incarceration. After considering the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and Pepper's
arguments, the district court denied Pepper's
motion for a downward variance.
On January 5, 2009, the district court
reconvened Pepper's resentencing hearing to
impose a sentence. Based on the district
court's decision to grant a 20% downward
departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1,
Pepper's advisory Guidelines range was 77
to 97 months. The district court sentenced
Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12
months supervised release. Thereafter, the
district court granted the government's
January 2, 2009, Rule 35(b) motion to
reduce Pepper's sentence further for the
assistance Pepper provided after he was
initially sentenced, reducing Pepper's
sentence to 65 months imprisonment.
Pepper's appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"We review all sentences, whether inside or
outside the Guidelines range, under a
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deferential abuse of discretion standard."
We "must first ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error.".
B. Downward Departure
1. Scope of Our Remand for Resentencing
Pepper first argues "[t]he scope of the
remand and law of the case from Pepper II
and Pepper III required [the district court] to
reduce Pepper's advisory [Guidelines] range
by at least 40% pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
5Kl.l." The government disagrees and
contends the law of the case doctrine does
not apply because our court did not place
any limitation upon the district court's
discretion in resentencing Pepper.
"On remand for resentencing, all issues
decided by the appellate court become the
law of the case, and the sentencing court is
bound to proceed within the scope of any
limitations imposed . . . by the appellate
court." "Under the law of the case doctrine,
a district court must follow our mandate, and
we retain the authority to decide whether the
district court scrupulously and fully carried
out our mandate's terms." "Ultimately, the
scope of a remand must be determined by
reference to the analysis contained in the
opinion." When we decide to remand a case
for resentencing, we have two options: (1)
we may remand the case with instructions
limiting the scope of the district court's
discretion, or (2) we may remand without
placing any limitations on the district court's
discretion.
We used the following remand language in
the conclusion of Pepper III: "For the
foregoing reasons, we again reverse and
remand Pepper's case for resentencing
consistent with this opinion. As the district
court expressed a reluctance to resentence
Pepper again should the case be remanded,
we again remand this case for resentencing
by a different judge." Pepper II~s remand
language is nearly identical to the remand
language in Pepper I.
In the district court's Remand Order, which
was reaffirmed by the district court in the
Sentencing Order, the district court
explained, "The only specific restrictions on
the court's decision on remand were (1) the
second resentencing hearing should take
place before a different judge and (2) such
judge's decision should be 'consistent with
[Pepper II]."' The district court observed
that while our court "indicated that a 40%
downward departure was not an abuse of
discretion[,]" we did not "hold that a 40%
downward departure [wa]s the only
reasonable outcome for [Pepper] or that the
[district] court must impose a 40%
downward departure on remand pursuant to
USSG §5Kl.l."
We agree with the reasoning of the district
court. Our remand was a general remand for
resentencing. Our opinions in Pepper II and
Pepper III did not place any limitations on
the discretion of the newly assigned district
court judge in resentencing Pepper. We did
not specify the district court's discretion
would be restricted to considering whether a
downward variance was warranted, nor did
we specify the district court would be bound
by the 40% downward departure previously
granted. We concluded a 40% downward
departure was not an abuse of discretion. In
other words, a 40% downward departure
was within the range of reasonableness.
Under the circumstances of Pepper's case, a
complete resentencing without any
restrictions on the district court's discretion
was preferable, in contrast to a partial,
piecemeal resentencing limiting the
sentencing judge's discretion. We conclude
neither scope of our remand, nor the law of
the case doctrine, required the district court
to grant Pepper a 40% downward departure
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for substantial assistance.
2. Extent of the Downward Departure
We turn to Pepper's next argument that the
district court abused its discretion by
refusing to depart downward by more than
20% based on Pepper's substantial
assistance. We dispose of this argument
easily. "[T]he extent of a downward
departure in the defendant's favor lies within
the district court's discretion and is virtually
unreviewable on a defendant's appeal,
absent an unconstitutional motive animating
the district court." As Pepper has not
asserted an unconstitutional motive played a
role in the district court's decision, we lack
jurisdiction to review the extent of the
departure. We affirm the district court's
judgment with respect to the extent of the
downward departure.
C. Downward Variance
Pepper next challenges the district court's
denial of his motion for a downward
variance. Pepper argues the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to consider
Pepper's post-sentencing rehabilitation and
the cost of his incarceration as bases for
varying downward under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).
1. Post-Sentencing Rehabilitation
While Pepper acknowledges our court
explicitly has stated that post-sentencing
rehabilitation is not a permissible factor to
consider in granting a downward variance,
and that the district court was merely
following our precedent in refusing to
consider this factor, Pepper nevertheless
suggests, under the unique circumstances of
his case, post-sentencing rehabilitation is an
appropriate consideration. Pepper urges us
to consider the fact Pepper's rehabilitation
began before Pepper "realized his 24 month
sentence of imprisonment and five years of
supervised release would turn into a 65
month term of imprisonment and one year of
supervised release."
We agree Pepper made significant progress
during and following his initial period of
imprisonment. While in prison, Pepper
completed a 500-hour drug treatment
program. Three days after we issued our
opinion in Pepper I, Pepper completed his
term of imprisonment on June 27, 2005, and
began serving his term of supervised release.
Pepper enrolled at Western Iowa Tech
Community College. In 2007, Pepper
married and became a stepfather to his
wife's daughter. At the time of his second
resentencing in October 2008, Pepper was
working as a supervisor of the night crew at
Sam's Club and attending school in Illinois.
We commend Pepper on the positive
changes he has made in his life. However,
the law of our circuit is clear. "[E]vidence of
[a defendant]'s post-sentence rehabilitation
is not relevant and will not be permitted at
resentencing because the district court could
not have considered that evidence at the
time of the original sentencing." "This panel
is bound by Eighth Circuit precedent, and
cannot overrule an earlier decision by
another panel."
2. Cost of Incarceration
Finally, Pepper contends the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to consider
the cost of incarceration as a basis for
varying downward. In the Sentencing
Memorandum, the district court cited as
support for its decision our prior opinions in
United States v. Collins and United States v.
Wong. The district court then opined, even if
the cost of incarceration were an appropriate
consideration under Eighth Circuit
precedent, the district court did "not believe
the cost of incarceration fits with any of the
factors listed for imposing sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)."
We agree with the reasoning of the district
court, and this view was shared by another
panel of our court in a recent opinion. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to consider the cost of Pepper's
incarceration as a basis for varying
downward.
Further, "giv[ing] due deference to the
district court's decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify" Pepper's
sentence, our review of Pepper's sentence
reveals no abuse of the district court's
considerable discretion and no basis for
concluding Pepper's sentence is
substantively unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm Pepper's sentence and the
judgment of the district court.
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"8th Circuit Limits Reasons Behind Reduced
Sentences for Helping"
St. Louis Daily Record
June 28, 2005
Donna Walter
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines do not
allow federal trial courts to consider factors
unrelated to a defendant's assistance to
prosecutors when entering a downward
departure based on a motion by the
government, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals said Friday [in United States of
America vs. Jason Pepper].
The decision puts the 8th Circuit in line with
six other circuits that have considered this
question.
The issue arose in March 2004 when Chief
Judge Mark W. Bennett of the U.S. District
Court in the Northern District of Iowa
sentenced defendant Jason Pepper to 24
months in prison after he pleaded guilty to
conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more
of methamphetamine mixture. Pepper's
sentencing range under the guidelines fell at
97 months to 121 months, but the
government filed a motion for a downward
departure under Section 5K1.1 because
Pepper had provided the government with
information about two other people involved
with illegal guns and drugs. The
government's motion requested a 15 percent
departure, which would have put Pepper's
sentence at 82 months.
Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines
gives the government the right to file a
motion for a substantial-assistance departure
and then states: (a) The appropriate
reduction shall be determined by the court
for reasons stated that may include, but are
not limited to, consideration of the
following: (1) the court's evaluation of the
significance and usefulness of the
defendant's assistance, taking into
consideration the government's evaluation
of the assistance rendered; (2) the
truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of
any information or testimony provided by
the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of
the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury
suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to
the defendant or his family resulting from
his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the
defendant's assistance.
We do not think that the similarity of the
examples is a coincidence, wrote Circuit
Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold for the
unanimous panel.
The appellate court adopted the reasoning of
the 7th Circuit in United States vs. Thomas,
decided in 1991. The 7th Circuit said, "Had
the Sentencing Commission wished to
permit courts to consider factors unrelated to
the quality of the defendant's cooperation
when departing because of that cooperation,
it seems likely that it would have
promulgated a list of examples
encompassing factors unrelated to
cooperation."
Arnold added, "Buttressing this conclusion
is the fact that the finely reticulated structure
of the guidelines indicates that the
commission was neither careless in its
selection of examples nor bent on giving
courts the sort of discretion that follows
from allowing them to extend or shorten
departures for any reason under the sun. We
believe that the same arguments apply to the
background section of the commentary to
the guidelines."
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In arriving at this conclusion, the appellate
court rejected as dicta pronouncements it
had made in two earlier decisions. The
language in each decision allowed the
consideration of matters unrelated to the
substantial-assistance departure motion. In
the 1998 decision of United States vs.
Anzalone, the court said a district court
could consider post-plea agreement drug
use, but the question before the court dealt
with what matters the government could
consider when deciding whether to file a
substantial-assistance departure motion in
the first place. In United States vs. Pizano,
decided in April, the court looked at the
commentary of the provision regarding the
nature, extent and significance of the
assistance and said those aren't the only
legitimate considerations and that relevant
factors are to be considered. According to
the court, this was dictum because the panel
had already decided the extent of the
downward departure hadn't been based on a
factor unrelated to the assistance.
Once the 8th Circuit determined unrelated
factors may not be considered in substantial-
assistance departures, it found the trial
judge's reasoning behind the decision to
sentence Pepper to 24 months in prison was
unrelated to the assistance Pepper gave the
government. Specifically, the judge decided
on the 24-month sentence because that was
the minimum sentence Pepper could receive
and still take part in the prison's intensive
drug treatment program.
The 8th Circuit remanded the case back to
the trial judge for resentencing.
Senior Circuit Judge C. Arlen Beam and
Circuit Judge William Jay Riley concurred
with Arnold's opinion.
United States of America, appellant, vs.
Jason Pepper, appellee; No. 04-2057;
handed down June 24.
"Court: Meth Dealer Should
Be Sentenced Again"
Sioux City Journal
May 25, 2007
A federal appeals court has overturned the
prison sentence of a convicted
methamphetamine dealer, and removed the
judge who had sentenced him twice before.
The St. Louis-based 8th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that Jason Pepper, who
pleaded guilty three years ago to conspiring
to distribute more than 500 grams of
methamphetamine in the Sioux City area,
should be sentenced a third time. It also said
U.S. District Judge Mark Bennett should be
replaced as the sentencing judge, citing his
reluctance to sentencing Pepper again.
The case was reassigned to U.S. District
Judge Linda Reade.
Pepper was released from prison after
serving nearly all of his initial 24-month
sentence. He now lives in Illinois, where he
works full-time and goes to college.
Bennett reduced Pepper's sentence by 75
percent because he pleaded guilty and
testified on the government's behalf.
Prosecutors appealed, saying the sentence
should only have been reduced by 15
percent.
The appeals court agreed, saying Bennett's
reduction was too lenient and returned the
case for resentencing. Bennett sentenced
Pepper again, reducing it by 59 percent, and
prosecutors appealed.
The appeals court cited several factors in
reversing Pepper's sentence, including that
other co-defendants received much longer
sentences.
The court also said that Bennett abused his
discretion in issuing the lighter sentences.
Bennett declined comment.
Patrick Parry, Pepper's attorney, objected to
the court's decision.
"He's out of custody now... and he's going
to have to go back to prison potentially
when everyone agrees he doesn't pose a risk
to the community for something for which
he's already done his time," Parry said.
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"Reformed Drug Addict
Returning to Prison"
The News-Gazette
April 1, 2009
Jim Dey
Travel plans called for Jason Pepper to say
goodbye to his daughter Tuesday morning at
their home in St. Joseph and then begin a
long drive with his wife to Florence, Colo.,
where he was to report Thursday to a
minimum-security prison.
"It's rough. I'm having good hours and bad
hours," Pepper said the day before he was
scheduled to depart.
At the same time, the 29-year-old was
philosophical about his return to prison after
a federal appeals court ruled that his initial
two-year sentence, which ended in 2005,
was too short and that he must be
resentenced to a longer period of
incarceration.
"It's not something that's going to kill me..
. . If they're going to make me do it, what
choice do I have?" he said.
The News-Gazette reported in early March
about Pepper's legal troubles.
A former methamphetamine addict who sold
the drug to finance his habit, Pepper was
arrested by federal agents in Sioux City,
Iowa, where he was living, in October 2003.
He pleaded guilty to methamphetamine
distribution and was sentenced by U.S.
Judge Michael Bennett to two years.
Pepper broke his addiction to meth during
his incarceration and said he vowed to make
a productive life for himself after his release.
Discharged from federal prison in Yankton,
S.D., following 21 months in custody, he
went back to school, worked and married.
Meanwhile, prosecutors appealed the
judge's initial two-year sentence. Finally,
after a series of appeals that went all the way
to the U.S. Supreme Court and took more
than three years, the government won a
ruling that Pepper must be resentenced.
Earlier this year, U.S. Judge Linda Reade
resentenced Pepper to 65 months of
incarceration but allowed him to remain free
until contacted by the federal Bureau of
Prisons and told where to report. Pepper said
he received a phone call two weeks ago
telling him he should report on Thursday to
the Colorado facility.
It's unclear how long Pepper will be held.
He was sentenced to 65 months. But he's
already served 21 months and been given
good-time credit for another three months.
He also participated in an addiction
education program at Yankton that entitles
inmates to a 12-month reduction in sentence,
a discount Pepper never received because of
his 2005 release.
So while Pepper is certain not to serve 65
months, the Bureau of Prisons will have to
determine how long he will be held.
Whatever it is, Pepper faces a considerable
separation from his wife, Hannah, and his
child.
Pepper said he's trying to be as positive as
he can about the future. Noting that smoking
is banned in federal prison, Pepper said he is
pleased that "I'm going to get to quit
smoking."
"That's one positive. But my list of positives
does not outweigh my list of negatives," he
said.
Pepper last week resigned a job he held at
Sam's Club in Champaign. A supervisor on
the night shift, he said he hopes to return to
the company when he's released and work
his way into management. "I don't think
(going back to work there) is an issue," he
said, noting that his bosses have supported
him during his appeals.
Pepper is not without hope of a legal
reprieve. His lawyers have appealed Judge
Reade's 65-month sentence to the 8th
Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis. They
also have asked, so far without response,
that he be allowed to remain free on bond
while the issue is in litigation.
Pepper's story is a cautionary tale about the
astounding addictive power of
methamphetamine. He said he had
experimented with alcohol and other drugs
while in high school. But his intended
experimentation with methamphetamine
turned into a multiyear addiction that
dominated his every waking moment.
He said amphetamine use can end in one of
two ways-jail or death. Pepper said he was
glad he ultimately was arrested, because
being locked up and cut off from meth
prevented an early death.
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"Private Lawyer to Argue Sentencing"
SCOTUSblog
July 22, 2010
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court on Thursday named a
New York City lawyer and former Supreme
Court clerk to argue the side of a criminal
sentencing case that the federal government
normally would defend. The government,
however, has sided with the prison inmate
challenging his sentence in Pepper v. U.S.
(09- 6 822)--a case granted review near the
end of last Term and not yet scheduled for
oral argument.
At issue in the case is whether, under federal
law, a judge imposing a new sentence after
an earlier one was set aside is barred from
reducing the sentence as a way to give the
individual credit for having made efforts to
rehabilitate himself after the initial sentence
was imposed. The Justice Department now
takes the position that the judge may do so.
The Department had urged the Court to send
the case back to the Eighth Circuit Court to
consider the Department's present position,
but the Supreme Court went ahead and
granted review June 28 of an appeal by the
Iowa prisoner, Jason Pepper.
In Thursday's order, the Court chose Adam
G. Ciongoli to enter the case as a friend-of-
the-court and present a merits brief and an
oral argument that a judge lacks that
authority. Ciongoli, now engaged in
corporate practice and teaching part-time at
Columbia Law School, is a former law clerk
to Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
Pepper pleaded guilty to a charge of
conspiring to distribute an illegal drug,
methamphetamine, after being arrested
during a federal probe of a "meth"
trafficking ring in Iowa. Under federal
guidelines, his sentence could have been set
between 97 and 127 months, but the judge
imposed a sentence of only 24 months-a
figure the judge chose to make Pepper
eligible for drug rehabilitation at a federal
prison.
That reason was rejected by the Eighth
Circuit, but, at a new sentencing proceeding,
the judge again gave Pepper 24 months, in
part because of Pepper's efforts at
rehabilitation since the original sentencing.
After federal prosecutors appealed, that
sentence, too, was set aside. Ultimately,
after further proceedings, a new judge gave
Pepper 65 months in prison. He had already
served the original 24-month sentence, so
was ordered back to prison to serve the
additional 41 months.
After finishing his initial sentence, Pepper
had enrolled in college, had married and
become a stepfather, and was working as a
supervisor of the night crew at a Sam's Club
retail store. After the new, longer sentence
was imposed, Pepper appealed the case to
the Supreme Court, gaining review.
Once Pepper's lawyers and Ciongoli file
briefs on the merits, the case will be
scheduled for oral argument. If Justice-
designate Elena Kagan is on the Court when
the case is considered, she presumably will
not take part, since she was counsel of
record for the government in the case in her
post as U.S. Solicitor General.
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Schwarzenegger v. Plata
09-1233
Ruling Below: Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2711 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
jurisdiction postponed, Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4817 (2010).
In Plata v. Schwarzenegger and Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, the federal courts initially issued
narrow orders requiring California to develop and implement remedial plans to bring the
California prison system's medical and mental health care into constitutional compliance.
However, as the state time and again failed to meet its own remedial targets, both courts were
forced to adopt increasingly drastic remedies, culminating in the Plata court's 2005 appointment
of a receiver to manage the prison medical system. Ultimately, by late 2006 it became apparent
that the overcrowding in California's prisons rendered the efforts of the courts insufficient. At
the request of the Plata and Coleman courts, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit convened a three-judge court to consider the plaintiffs' request for
a court-ordered reduction in the California prison population. The court found overcrowding to
be the primary cause of violations within California's prison system. It approved a population
limit of 137.5% of design capacity, and it ordered the state to submit a plan as to how it can best
reduce the current prison population from its present level of more than 190% of design capacity.
On November 12, 2009, the State timely submitted a plan to reduce the prison population to the
required 137.5% of design capacity by December 2011. At the plaintiffs' request, a three-judge
panel then entered an order requiring the defendants to achieve the population reduction
benchmarks set forth in the plan.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the three-judge district court had jurisdiction to issue a
"prisoner release order" pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 18 U.S.C. §
3626. (2) Whether the court below properly interpreted and applied Section 3626(a)(3)(E), which
requires a three-judge court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that "crowding is the
primary cause of the violation of a Federal right; and ... no other relief will remedy the violation
of the Federal right" in order to issue a "prisoner release order." (3) Whether the three-judge
court's "prisoner release order," which was entered to address the allegedly unconstitutional
delivery of medical and mental health care to two classes of California inmates, but mandates a
system-wide population cap within two years that will require a population reduction of
approximately 46,000 inmates, satisfies the PLRA's nexus and narrow tailoring requirements
while giving sufficient weight to potential adverse effects on public safety and the State's
operation of its criminal justice system.
Ralph COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
V.
Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, et al., Defendants.
Marciano Plata, et al., Plaintiffs,
V.
Arnold Schwarzenegger, et al., Defendants.
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
Decided January 12, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
On August 4, 2009, this three-judge court
issued an Opinion and Order finding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that
crowding is the primary cause of the
constitutional inadequacies in the delivery of
medical and mental health care to California
inmates and that no relief other than a
"prison release order," as that term is
broadly defined by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA"), 18 U .S.C. §
3626(g)(4), is capable of remedying these
constitutional deficiencies. We further
concluded that relief requiring the State to
reduce the population of its thirty-three adult
prisons to 137.5% of their total design
capacity was narrowly drawn, would extend
no further than necessary to correct the
violation of California inmates' federal
constitutional rights, and was the least
intrusive means necessary to correct that
violation. Accordingly, in consideration of
this court's limited role and the State's
"wide discretion within the bounds of
constitutional requirements" we ordered the
State to provide "a population reduction plan
that will in no more than two years reduce
the population of the CDCR's adult
institutions to 137.5% of their combined
design capacity." As required by the PLRA,
we also gave "substantial weight to any
adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of a criminal justice system" and
determined, based on the evidence presented
at trial, that means exist by which the
defendants can accomplish the necessary
population reduction without creating an
adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of the criminal justice system.
The State submitted a proposed prison
population reduction plan on September 18,
2009, but that proposed plan would have
reduced the prison population to only 166%
of design capacity in two years absent
further legislation, and 151% of design
capacity in two years if all of the proposals
were granted legislative approval. Because
the plan that the State provided did not
comply with our August 4, 2009 Order, we
rejected the plan and ordered the State to
submit a revised population reduction plan
that complied with our August 4 Order. On
November 12, 2009, the State timely
submitted a revised plan. In accordance with
our Orders, this revised plan proposed
measures estimated to reduce the prison
population to the required 137.5% of design
capacity by December 2011.
On December 7, 2009, plaintiffs agreed that
the State's revised plan satisfied the
requirements of our August 4, 2009 Order
and proposed that we enter an order
requiring the defendants to achieve the six-
month population reduction benchmarks set
forth in the revised plan without ordering
implementation of any specific population
reduction measures. We agree that such an
order is appropriate because it would afford
the State maximum flexibility in its efforts
to achieve the constitutionally required
population reduction.
340
As defendants and county intervenors
observe in their December 18, 2009 replies
to plaintiffs' response, we have not
evaluated the public safety impact of each
individual element of the State's proposed
plan. However, the evidence presented at
trial demonstrated that means exist to reduce
the prison population without a significant
adverse impact on public safety or the
criminal justice system. Certain of the
measures suggested by the State, such as
raising the threshold for grand theft and
limiting the maximum sentence for certain
enumerated felonies to 366 days to be
served in county jail, were not included
within the means we considered in our
August 4 Opinion and Order, and were thus
not evaluated from the standpoint of public
safety. We noted, however, that they had
previously been endorsed by state officials,
and thus, presumably, "would not have an
adverse effect on public safety." Certain
measures that we concluded would
substantially reduce the prison population
that we did evaluate positively from a public
safety standpoint, such as changes with
respect to the churning of technical parole
violators, appear to be included only in part
in the State's plan. We believe, as we did
when we issued our prior Order, that it is
appropriate for the State to exercise its
discretion in choosing which specific
population reduction measures to
implement, and, in doing so, to bear in mind
the necessity for ensuring the public safety.
We are satisfied that, as we previously held,
the reduction in prison population that we
have ordered can be implemented safely and
trust that the State will comply with its duty
to ensure public safety as it implements the
constitutionally required reduction. Should
the State determine that any of the specific
measures that it has included in its plan
cannot be implemented without significantly
affecting the public safety or the criminal
justice system, we trust that it will substitute
a different means of accomplishing the
constitutionally required population
reductions.
We emphasize here that we are not
endorsing or ordering the implementation of
any of the specific measures contained in the
State's plan, only that the State reduce the
prison population to the extent and at the
times designated in this Order. We also
emphasize that we do not intend by this
Order to prohibit the State from taking
actions that may have the effect of reducing
the prison population, whatever their impact
on public safety, should those actions be
taken for reasons other than compliance with
our Order.
The concerns that county intervenors
express regarding funding may have merit.
Counties may well require additional
financial resources from the State in order to
ensure that no significant adverse public
safety impact results from the State's
population reduction measures. Counties
may, for example, need additional financial
resources in order to fund the additional
costs of ongoing rehabilitation, re-entry,
drug or alcohol, educational, and job
training programs. Reducing the number of
persons it imprisons should result in
significant savings to the State. We do not
now decide whether and to what extent the
State should allocate part of its savings from
such reductions to the counties; instead, we
note that whether public safety requires such
a reallocation demands serious consideration
by the State, both under its general
responsibilities to the public and in accord
with the PLRA.
In light of all of the above, as well as our
August 4, 2009 Opinion and Order, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. In accordance with the figures in
defendants' November 12, 2009 revised
population reduction plan, defendants shall
reduce the population of California's thirty-
three adult prisons as follows:
a. To no more than 167% of design capacity
by six months from the effective date of this
Order.
b. To no more than 155% of design capacity
by twelve months from the effective date of
this Order.
c. To no more than 147% of design capacity
by eighteen months from the effective date
of this Order.
d. To no more than 137.5% of design
capacity by twenty-four months from the
effective date of this Order.
"Design capacity" for purposes of these
benchmarks may not remain static. For
example, an increase in design capacity
through construction would decrease the
number of inmates by which the prison
population must be reduced. Conversely, a
decrease in design capacity, such as would
result from the closing of a prison, would
increase the numeric reduction required.
2. All population reduction measures
undertaken by defendants must comply not
only with our Orders and the PLRA, but also
with any relevant orders entered by other
courts, including the individual Plata and
Coleman courts.
3. Within fourteen days following each of
the deadlines described above, defendants
shall file a report advising the court whether
the estimated population reduction has been
achieved. This report shall include the total
reduction in the population of California's
adult prisons that has been achieved; the
current population of those institutions, both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of
design capacity; and the reductions
associated with each of the individual
measures that defendants described in their
November 12, 2009 plan as well as any
additional or alternative population
reduction measures that it may have
subsequently adopted. If the State has failed
to achieve the required population reduction,
defendants shall advise the court as to the
reasons for such deficiency and what
measures they have taken or propose to take
to remedy it. They also shall advise the court
as to whether such deficiency could have
been avoided by the exercise of executive
authority, such as that invested in the
Governor and other officials by the
California Emergency Services Act. Finally,
defendants shall advise the court whether
legislative changes are required to remedy
any deficiency and, if so, what efforts
defendants have made to obtain such
changes, including specific proposals made
to the legislature and the legislative
responses to such proposals. Defendants are
advised that we may also order the
submission of interim reports informing the
court of what specific tasks defendants
intend to undertake during each six-month
period and the specific persons responsible
for executing those tasks.
4. If, at any time, the State believes that the
waiver of state law by this court is necessary
to permit it to meet any of the above
population reduction deadlines, defendants
shall promptly file a statement with this
court, explaining the reasons that they
believe such waiver to be necessary;
whether they have considered and rejected
all other available remedies; if they have
rejected such remedies, the reasons therefor;
and why the proposed waiver is permissible
under the PLRA and the Constitution of the
United States.
5. To the extent that population reduction
measures implemented by the State increase
the need for re-entry, rehabilitation,
education, job training or other community
services provided by the counties, or
necessitate other measures be undertaken by
such counties, defendants shall, in
cooperation with the counties, calculate the
amount of additional funds that the counties
may require from the State in order to
maintain the level of public safety at or
about the existing level. Within thirty days
of the effective date of this Order,
defendants shall file with this court a
statement setting forth (1) the amounts
agreed upon or, should there be no
agreement, the parties' respective positions
as to such amounts, and (2) what steps
defendants have taken or plan to take to
fulfill their obligations to the counties in
connection with the implementation of the
prison population reduction measures,
including the allocation to the counties of a
portion of any budgetary savings resulting
from such implementation. It would be in
the interest of both the State and the counties
to commence such discussions prior to the
effective date of this Order.
6. The effective date of this Order is
STAYED pending the United States
Supreme Court's consideration of the appeal
of our August 4, 2009 Opinion and Order
and any appeal of this Order. Unless this
Order is rendered moot by the Court's
disposition of any such appeal, the effective
date of this Order shall be the day following
the final resolution by the Court of a timely-
filed appeal of this Order or, if no such
appeal is filed, the later of the day following
the expiration of defendant's time for filing
an appeal and the day following the Court's
final resolution of the appeal of our August
4 Opinion and Order.
7. We note that this stay grants the State
additional time in which to reduce the
population of its adult prisons, which
Defendant Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger has proclaimed are in a
state of emergency due to overcrowding. In
addition, the stay affords defendants the
time and opportunity to seek legislation
enacting those prisoner population reduction
measures that they proposed in their
November 12, 2009 revised plan, but
asserted that they lacked the authority to
implement. We also note that defendants
represented in their November 12, 2009 plan
that they would seek legislation affording
them such authority. Accordingly, within
fourteen days of the effective date of this
Order, defendants shall file a report advising
this court whether they have obtained the
requisite authority for such measures or for
other alternative measures that would
achieve equal or greater reductions in the
prison population, and, if not, what efforts
they have made towards obtaining such
authority, including what specific proposals
they have made and what specific responses
have been received from the legislature, if
any.
As we have repeatedly stated, we do not
intervene lightly in the State's management
of its prisons. However, the State's long-
standing failure to provide constitutionally
adequate medical and mental health care to
its prison inmates has necessitated our
actions, and our prison population reduction
Order is the least intrusive remedy for the
constitutional violations at issue. We
reiterate our "hope that California's
leadership will act constructively and
cooperatively . . . so as to ultimately
eliminate the need for further federal
intervention." We do, however, necessarily
reserve the right, and indeed we have the
obligation, to order additional steps to
implement our August 4 Order should the
actions taken by the State fail to meet any
six-month reduction goal set forth in this
Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
"Top Court to Hear Inmate Release Case"
Los Angeles Times
June 15, 2010
David G. Savage
Agreeing to hear an appeal from Gov.
Arnold Schwarzenegger, the U.S. Supreme
Court said Monday it will decide whether
the state can be forced to release 46,000
inmates-more than one-fourth of its prison
population-to relieve overcrowding.
The justices said they would hear the case in
the fall and rule early next year.
The court's intervention was a victory for
the governor and state prison officials.
"We continue to believe federal judges do
not have the authority to order the early
release of prisoners in our state," said
Rachel Arrezola, a spokeswoman for the
governor. "California should be able to take
action on its own to keep its citizens safe
without interference from the federal
courts."
At issue in the case is whether federal judges
can cure a constitutional violation in a state
prison system by ordering the release of
some inmates.
A special three-judge panel decided last year
that the state's prisoners were being given
inadequate medical and mental health care.
Denying needed care to prisoners has been
held to violate the 8th Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment.
The judges concluded the overcrowding was
the "primary cause" of this violation, and
they ordered the state to cap the population
of its prisons at 137% of capacity. State
officials say they would have to release
46,000 inmates over two years to comply
with that order.
California's state prison system is the
nation's largest, with 165,000 inmates.
The governor and a group of Republican
state lawmakers appealed the prisoner-
release order, arguing that the judges had
overstepped their authority under a federal
law intended to restrict lawsuits involving
prisons. In his appeal, Schwarzenegger
called the order "unprecedented" and said it
"intrudes on the state's authority over its
prison system."
The case was years in the making, however.
U.S. District Judges Thelton Henderson in
San Francisco and Lawrence Karlton in
Sacramento had ruled in separate cases that
prisoners were being denied needed medical
care. Court officials stepped in and decided
to have a three-judge panel consider the
state's prison system as a whole. Judge
Stephen Reinhardt from Los Angeles, who
serves on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,
was added to panel.
The judges said last year that they concluded
they saw no other remedy than to reduce the
prison population. However, they agreed to
put their order on hold until the state
appealed.
The Supreme Court said it would hear the
case, known as Schwarzenegger vs. Plata,
in its new term beginning in October and
decide whether the judges went too far.
Donald Specter, director of the Prison Law
Office that brought the class-action suit
alleging inadequate healthcare, said he was
not surprised by the high court's action.
"There was always a danger," he said, that
the liberal-leaning panel in California would
be reversed by a conservative majority of
justices in Washington.
"But the three-judge panel did exactly what
Congress told them to do in these
situations," Specter said.
"And the three judges are also doing what
the governor has tried to in each of the past
three years" by reducing the prison
population and the state's spending on
corrections.
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"Ruling on California Prison Overcrowding:
Cut 57,000 Prisoners"
The Wall Street Journal
February 10, 2009
Ashby Jones
It sounds like the opening of a lousy movie
(set in "the near future," of course, like most
dystopia pics): prison wardens reluctantly
throwing open their doors after orders from
well-intentioned but misguided judges fed
up with prison overcrowding.
What's happening in California isn't quite
that dire, but the prison system got a stern
rebuke from a three-judge panel yesterday,
which tentatively ruled that the state must
reduce its prison population by as many as
57,000 people....
The ruling came in the midst of a lawsuit
brought by inmates claiming that the
California prison system had deprived them
of a constitutional level of medical and
health care.
Their order is not final, but U.S. District
Court Judges Thelton Henderson and
Lawrence Karlton and the Ninth Circuit's
Stephen Reinhardt-a left-of-center panel,
to be sure-effectively told the state that it
had lost the trial and would have to make
dramatic changes in its prisons unless it
could reach a settlement with inmates'
lawyers.
"There is . . . uncontroverted evidence that,
because of overcrowding, there are not
enough clinical facilities or resources to
accommodate inmates with medical or
mental health needs at the level of care they
require," the judges wrote in a 10-page
decision.
State officials immediately said they would
appeal.
If the state is ordered to reduce the prison
population, it would likely be able to do so
over two or three years, so it would not have
to release large numbers of inmates at once.
Some methods of cutting the population
include limiting new admissions, changing
policies so parole violators return to prison
less frequently, and giving prisoners more
time off of their sentences for good behavior
and rehabilitation efforts.
"Governor Files 'Good Faith' Prisons Plan"
The Sacramento Bee
September 19, 2009
Kevin Yamamura
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger filed a plan
Friday to ease prison overcrowding that falls
well short of a demand by federal judges to
reduce 40,000 inmates in two years.
The main proposal would cut
inmates in the next two years.
18,212
Schwarzenegger will submit an alternate
scenario that would reach the three-judge
panel's target in five years by reducing
44,907 imates-if the Legislature approves
additional changes. Those include an
"alternative custody" proposal allowing
lower-level offenders to go on house arrest
for their final 12 months. The Assembly
rejected that idea last week.
Even under the alternate scenario, the state
would only reduce the prison population by
23,312 over the next two years.
If the judges reject Schwarzenegger's plan,
they could ask him to make further
reductions. They also could hold
Schwarzenegger and corrections chief
Matthew Cate in contempt for not
submitting a plan that meets the court order.
Cate framed the proposal as a "good-faith
effort" that was in "substantial compliance"
but fell short because of the Legislature. The
governor will ask lawmakers to pursue his
prison changes.
"We were disappointed that more didn't get
done," Cate said. "I think there were a lot of
legislators who were disappointed that more
didn't get done."
The judges last month ordered the state to
dramatically reduce its prison population in
response to lawsuits alleging that
overcrowding has led to unconstitutional
and inadequate levels of medical and mental
health care. They asked the state to submit a
plan by the end of Friday.
The governor's plan incorporates measures
lawmakers sent to him last week, including
parole changes that attempt to keep lower-
level offenders from re-entering the system
and keeping some offenders in county
facilities rather than state prisons.
Schwarzenegger wants to expand inmate
transfers to out-of-state prisons by 2,500, on
top of the 8,000 already housed in other
states. He would also expand the use of
private prisons each year and commute the
sentences of 600 undocumented immigrant
felons eligible for deportation.
The plan calls for new prison beds at
existing prisons, using bond funds
previously approved by the Legislature. The
state would add 764 beds this fiscal year,
2,364 in 2010-11 and 3,904 in 2011-12.
Donald Specter of the Prison Law Office,
co-chief counsel for the inmates, said,
"There's no question that it's far short of
what the court ordered. . . . What's very
distressing to me is that it appears not to be a
good-faith effort."
Specter said Schwarzenegger's plans to deal
with overcrowding with new beds are overly
optimistic because construction historically
has been slower than planned. He also
suggested Schwarzenegger could pursue
alternative custody on his own or ask the
court to waive state laws.
Some Republicans welcomed the fact
Schwarzenegger's plan will defy the judges'
order, hoping it will lead to an ultimate U.S.
Supreme Court review of whether the judges
can order such reductions. They also
applauded the construction of new prison
facilities. But Sen. Tom Harman, R-
Huntington Beach, said he was not happy
with Schwarzenegger's renewed demand for
alternative custody.
Assembly Speaker Karen Bass, D-Los
Angeles, said in a statement, "We must
ensure public safety and find responsible
solutions to prevent the wholesale release of
prisoners by federal judges. This will take
the cooperation of leaders throughout the
state, including Republicans, who need to
look past the throw-away-the-key approach
to corrections and work with us on
implementing proven rehabilitation,
intervention and prevention measures."
"Judges OK Schwarzenegger Plan
to Reduce Prison Crowding"
Los Angeles Times
January 13, 2010
Michael Rothfeld
A panel of three federal judges Tuesday
approved a court-ordered plan submitted by
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to reduce
overcrowding in California prisons by
40,000 inmates within two years.
The judges ruled against the state in August
in two lawsuits by inmates who argued that
overcrowding was the main cause of
inadequate medical and mental health care
in the prisons.
Schwarzenegger has appealed that ruling to
the U.S. Supreme Court, but he was ordered
in the meantime to come up with a plan to
fix the problems. U.S. District Judges
Thelton Henderson and Lawrence Karlton
and 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Stephen Reinhardt make up the panel.
They rejected his first proposal in October,
saying it did not meet the required
population targets or timeline. The
governor's next attempt, submitted in
November, was acceptable, the judges said.
They ordered Schwarzenegger to implement
it pending the resolution of his appeal of the
case to the Supreme Court.
"We do not intervene lightly in the state's
management of its prisons," the judges
wrote Tuesday. "However, the state's long-
standing failure to provide constitutionally
adequate medical and mental health care to
its prison inmates has necessitated our
actions."
The nation's high court is expected to decide
as early as Friday whether to take up the
matter. Schwarzenegger's spokesman,
Aaron McLear, said in a statement that
administration officials "expect that the U.S.
Supreme Court will hear our appeal on
whether federal judges have the authority to
order the early release of prisoners in our
state."
If the state loses, the judges said, officials
will have to meet interim population targets
every six months, while submitting progress
reports, before completing the plan within
two years.
Schwarzenegger said in his plan that he
would work with lawmakers to approve
measures they rejected last year, including
home detention with satellite tracking
devices for some inmates; permitting some
felons to serve time in county jails instead of
state prisons; and reducing sentences for
property crimes.
The governor also said he would need more
prisoner transfers to other states, private
prison construction and suspension of Civil
Service rules, among other solutions.
If lawmakers refuse to go along, the judges
could waive state law and order the
measures implemented, Schwarzenegger
said. The judges said they would consider
waiving laws once the state had shown that
other solutions had failed.
"Hold Schwarzenegger in Contempt,
Inmates' Lawyers Urge Judges"
The Sacramento Bee
October 9, 2009
Denny Walsh
Saying the Schwarzenegger administration
is thumbing its nose at three federal judges
with a flawed plan to ease overpopulation of
prisons, inmates' attorneys Thursday asked
the judges to find the governor in contempt.
Rather than complying with the three-judge
panel's Aug. 4 order, a defiant Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger and Corrections Secretary
Matthew Cate "essentially have told the
court that they will reduce the prison
population as the state sees fit, to a level the
state deems appropriate, and in a time frame
the state has set for itself," the attorneys
wrote.
"The court must issue an order requiring
(the administration) to submit a plan that
fully complies with this court's order, and
requiring Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to
show cause why he should not be held in
civil and criminal contempt of court," the
inmates' attorneys said in a 19-page
response to the plan.
The administration has until Oct. 19 to file
its reply to the inmates' opposition.
"The state filed a plan that complies with
population reduction and does not create
undue risk to public safety, and we continue
to object to the panel's arbitrary cap under a
two-year timeline and are continuing our
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,"
Schwarzenegger spokeswoman Rachel
Cameron said Thursday.
State officials tried to avoid submitting a
plan by asking for a stay of the Aug. 4 order,
which allowed them 45 days to come up
with a blueprint for cutting the population of
33 adult prisons to 137.5 percent of design
capacity within two years. But the three-
judge panel and the Supreme Court denied
requests for a stay.
The high court told the state to come back
after the panel has issued a final order
adopting a reduction plan.
The design capacity of the institutions at
issue is approximately 80,000 and the
population is just under 150,000. The court's
order requires that the latter figure be
slashed to 110,000.
Cate spokesman Gordon Hinkle said the
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation "believes it has submitted a
plan that is substantially compliant with the
court's desires."
"We don't believe contempt proceedings are
appropriate," he added.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996, if a panel is convened to consider
allegations of unconstitutional conditions, an
appeal of its final ruling goes directly to the
Supreme Court.
The panel is made up of 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Stephen Reinhardt
of Los Angeles and U.S. District Judges
Lawrence K. Karlton of Sacramento and
Thelton E. Henderson of San Francisco.
They made a formal finding in the Aug. 4
order that overcrowding is the primary cause
of prison health care delivery so deficient
that it violates the Eighth Amendment ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.
Because the governor "would be able to
purge civil contempt sanctions by belatedly
complying with the Aug. 4 order," he should
be subjected to a criminal contempt
proceeding and fined, Thursday's brief says.
It has become a test of wills between
Schwarzenegger and the jurists. The
governor and Cate feel the panel is meddling
where it shouldn't and they simply do not
want to bow to the judges' wishes. The
judges feel strongly that California inmates
need their help to escape a health care
system that for years has been mismanaged
and to achieve a constitutional level of
medical and mental health treatment.
This summer Schwarzenegger submitted a
proposal to the Legislature that would, he
said, safely reduce the population over two
years by 37,000, just shy of the court's
mandate. Cate trumpeted this plan and urged
lawmakers to adopt it.
"Nonetheless," the inmates' attorneys said in
Thursday's brief, the administration
"submitted a very different and far inferior
plan to this court."
The state plan submitted to the panel would
reduce the population to 166 percent of
design capacity in two years, but does not
anticipate a time when 137.5 percent would
be realized.
The court's order requires the plan to
include six-month benchmarks so the judges
can measure progress. The state's plan has
one-year benchmarks tied to its fiscal year.
Contrary to the court's order, the state
refused to identify any state law barriers to
reducing the prison population.
Moreover, inmates' attorneys noted in their
brief, the plan relies on construction for
more than half of overcrowding relief, yet
many of the construction projects are being
planned jointly with a court-appointed
medical receiver whose termination the state
is seeking at the 9th Circuit.
"Prisons in Crisis, Governor Declares"
San Francisco Chronicle
June 27, 2006
Mark Martin
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger declared
California's prison system dangerously
overcrowded Monday and ordered a special
legislative session to enact proposals to
build new prisons and shift thousands of
inmates from mostly rural prisons into new
housing units in urban areas.
Less than a week after a court-appointed
watchdog blasted the governor for
abandoning prison reform, Schwarzenegger
guaranteed a spotlight on prisons this year
by calling for the special session, which will
begin today and will allow bills to advance
through the legislative process more quickly.
But administration officials conceded they
had no legislation ready and details of the
proposals-such as how much the governor
wants to spend and how many new cells
they hope to create-were not available.
Some lawmakers reacted with skepticism.
"It seems like a rather obvious response to
the report from last week," said
Assemblyman Mark Leno, D-San Francisco,
chairman of the Assembly's Public Safety
Committee.
Speaking at a conference of state district
attorneys in Newport Beach,
Schwarzenegger characterized jam-packed
prisons as being in crisis and warned that
courts could take over the system and "order
the early release of tens of thousands of
prisoners."
He noted that a system designed to hold
about 100,000 inmates houses more than
171,000, and more than 16,000 inmates are
sleeping in gyms, dayrooms and other areas
of lockups not intended for housing.
The governor proposed a four-pronged
approach: building at least two new prisons;
enacting rules to suspend some state laws to
allow the new prisons to be built quickly;
shifting 4,500 female inmates from prisons
to community-based facilities closer to their
families; and opening new facilities
designed to help male inmates adjust to life
outside prison.
The new housing for male inmates would
serve inmates about to be paroled and would
provide them with programs to help them
get jobs and steer clear of crime.
The re-entry proposal and the idea to move
some female prisoners would be a major
change for the system, creating thousands of
spots for inmates who would receive
services like drug rehabilitation and job
training that are not widely available in
prisons. It could also shift a substantial
number of inmates from rural areas, where
most prisons are located, to urban areas,
where the bulk of the prison population
comes from.
That could lead to battles with local
governments and residents about where the
new facilities are located. Administration
officials said the new lockups could house
as many as 500 people. Acting Corrections
Secretary Jim Tilton said he hoped to locate
them in warehouse districts, not residential
areas, and he admitted that finding sites for
the mini-prisons would be a significant
issue.
New community prisons could be built or
run by private companies, although Tilton
said state prison guards would provide
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security.
Schwarzenegger said his proposals were
aimed at two critical problems:
overcrowding and a recidivism rate he called
the highest in the nation, noting that 70
percent of inmates end up back in prison.
The new proposals mark at least the third
time Schwarzenegger has tried to revamp
state prisons.
His administration promised to reduce the
inmate population in 2004 when it unveiled
changes to parole policy intended to send
parolees who failed drug tests or committed
other parole violations to programs instead
of back to prison. But that idea was scrapped
amid opposition from victims' rights groups
and the state's prison guards union and after
Schwarzenegger's corrections secretary
admitted the proposal was not well thought
out.
Last year, the governor proposed a
bureaucratic reshuffling that changed the
name of the corrections department and gave
more clout to the head of the department.
Legislators were quick to remember those
moves.
"The track record of the department of
corrections has not been stellar," said
Assemblyman Todd Spitzer, R-Orange, who
acts as the Assembly Republicans lead
negotiator on prison issues. "They've come
up with reforms in the past, where they
weren't capable of implementing them."
Spitzer said he would evaluate the new
proposals with significant skepticism.
Schwarzenegger has pitched some of the
proposals before. He included prison-
building in his January proposal to issue
bonds for new roads, schools and levees,
and he also proposed moving some female
inmates out of prisons.
The Legislature balked at both ideas, and
whether there will be more interest now
remains to be seen.
Some lawmakers said more policy changes
were needed to lower the inmate population.
"We can look at bricks and mortar, but we
have to look at sentencing reform and parole
reform-that's where change is needed,"
said state Sen. Gloria Romero, D-Los
Angeles, who carried unsuccessful
legislation this year that would have
amended the state's three-strikes law to
lessen the use of lengthy sentences for some
non-violent offenses.
Romero was also critical of the governor's
proposal Monday to use a specific type of
bond, called a lease-revenue bond, to build
prisons that wouldn't require voter approval.
The bonds could be issued with approval
from lawmakers.
"That's just a way of getting around voters,
with polls showing no one is interested in
building more prisons," she said.
A spokesman for the prison guards union,
which has considerable clout in the
Legislature, reacted more positively.
"Given the overcrowding, this is a welcome
signal from the administration," said Lance
Corcoran, executive vice president of the
California Correctional Peace Officers
Association.
Administration officials said they had been
contemplating calling a special session on
prisons for several weeks and denied the
announcement Monday was a response to
the report issued last week. In the report, a
special master working for U.S. District
Judge Thelton Henderson criticized
Schwarzenegger for bowing to pT'essure
from the state's politically powerful prison
guards union and warned that the governor
was retreating from reforms.
The governor was quickly attacked Monday
by his adversary in this year's gubernatorial
election, who noted that calling a special
session would likely allow bills to become
law only one month earlier than they Would
have under the normal legislative process.
State Treasurer Phil Angelides said
Schwarzenegger was taking cosmetic 4ction
after presiding over a "meltdown of a prison
system that is threatening our public safety."
Angelides offered no specifics as to how he
would fix the system if elected, however,
saying he would conduct an audit after
taking office and then come up with a plan.
Prison proposals
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger called
Monday for a special session of the
Legislature to deal with state prisons. He
proposes four ideas for lawmakers to
consider:
" Issuing bonds to pay for new prisons.
* Suspending of state construction laws to
speed prison building.
* Moving 4,500 nonviolent female inmates
from prisons to community-based facilities.
* Moving male inmates who are about to be
released on parole into new housing units
designed to help them adjust to life in their
communities.
354
"State Prisons Releasing Parole
Violators Early"
Los Angeles Times
July 15, 2009
Michael Rothfeld
California prison officials, facing severe
overcrowding and a financial crisis, have
been releasing inmates who were serving
time for parole violations before they
finished their scheduled terms.
State officials said the dozens of prisoners
set free from the California Institution for
Men in Chino and from lockups in San
Diego and Shasta counties had 60 days or
less left on their terms, or had been accused
of violations and were awaiting hearings.
The releases were approved by the state
parole board.
At least 89 inmates have been freed or
approved for early release during the past
two months. Others have been sent to home
detention, drug rehabilitation programs or
similar alternative punishments.
They were screened to ensure that they had
never been convicted of the most serious
crimes, such as murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping or sex offenses, the officials
said. They may have been convicted of
grand theft, weapons possession, driving
under the influence of alcohol or other
crimes. Their parole may have been revoked
for missing an appointment with a parole
agent, shoplifting, robbery or any number of
other offenses.
The moves came as county authorities in
Los Angeles and elsewhere said they could
no longer house-and in some cases,
threatened to release-inmates awaiting
transfer to state prisons from their own
teeming jails. Counties routinely hold newly
convicted prisoners or those picked up on
parole violations until the state can take
them.
But California's huge deficit has left the
state without enough money to pay for all of
those its laws designate for punishment.
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and
lawmakers are considering numerous ways,
including the early release of inmates, to
save money by reducing a prison population
of nearly 170,000.
No budget decisions have been made, and
Schwarzenegger spokesman Matt David said
the governor had been unaware of the recent
releases, most of which were in response to
complaints by Los Angeles County that the
state had left nearly 2,000 prisoners in its
jails. That number represents about 10
percent of the prisoners in the county's jail
system, which has a court-ordered
population cap.
"This was an emergent crisis," Terri
McDonald, the state's chief deputy secretary
for adult operations at the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. "We don't
want a system failure in the county jail."
The inmates released from Chino opened up
beds for some of those being held in Los
Angeles. McDonald said the state, to be
"good partners" with the county, put other
inmates in prison gymnasiums that officials
had planned to stop using as dormitories,
and took additional measures to free up
space.
Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca,
however, said the burden had not been
alleviated, and the inmates, who cost the
county $70 million a year to house, are the
state's responsibility.
"If they're releasing them . . . that's their
call," Baca said. "For them to blame me for
their decision is absurd. All I'm saying is, 'I
don't want them in my jail any longer.
You're not paying me, and we're not
offering a free ride."'
In a June 30 e-mail, a state parole
administrator told agents that the Chino
prison would be the "first target" for
releasing parole violators. Because of the
fiscal crisis, the e-mail said, "we are starting
to experience some resistance and refusals
of the counties to hold our prisoners" and
the state was "incapable" of taking them.
Shasta County, for instance, had recently
been forced to close a jail wing due to
layoffs of sheriffs deputies, wrote the
administrator, whose e-mail was provided to
the Los Angeles Times without a name
attached.
The county had notified the state on the
previous Friday that unless "30 or so"
inmates were transferred, it would "release
them to the streets over the weekend," the e-
mail said.
Five were evaluated and released early, with
approval from the parole board; the rest
were transferred to state prisons, corrections
officials said.
In San Diego, 200 inmates are transferred
from local jails to state prisons each week.
After the state abruptly stopped accepting
them in May, then-Sheiff William Kolender
warned prison officials that he would release
138 parole violators to avoid exceeding his
jails' court-ordered population cap.
"We regret to take this drastic action, but we
have no other alternative given our
responsibility to adhere to a court order,"
Kolender wrote in a letter on May 5. He
added that the county had been "burdened
with holding state prisoners for an inordinate
amount of time and cost."
The county did not carry out its threat
because the state approved two inmates for
early release, sent some home on alternative
sanctions and transferred others to state
prisons.
California has one of the nation's most
stringent policies of supervising ex-convicts
once they are released; parole violations
account for 70,000 prison admissions each
year.
Joan Petersilia, a prisons expert who has
advised Schwarzenegger's administration,
said it makes "good public-policy sense" to
reduce that number and reserve prison beds
for those who are most dangerous.
"We simply can't afford the punishment that
we've had in California," Petersilia said.
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"Will the Supreme Court Keep
Prisons Overcrowded?"
Time
June 17, 2010
Adam Cohen
California is often on the cutting edge of
national trends-and so it is now with the
"ugly bed." That is prison lingo for double
and triple bunks that are jammed into
gymnasiums and dayrooms because there is
nowhere else to put the inmates. It is an
inhumane and dangerous way to house
prisoners, but it is one that has become all
too common in California's jam-packed
correctional facilities.
It has been nearly four years since Gov.
Arnold Schwarzenegger declared a "Prison
Overcrowding State of Emergency,"
warning that conditions in the state's 33
adult prisons posed a serious risk to inmates
and staff. But the overcrowding has
continued.
And while California's legislature has
dithered, the federal courts have stepped in,
ordering the state to bring down its prison
population. On Monday, however, the
Supreme Court accepted an appeal in this
California prisons-condition case. It is an
ominous development, one that could make
prisons far worse in all 50 states.
California's correctional facilities are among
the nation's most overcrowded. The driving
force has been the state's harsh and at times
bizarre criminal laws and parole practices.
Under the state's notorious three-strikes-
and-you're-out law, criminals can be sent
away for life for even minor, non-violent
crimes-including shoplifting. Not
surprisingly, then, the prison population has
soared over the past few decades, from
about 20,000 in the early 1970s to past
160,000 in recent years.
The results have been disastrous, with
Schwarzenegger' s state-of-emergency
declaration painting a grim picture. Because
of the overcrowding, it was difficult for the
guards to monitor prisoners and to prevent
violence from breaking out. There were
frequent power outages. And the sewage
systems were overtaxed, creating a risk of
disease. "Immediate action is necessary,"
the governor warned, "to prevent death and
harm."
That action never came-at least not on the
scale that was needed-but the death and
harm did. Prisoners have been dying and
suffering injuries at alarming rates. Last
summer, 250 inmates were injured in a riot
at a state prison in Chino. The facility was
built to hold 3,160 inmates, but roughly
twice that number had been crammed into it.
Last summer, a special three-judge federal
court intervened. It ruled that California's
prison medical system-which a judge had
declared to be responsible for one inmate
death a week-violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. The court ordered the state to
cap its prison population at 137% of
capacity, and to release about 40,000
inmates-roughly a quarter of the total
population-over two years.
It was a good and important ruling, which
promised to begin making California's
increasingly barbaric prisons safer and more
civilized. But the Supreme Court's decision
this week throws that potential bit of
progress into doubt, and not just for
California.
The United States is a country that likes to
put people behind bars. It has less than 5%
of the world's population, but almost one-
quarter of the world's prisoners. One in
every 100 American adults is behind bars,
the highest incarceration rate in the world;
between 1972 and 2008, the number of state
prisoners soared by 708%. Making matters
worse, this rush to incarcerate has not been
matched by an equal commitment to
funding.
The Supreme Court, which is likely to
schedule arguments in the case during its
next term, starting in the fall, could end up
upholding the lower-court ruling from
California, but there is good reason to think
it might not. The court's conservative
majority has taken an unduly narrow view of
the Eighth Amendment in recent years. And
it could use the case to rewrite prison
conditions law and to make it extremely
difficult for judges to bring down prison
populations, even when they reach
dangerous levels.
That would be unfortunate.
Overincarceration is not only inhumane-it
is terrible correctional policy. Crowded
prisons are more likely to have riots and
inmate-on-inmate violence, including sexual
assaults. Inmates in jam-packed prisons also
have less opportunity to improve
themselves, and are more likely to come out
of prison unrehabilitated and hardened. That
is bad news for law-abiding citizens, since
most prisoners are eventually released back
into society.
Some people argue that governors and
legislatures are the branches of government
that should decide how prisons are run-and
for the most part, they are right. But when
those branches repeatedly fail to ensure that
prisons are run in a minimally adequate way,
judges have to have the authority to step in
and enforce the Constitution.
"Hard Time: California's Prisons in Crisis"
San Francisco Chronicle
July 3, 2005
James Stemgold & Mark Martin
Nearly three decades after California
cracked down on rising crime rates with
tougher sentencing laws, the bill is coming
due for what experts say has been one of the
most ill-planned and flawed prison
expansions in the country.
At the heart of the problem is a simple but
overpowering mismatch-lawmakers and
prosecutors sent far more criminals to prison
than Californians, ultimately, were willing
to pay for. The result has been such acute
overcrowding that critical prison programs
and services are breaking down and require
enormously expensive fixes.
On Thursday, a federal judge expressed
shock at what he called the neglect and
"depravity" in parts of the prison health care
system, and ordered that a receiver take
control. Court-ordered improvements could
send costs soaring in a program that already
spends $1.1 billion a year.
Just weeks before, the Corrections
Department opened Kern Valley State
Prison, built at a cost of $716 million and
hailed as the last of 22 new prisons in a $4.5
billion construction program. But days later,
the head of the agency, Roderick Q.
Hickman, told The Chronicle that Kern
Valley could not possibly be the last prison,
because the system holds twice the number
of inmates it was designed for and is still
adding more.
Hickman said taxpayers will also have to
pay many millions of dollars to upgrade
older prisons and to comply with court
orders demanding the correction of
conditions so abysmal that they violate
inmates' constitutional rights. With some of
the highest costs per inmate, the most
violence, the highest rate of parolees going
back to prison and the worst crowding,
California's corrections system is unlike any
other system in the United States.
"There's California and then there's the rest
of the country," said Michael Jacobson, the
director of the Vera Institute of Justice in
New York and the former head of New York
City's jail system. The costs of the failures
are now becoming clear:
- A major cause of overcrowding is a parole
system that sends far more released inmates
back to prison than other states. Decisions
by corrections officials and politicians to de-
emphasize rehabilitation programs, lengthen
parole periods and send violators back to
prison instead of giving them treatment have
produced a return rate of about 60 percent,
the nation's highest.
- The health care system is so neglected that
up to 30 percent of its physician jobs are
vacant and some examination rooms don't
even have sinks. Once the federal court
appoints a receiver, taxpayers will have to
pay the bill for hiring new staff and
renovating facilities. Meanwhile, longer
sentences are producing an aging inmate
population with much more expensive
medical needs.
* In a system that moves people in and out
of prisons hundreds of thousands of times a
year, management is hobbled by an obsolete
information technology system. Officials
say a modem computer network that would
cut costs, reduce errors and streamline
management is years away, and could cost
hundreds of millions of dollars.
California's problems are particularly
striking because they run counter to a broad
national trend that is saving other states
millions of dollars while making citizens
safer. If it could fix its dysfunctional
programs, experts say, a department that is
projected to spend $7.3 billion this fiscal
year could save hundreds of millions of
dollars a year.
Even strict law-and-order states such as
Mississippi and Louisiana have embraced
new models that involve elements like
shorter sentences, improved rehabilitation
programs and more alternatives to prison.
Texas, which has a higher crime rate than
California and houses nearly as many
inmates, puts only a fraction as many parole
violators back in prison.
"California has used policies that show no
evidence of effectiveness; all they show is
high cost," said Jeremy Travis, president of
the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in
New York City. "The state is the poster
child for corrections policies that have no
benefit to public safety."
Hickman, in an interview, said of the parole
system: "California, quite frankly, is
aberrant compared with anywhere else in the
country."
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger appointed
Hickman on his first day in office to be
secretary of the Youth and Adult
Correctional Agency, which operates the
adult prisons and the much smaller juvenile
system. Hickman leaped into motion,
declaring that he was determined to overhaul
the parole system because its problems were
so central to prisons being overstuffed with
some 164,000 inmates.
This Friday, 20 months later, he reached a
landmark when his agency took the name
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation as part of the reorganization.
But some critics express deep
disappointment that so little has been
accomplished. While they call for urgency,
Hickman said that it could take an additional
18 to 24 months to institute major new
policies in the areas suffering the gravest
problems.
"My emphasis with adult corrections right
now is evaluating the prisons, evaluating the
safety of the prisons, and then reconfiguring
the prisons within the mission we now
have," he said.
The foundation of the current problems was
laid in the late 1970s, when Gov. Jerry
Brown, a Democrat, and Republican
officials toughened the state's criminal-
justice policy.
As rising crime rates fed a law-and-order
mood, Brown signed legislation requiring
judges to impose fixed sentences. Other
laws provided longer sentences for drug
crimes, sex crimes and for habitual
offenders, reaching a peak with "three
strikes" in 1994, which mandated life
sentences for some repeat offenders.
There were warnings that the state was
unprepared. In 1979 the head of the
Corrections Department, Jiro Enomoto,
warned that the prison population could
shoot out of control, to 27,000 by 1986 from
about 20,000. By 1986 there were 54,000,
and the state never caught up.
Today the prisons hold nearly twice the
number of inmates they were designed for,
many having converted gyms and other
areas into large dormitories. The crowding
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has raised racial and other tensions, made
prisons more difficult to control, and
hindered the limited treatment and education
programs that are provided.
"People are consistently coming out worse
than they're going in," said Barry Krisberg,
president of the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency in Oakland. He served on a
blue-ribbon commission 15 years ago that
examined the prisons and recommended
major reforms, most of which were ignored.
"It's getting worse," said Krisberg, "and it is
harming public safety because these people
are going back in their communities."
Parole
Overcrowding is at the root of many of the
system's failures, and parole is at the root of
the overcrowding. Experts blame the state's
policy of keeping most released inmates on
parole for far longer periods than other
states and sending most of those who violate
parole back to prison, even for relatively
minor offenses such as missing meetings or
failing drug tests.
So many parole violators are returned to
prison that they make up more than one third
of all inmates. The Little Hoover
Commission, an independent state research
body that provides policy recommendations,
estimated 18 months ago that the prisons
spend about $1.5 billion a year on parole
violators and parolees who commit new
crimes.
When inmates do make it back home, they
are ill-prepared, either by their stay in prison
or parole programs, to hold down jobs or
stay out of trouble. The Little Hoover
Commission found that 10 percent are
homeless, half are illiterate, as many as 80
percent are unemployed. Eighty percent are
drug users.
Experts say that spending money on treating
or training parole violators is more effective
than sending them back to prison for typical
stays of 90 to 120 days.
Among parolees who met drug treatment
goals at intensive residential centers, only
15.5 percent returned to prison within a year
of being released, compared with more than
40 percent for all offenders, said Sheldon
Zhang, a professor of sociology at Cal State
San Marcos.
But the Schwarzenegger administration has
cut funding for some programs and poorly
planned others. One drug treatment program
in a prison, for example, performed poorly
because it did not isolate the inmates who
were in treatment from the general prison
population, where they had access to drugs.
Two years ago, the state said new parole
programs emphasizing treatment and
alternatives to prison for violators would cut
the prison population by 15,000 inmates.
But they were poorly designed, in some
cases sending drug violators to halfway
houses with no drug programs, and never
even implemented properly. In April the
state stopped sending parole violators to
these programs.
Parole violation cases have risen sharply this
year, one of the reasons the Corrections
Department had to ask for an additional
$207 million for a larger inmate base.
Health care
California already spends $1.1 billion a year
on health care for inmates-a doubling in
costs in just seven years-but the level of
care is so poor that U.S. District Judge
Thelton Henderson has said it violates
inmates' constitutional right against cruel
and unusual punishment. Henderson, based
in San Francisco, ruled Thursday that a
receiver would be appointed to order
improvements.
No budget figures were discussed, but most
expect costs to soar, perhaps for years,
because of the system's desperate needs. In
a separate area, mental health, a department
consultant has estimated it could cost $1.4
billion to meet the needs of the growing
number of mentally ill inmates.
Last year the department asked if the
University of California, with its big, highly
regarded medical system, could take over
management of the prison health care
programs. The university said no almost
immediately.
"We just were not able to take on something
of that scale," said Jeff Hall, director of
policy for the university's Division of
Health Affairs.
High vacancy rates for doctors, nurses,
psychiatrists and pharmacists who must
work under difficult conditions will require
heavy spending for recruitment, as well as
bonuses and other incentives to attract
qualified people to some remote prison
locations.
The department has also agreed to hire a
new level of supervisors and regional
managers to oversee care, putting even more
pressure on the budget.
Many doctors are furious, saying they are
being unfairly blamed for the problems
when they have to work in deplorable
conditions and are badly overworked.
"The prisons were designed to incarcerate
inmates," said Dr. Charles Hooper, who
works at the California State Prison,
Sacramento. "They were not designed to be
the Mayo Clinic. They are essentially
dungeons."
Hooper said that as many as half the inmates
he sees for treatment show up without
charts. The frequent lockdowns at the
prison, often a result of tensions due to
crowding, also disrupt proper treatment.
"It can be a fiasco at times," he said.
Health costs could also soar because of the
rapidly rising number of geriatric inmates.
According to an internal Corrections
Department report, the total cost of an
elderly inmate is three times that of a
younger one. New facilities for them could
also require major renovations.
The number of inmates 60 and over, among
the most expensive to care for, nearly
doubled in only six years, to 3,358 in 2004
from 1,781 in 1998, according to the
department.
Health costs are also affected by the high
level of violence in the prisons. California's
prisons have roughly twice the number of
violent incidents reported in Texas prisons
and almost three times the number in federal
prisons, both of which have similar numbers
of inmates, according to the Legislative
Analyst's Office.
Technology
Some people complain that the system
seems immune to even the smallest changes.
David Warren, a volunteer chaplain and
member of the Family Council, which works
with prison officials on behalf of inmate
families, tells of a prison dentist who was
concerned that the toothbrushes he was
supplied were so hard that they were
actually causing dental problems. He sought
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to have the state order softer brushes. He
succeeded-after 18 months.
"There is a mind-set that you have to see to
understand," Warren said.
On a much broader level, the department's
technology experts say it will be years
before the prisons have computer networks
that will enable them to keep track of the
movements and needs of the inmates and a
staff of about 54, 000.
Only recently have prison officials been able
to communicate through the same e-mail
system. Jeff Baldo, the head of the
department's information technology
division, said state-of-the-art optic fibers
were installed in some prisons a decade ago,
then left unused.
He said the department has one information
technology specialist for every 1,000
employees; typically, a state agency of its
size would need one technology expert for
every 6 to 10 employees.
"I've never been in a place where you see
this," Baldo said.
As a result, transferring large volumes of
data from one prison to another is nearly
impossible, the department's experts said.
Most medical records are on paper, and
when inmates are moved, their records
sometimes fail to catch up. Thus prison
officials often have to make decisions
without complete data on inmates' records,
medical conditions and special needs.
The officials said that building an adequate
computer system could cost well over $100
million and take at least five more years.
"It could be less, but it also could be triple
that amount," said Robert Horel, the
corrections agency's chief of fiscal
programs. "It doesn't take a very long term
for the problems to grow when you're in the
dark as much as we are."
"California, in Financial Crisis,
Opens Prison Doors"
The New York Times
March 23, 2010
Randal C. Archibold
The California budget crisis has forced the
state to address a problem that expert panels
and judges have wrangled over for decades:
how to reduce prison overcrowding.
The state has begun in recent weeks the
most significant changes since the 1970s to
reduce overcrowding-and chip away at an
astonishing 70 percent recidivism rate, the
highest in the country-as the prison
population becomes a major drag on the
state's crippled finances.
Many in the state still advocate a tough
approach, with long sentences served in full,
and some early problems with released
inmates have given critics reason to
complain. But fiscal reality, coupled with a
court-ordered reduction in the prison
population, is pouring cold water on old
solutions like building more prisons.
About 11 percent of the state budget, or
roughly $8 billion, goes to the penal system,
putting it ahead of expenditures like higher
education, an imbalance Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger has vowed to fix.
The strains on the system are evident inside
the state prison here, about 50 miles north of
Los Angeles, where 4,600 inmates fill
buildings intended for half as many. A
stuffy, cacophonous gymnasium houses
nearly 150 people in triple-bunked beds
stretching wall to wall.
The new effort this year is intended to
remove from prisons criminals who are
considered less threatening and divide them
into two categories: those who pose little or
no risk outside the prison walls, and those
who need regular supervision.
The goal is to reduce the number of inmates
in the state's 33 prisons next year by
6,500-more than the entire state prison
population in 2009 of Nebraska, New
Mexico, Utah or West Virginia. In all, there
are 167,000 prisoners in California.
"People in the criminal justice world are
looking at California with great interest,"
said Jeremy Travis, president of John Jay
College of Criminal Justice in New York.
"Some very important reforms are under
way."
The effort, narrowly approved by the
Democratic-controlled State Legislature and
signed into law by Mr. Schwarzenegger, a
Republican, will be achieved through a
range of steps long recommended by
independent analysts and commissions.
To slow the return of former inmates to
prison for technical violations of their
parole, hundreds of low-level offenders will
be released without close supervision from
parole officers. Those officers will focus
instead on tracking serious, violent
offenders.
Some prisoners may also be released early
for completing drug and education programs
or have their sentences reduced under new
formulas for calculating time served in
county jails before and after sentencing.
The effort represents a "seismic shift," said
Joan Petersilia, a criminologist at Stanford
Law School and a longtime scholar of the
state's prisons.
Public safety concerns have other states
rethinking their decisions to save prisons
costs by releasing inmates early and
expanding parole.
The same red flags are being raised here, but
the overcrowding problem dwarfs that of
any other state and the budget deficit-$20
billion and climbing-has left lawmakers
with virtually no choice but to move ahead.
The Schwarzenegger administration has
floated a number of other ideas to reduce
costs, including building prisons in Mexico
for illegal immigrant offenders, turning over
prisons to private contractors and, last week,
having the University of California handle
inmate health care.
The release of prisoners in California has
stirred a backlash. Several hundred inmates
at county jails were released in the last
couple of months because of confusion over
time credits in the new law.
Attorney General Jerry Brown, a Democrat
who is running for governor, issued a
directive clarifying the law, but not before
one inmate in Sacramento was arrested
shortly after his release and charged with
attempting to rape a woman. The man had
been released on probation after serving
time on an assault charge.
That case prompted several lawmakers to
call for abandoning early releases. And
crime victim and law enforcement groups
have been sounding alarms about what they
consider the dangers of not more
aggressively tracking the low-level
offenders.
"We are concerned about victims these
felons will leave in their wake before being
rearrested for committing new crimes," said
Paul M. Weber, the president of the Los
Angeles police union.
Proponents, including Mr.
Schwarzenegger's corrections secretary,
Matthew Cate, have stood by the law,
calling it overdue and necessary. The state
spends, on average, $47,000 per year to
house a prisoner. Early estimates suggest the
new changes could save $100 million this
year.
"This was an opportunity to do something
impactful without imperiling public safety,"
Mr. Cate said, adding that allowing parole
officers to focus on more serious offenders
will improve public safety.
Even with the new law, the system falls
short of providing the kind of rehabilitation,
drug treatment and education and job
programs that academics and prisoner
advocates have called for to help ensure
prisoners and parolees do not commit new
crimes.
The governor and the Legislature received a
report on March 15 from a state oversight
board warning that cuts to inmate
rehabilitation programs would jeopardize the
effort to reduce recidivism.
California is the only state that places all
prisoners on parole at release, no matter the
offense, Professor Petersilia said, and
usually for one to three years. If a parolee is
arrested or fails a drug test or misses an
appointment with a parole officer, the
offender lands back in prison.
Now, low-level offenders will not need to
meet regularly with a parole officer and
must be convicted of a new crime to be sent
back.
Eric Susie, 24, recently had his parole terms
readjusted under the new law. Mr. Susie had
served 13 months in prison for possessing an
M-80 firecracker wrapped with razors near a
school (he argued, unsuccessfully, that it
belonged to a friend).
Now, more than a year out of prison, he no
longer reports to a parole officer or submits
to monthly drug tests and can travel more
freely, including out of state to visit family
in Las Vegas.
"I feel like I am finally free," Mr. Susie said.
"I feel like I don't have that monkey on my
back, like being a prisoner. I feel like I am a
human being and can get my life together."
Even the guards' union, which so heavily
promoted and supported the tough
sentencing of the past that fueled the prison
building and expansion boom, now says it
supports the idea of alternatives to prison
and did not publicly object to the new law.
The overcrowding, union officials now say,
poses a physical threat to its members, and
the union has sided with plaintiffs battling in
federal court to force even greater reductions
of 40,000 inmates over the next two years.
But even with the progress in recent months,
State Senator Mark Leno, a Democrat from
San Francisco who helped push through
changes in the prison system, suggested that
further reductions would be a hard sell. Mr.
Leno called the changes under way "a noble
effort" and the best that could be achieved in
the current political climate.
Many lawmakers, he said, still want to
lengthen sentences and spend more on
incarceration, both politically popular
notions.
"We can't control ourselves," Mr. Leno
said. "Or some of my colleagues can't
control themselves."
"Two Inmates' Views on California's
Prison Overcrowding Crisis"
New America Media
March 23, 2010
Dwight Abbott & Michael Cabral
Editor's Note: This January, a panel of
three federal judges ruled the State of
California must reduce its prison population
by up to 40,000 inmates, bringing it to 137.5
percent of its designated capacity (which, at
160,000 inmates, is currently at 200 percent
of capacity). The order grew out of lawsuits
alleging inadequate medical and mental
health care in California's prisons,
primarily the result of overcrowding, which
had brought the state prison under court
receivership.
The court, however, stayed its order until
the U.S. Supreme Court rules on the appeal
filed by the Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger administration, which will
not likely be decided before the end of this
year. In the meantime, the state has put forth
its own plan, which would increase prison
capacity, divert some prisoners to county
jails, reduce some parole revocations, and
grant certain prisoners additional credits
toward early release.
Below, two of those prisoners respond to the
proposals of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, and to the
conditions they face on a daily basis. Both
are serving long prison sentences in Salinas
Valley State Prison (Soledad). They
represent opposite ends of the age spectrum.
What Will Not Work (by Michael Cabral)
I once heard that there is no such thing as
"right" or "wrong"--that there is only "that
which works" and "that which does not
work." At the time I was presented with this
philosophy, I immediately discarded it as a
simple cop-out, as a way of justifying one's
disregard for consequences as long as
something desirable comes from it. That
was, however, before the great state of
California decided that the safest, most
effective solution to its grossly over-
crowded prison system problem was to
dump thousands of neglected, uneducated,
untrained prisoners back into society, the
same (if not more) bitter men they were,
with the same personal and social issues
they had when they came to prison in the
first place. Now, I understand that action,
right or wrong, is necessary, especially in
the name of that which works. The only
question to ask is: "What works?"
There has been much public outcry over the
state's plans to grant early releases to certain
non-violent prisoners, and rightly so. But
I'm not sure that people opposed to this plan
are outraged at the right things, or for the
right reasons. For as detrimental to public
safety as such releases are potentially,
making inmates serve out their entire
sentences-given no rehabilitation
programs--only delays the inevitable. And
that should make people mad. Just like it
makes mad those of us on this side of the
walls.
I have been in prison for seven years now,
and in that time, yes, I have met some of the
meanest, nastiest, most cold-hearted human
beings. But for the most part, I have met
men who hate where they've ended up; who
actually want better (for themselves, their
families, and even their communities); who
are embarrassed and frustrated with
themselves-and starving for that which
works. Yet, over the past year alone, we
have seen many excellent rehabilitative
programs with proven results, such as
various vocational training courses, college
programs, a number of self-help and
substance abuse programs, and even, for a
while, GED classes, all disappear. What's
worse is that the very programs being
eliminated are the same ones that the public
believes inmates are required to complete
before being released early, when actually,
the only inmates for whom rehabilitation is a
requirement before being released at all, are
those of us who likely will never be granted
parole.
When I asked Ben, a thirty-year-old fellow
prisoner serving nineteen years, eight
months, what he thought about the early
release program, he summed it up as
accurately as I've ever heard, and in two
simple words: "It's bullshit!"
A little deeper into our conversation, Ben
also made the observation that if any
inmates really are required to complete
rehabilitative programs, or even given
access to such programs, it must only be
those inmates in Level 1 or Level 2 prisons
who have been deemed "low risk" by the
CDCR. Meanwhile, Level 3 and 4 (the
highest security level) prisoners, who have
committed the most serious offenses, or
committed offenses more regularly, proving
the greatest need for rehabilitation, are
consistently being denied the necessary tools
(e.g. anger management, substance abuse
treatment, job training programs) to build
even a chance at becoming successful,
contributing members of society.
Against popular belief, most of us
incarcerated people actually want to be
better and make things better. We have the
heart and we have the desire. What we are
lacking, however, is support. Which is
perplexing to me. Because whether anybody
likes it, whether it is "early" or according to
schedule, we will be on your streets again.
And once there, we will either know how to
succeed, or how to get ourselves back to
prison. Whichever works for you.
Magicians, Creating an
Change (by Dwight Abbott)
Illusion of
The three judges who stayed their order to
reduce the state's prison population, I
believe to be naYve, or possibly tired and
becoming fatalistic. Schwarzenegger has
absolutely no intention of complying, only
delaying. Before the Supreme Court
considers the state's appeal, he and his
bunch will be long gone, and another
administration will begin the process
anew-using our system of "justice" to
grant a seek a postponement until
California's new ruler has had time to
"study the proposal," and in turn, begin
submitting his discourse, and "revised plan."
It has now been nearly fourteen years since
this fiasco began, fourteen years of evasive
legal maneuvering. All the while, inmates
continue to die unnecessarily, the direct
consequence of the overcrowding that
perpetrates violent confrontation and
overworked doctors, unable to provide
reasonable, basic medical care.
The facts today are now known by anyone
who reads the newspaper; California's
Corrections Administration has always
known them. Yet, it took a federal takeover
to squeeze out an admission that "there are
problems." This from the same people who
immediately after, refused to comply with
demands to repair what is broken. All the
while, both sides-the courts who have the
authority to force the reform, and the state
officials not wanting it to-appear to have
forgotten the inmates who are continuing to
die unnecessarily because of the inhumane
conditions being wrangled over . .
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Collateral damage.
End overcrowding? End warehousing and
abusing incarcerated juveniles? Compel
California to act on previous court orders
issued through the years? The
Administration has no fear of the courts,
with good reason. No person calling the
shots in this matter has yet to be charged
(much less jailed) for being in contempt of a
court mandate after refusing to comply.
Until that changes, the children will not be
"rehabilitated." They will not be allowed an
education (locked inside a 4'x4' screened
cage five hours a day), participate in
therapy, or to partake in vocational training,
watched over by an independent watchdog
group assuring what is supposed to be
happening. The 90% recidivism rate among
juvenile offenders will not change. They are
fodder to fill the state's bloated adult
prisons.
What programs could be brought to life to
change this dismal, unending record of
failure? In the long run, only a return to
indeterminate sentencing, with built-in
incentives (like early release) for prisoners
to participate can work to reduce a cycle that
no one seems able or willing to break. If
prisoners knew that immersing themselves
in programs that teach them to read, to
address their addictions, to learn violence
reduction strategies, to have access to
vocational training that actually prepares a
prisoner for meaningful employment, you
would see a dramatic decline in the worst
aspects of prison life, and a dramatic
increase in legal and productive behavior
when they hit the streets, as almost all will.
What to do right now about overcrowding?
Admit parole is a fake! Under California's
sentencing guidelines, those today being
paroled have, in reality, completed their
sentence. The problem lies with the courts
adding on years of parole, to be served after
a sentence is completed. Implemented,
perhaps, with the best of intentions, in truth,
parole only serves a huge number of men
and women employed by the state as Parole
Officers at a cost of over a billion dollars
annually. They in turn guarantee the CDCR
its prisons remain overcrowded with
"technical parole violators," which then
guarantees prison guards (whose annual
salary ranges between $50,000 and $60,000)
an opportunity to pad their checks with an
additional $100,000+ of taxpayer's money
in overtime pay each year.
What should be obvious to anyone reading
this: there is no need to release so much as
one convict who has not yet completed
his/her sentence. Instead, release those who
have, and are presently among the 30,000
"technical" parole violators who, at any
given time, languish in California's
overcrowded prisons for up to one year,
trapped by a broken system which has
recidivism rates of close to 70%, the highest
in the United States.
If you want to know what you get for the
$32,000 it costs to imprison these parole
violators (a billion dollars annually), take a
look, for example, at San Quentin's South
and West cellblocks where hundreds of men
lie sweltering in bunks stacked three high
out on the tiers, who must duck and dodge
24/7 the trash thrown from the four tiers
above. They are among the 30,000 parole
violators who should be released, and thus
end-even if only temporarily-the
overcrowding crisis, eliminating the need to
release inmates who have not completed
their sentences. Once prisoners have
completed a prison sentence, they should
remain in society, unless they commit a new
crime.
Thus, having temporarily
overcrowding problem,
interested in serious reform
resolved the
those truly
of this failed
system will then have time to sit back, take a
deep breath, and present a multitude of ideas
that have worked in other states, without the
necessity for short-term fixes demanded
when the system is in crisis, and inmates are
dying.
I cannot end without drawing on my five
decades of experience in this system to add
that whatever plan is given over to CDCR to
improve conditions inside its prisons, will be
abused. I have lived it. The CDCR is
comprised of magicians, creating the illusion
that it is a faithful steward of the people and
their billions of tax dollars that allow them
to operate. Their magic gives those who
want to believe the illusion that its intentions
are honorable. The truth is quite the
opposite.
Dwight Abbott, the author of I Cried, You
Didn't Listen, is serving four life sentences
at Salinas Valley State Prison, Soledad,
California. Michael Cabral is in his sixth
year of a 15-Life sentence at Salinas Valley
State Prison, Soledad, California.
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"Arguing Three Strikes"
The New York Times
May 17, 2010
Emily Bazelon
One day last fall, Norman Williams sat
drinking hot chocolate with his lawyer,
Michael Romano, at a Peet's coffee in Palo
Alto, Calif. At an outdoor table, Williams
began to talk about how he'd gone from
serving a life sentence at Folsom State
Prison to sitting there in the sun. "After
being shut down for so many years. I didn't
believe it," he said of the judge's decision to
release him in April 2009.
Williams, who is 46, was a homeless drug
addict in 1997 when he was convicted of
petty theft, for stealing a floor jack from a
tow truck. It was the last step on his path to
serving life. In 1982, Williams burglarized
an apartment that was being fumigated: he
was hapless enough to be robbed at gunpoint
on his way out, and later he helped the
police recover the stolen property. In 1992,
he stole two hand drills and some other tools
from an art studio attached to a house; the
owner confronted him, and he dropped
everything and fled. Still, for the theft of the
floor jack, Williams was sentenced to life in
prison under California's repeat-offender
law: three strikes and you're out.
In 2000, three years after Williams went to
prison, Steve Cooley became the district
attorney for Los Angeles County. Cooley is
a Republican career prosecutor, but he
campaigned against the excesses of three
strikes. "Fix it or lose it," he says of the law.
In 2005, Cooley ordered a review of cases,
to identify three-strikes inmates who had not
committed violent crimes and whose life
sentences a judge might deem worthy of
second looks. His staff came up with a list of
more than 60 names, including Norman
Williams's.
Romano saw Cooley's list as an opportunity.
After working as a criminal-defense lawyer
at a San Francisco firm, he started a clinic at
Stanford Law School in 2006 to appeal the
life sentences of some three-strikes convicts.
In search of clients at the outset, Romano
and his students wrote to Williams at
Folsom about the possibility of appealing his
conviction. Most prisoners quickly follow
up when the clinic offers free legal help. But
Williams didn't write back. At Peet's,
Williams said he'd been too nervous. "I
didn't want to use the wrong words," he
said.
"You were lucky you were at Folsom,"
Romano said. "It's only a couple of hours'
drive from here. So we decided to come up
and see you."
"Yeah, if not, I'd still be there, staring at the
walls," Williams said. "Never had visitors
before you came. I didn't know what the
visiting room looked like."
In 1994, the three-strikes ballot measure in
California passed with 72 percent of the
vote, after the searing murder of 12-year-old
Polly Klaas, who was kidnapped from her
slumber party and murdered while her
mother slept down the hall. When the killer
turned out to be a violent offender recently
granted parole, support surged for the three-
strikes ballot initiative, which promised to
keep "career criminals who rape women,
molest children and commit murder behind
bars where they belong."
The complete text of the bill swept far more
broadly. Under California's version of three
strikes, first and second strikes must be
either violent or serious. These include
crimes like murder, attempted murder, rape,
child molestation and armed robbery. But in
California, "serious" is a term of art that can
also include crimes like Norman Williams's
nonconfrontational burglaries. And after a
second-strike conviction for such an offense,
almost any infraction beyond jaywalking
can trigger a third strike and the life
sentence that goes with it. One of Romano's
clients was sentenced to life for stealing a
dollar in change from the coin box of a
parked car.
California's repeat-offender law is unique in
this stringency. Twenty-five other states
have passed three-strikes laws, but only
California punishes minor crimes with the
penalty of a life sentence. About 3,700
prisoners in the state are serving life for a
third strike that was neither violent nor
serious, according to the legal definition.
That's more than 40 percent of the total
third-strike population of about 8,500.
Technically, these offenders are eligible for
parole after 20 years, but at the moment, the
state parole board rarely releases any
prisoner early.
In 2004, reformers put an initiative on the
ballot, Proposition 66, that would have
reduced the number of people going to
prison for life by removing nonviolent
property and drug offenses from the list of
three-strikes crimes. Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger attacked the ballot
measure. He credited three strikes for a
major drop in crime-to the frustration of
most experts, who point out that California's
dip began in 199 1, well before three strikes
passed, and ended in 2000. "The great
weight of empirical studies discounts the
role of three strikes in reducing crime,"
states a 2004 report signed by six criminal-
law professors, including Franklin Zimring
at U.C. Berkeley. Still, Prop 66 fell short,
with 47 percent of the vote.
Now California is in the midst of fiscal
calamity. Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy, who had been a judge in
California, recently bemoaned state
sentencing and spending on prisons. In an
address at Pepperdine University, he said
that "the three-strikes law sponsor is the
correctional officers' union, and that is
sick!" And yet Schwarzenegger has vowed
not to touch the law. Meg Whitman and
Jerry Brown, the leading Republican and
Democratic contenders to succeed him in
November, are just as unbending.
If there's a way to reform three strikes, it
may follow Norman Williams's route out of
prison. Michael Romano, who is 38, got his
client released without opposition from the
L.A. district attorney by forging a working
relationship with Cooley's office. The 63-
year-old Republican prosecutor seems an
unlikely ally for a young defense lawyer. He
joined the D.A.'s office straight out of law
school. His office notched more death
sentences last year than the state of Texas,
and his lunchmates include Pete Wilson, the
former governor who signed three strikes
into law. Yet despite his conservative bona
fides, Cooley shares the conviction that
some number of third-strike offenders like
Norman Williams don't belong in prison for
life.
After three strikes became law, Cooley
watched one of his colleagues in the D.A.'s
office prosecute Gregory Taylor, a homeless
man who at dawn one morning in 1997 went
to a church where he'd often gotten meals
and pried open the door to its food pantry.
The priest later testified on his behalf.
Taylor's first crime was a purse-snatching;
his second was attempting to steal a wallet.
He didn't hurt anyone. Taylor was sentenced
to life. "It was almost one-upmanship,
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almost a game-bye-bye for life," Cooley
says, remembering the attitude in the office.
Three years later, Cooley ran for D.A. on a
platform of restrained three-strikes
enforcement, calling the law "a necessary
weapon, one that must be used with
precision and not in a scatter-gun fashion."
In office, he turned his critique into policy.
The L.A. district attorney's office no longer
seeks life sentences for offenders like
Norman Williams or Gregory Taylor. The
presumption is that prosecutors ask for a life
sentence only if a third-strike crime is
violent or serious. Petty thieves and most
drug offenders are presumed to merit a
double sentence, the penalty for a second
strike, unless their previous record includes
a hard-core crime like murder, armed
robbery, sexual assault or possession of
large quantities of drugs. During Cooley's
first year in office, three-strikes convictions
in Los Angeles County triggering life
sentences dropped 39 percent. No other
prosecutor's office in California has a
written policy like Cooley's, though a
couple of D.A.'s informally exercise similar
discretion.
It's a mistake, though, to cast Cooley as a
full-tilt reformer. He opposed Prop 66 for
ignoring a defendant's criminal history.
Instead, in 2006, he offered up his own bill,
which tracked his policy as D.A., taking
minor drug crimes and petty theft off the list
of three-strikes offenses unless one of the
first two strikes involved a crime that
Cooley considers hard-core. For staking out
even this middle ground, Cooley became
prosecutor non grata among his fellow
D.A.'s. No district attorney, not even the
most liberal, supported his bill, and it died in
Senate committee.
Cooley could once again pay a price for his
three-strikes record. This spring, he
announced his candidacy for California
attorney general. His Republican rivals have
hammered him for his moderate stance.
"He's acting as an enabler for habitual
offenders," State Senator Tom Harman told
me. "I think that's wrong. I want to put them
in prison." The race has developed into a
litmus test: for 15 years, no serious
candidate for major statewide office has
dared to criticize three strikes. If Cooley
makes it through his party's primary on June
8-and especially if he goes on to win in
November-the law will no longer seem
untouchable. If he loses, three strikes will be
all the more difficult to dislodge.
Michael Romano has another,
complementary strategy for changing the
law. He has won victories for 13 three-
strikes lifers in two years, 5 of them with the
help of Cooley's office, and he sees that
small number of victories as making a case
for larger reform. (He was on a panel I
moderated at Yale Law School last month.)
While that may sound far-fetched, the tactic
has worked before. Romano's boss,
Lawrence Marshall, helped prove the
innocence of 13 death-row inmates in
Illinois in the late 1990s. His work set in
motion a reassessment of the death penalty.
A result was a statewide moratorium on
executions that has held for a decade. "The
hardest step is to get people's attention,"
says Marshall, associate dean for clinical
education at Stanford. "And you can only
get it with sympathetic cases."
Romano started thinking about three strikes
when he clerked for Judge Richard Tallman
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in 2004. One afternoon, Romano
watched his boss and two other judges
quickly dispense with routine matters. One
of them was a three-strikes appeal. "This
guy, Willie Joseph, was doing life for aiding
and abetting a $5 sale of crack cocaine,"
Romano remembers. Legally speaking, his
case for release was so weak that it took the
judges "less than a few minutes" to reject
the appeal.
And yet Willie Joseph's life sentence was
effectively the same as the punishment
imposed on the most vicious killers in
California. While 694 convicted murderers
sit on the state's death row, only 13 have
been executed since the Supreme Court
allowed for reinstatement of the death
penalty in 1976. The 3,700 nonviolent,
nonserious three-strikers serving life in
California outnumber the 3,263 death-row
inmates nationwide.
By working with three-strikers, Romano is
trying to highlight the plight of criminals he
sees as more pathetic than heinous. "I think
about explaining to my kids what I do, and I
see no moral ambiguity," Romano says
about his work. Capital defendants, of
course, deserve representation, he explains.
"But there are other lives to be saved, of
people who haven't done horrible things,
who haven't actually hurt anyone."
In practical terms, Romano points out, the
difference between being convicted of
capital murder and a small-time third strike
is this: a murderer is entitled to a far greater
share of legal resources. California spends at
least $300,000 on the defense side of a
capital murder trial. The courts give extra
scrutiny to each capital appeal that comes
before them. And it's only in death-penalty
cases that the state pays lawyers to file a
writ of habeas corpus, the route to
challenging a conviction once direct appeal
has been exhausted.
A three-strikes case, by contrast, is just one
more file in the stack on a public defender's
desk and a judge's docket. Romano has a
client whose appellate lawyer cut and pasted
into her brief for him the more serious
criminal history of another man-incorrectly
telling the judges that her client was far
more violent when he actually was.
In court, Romano and his students don't
simply argue that their clients are minor
offenders who don't deserve to spend the
rest of their lives in prison. That route to
release is mostly blocked by the Supreme
Court's twin rulings on three strikes. In
2003, the justices voted 5-4 to reject the
argument that three strikes violates the
Eighth Amendment's protection against
cruel-and-unusual punishment. Because of
criminal histories, the high court let stand
the life sentences for Leandro Andrade,
convicted of a third strike when he
shoplifted videotapes from two Kmarts, and
Gary Ewing, who walked out of a store with
three golf clubs in a leg of his pants.
But the California Supreme Court has left
open a different route to appeal. In 1998, the
court told trial judges who were weighing a
bid for leniency at sentencing after a three-
strikes conviction that they could consider
whether a defendant's "background,
character and prospects" place him outside
the "spirit" of three strikes.
Romano argues that, as in capital cases, his
clients deserve to ask for lesser sentences
based on "mitigating evidence"---often of
child abuse, mental illness or mental
retardation. Romano's students track down
clients' old files, ask about their childhoods
and pry confirmation out of family
members. From Norman Williams's juvenile
files and probation reports, Romano's
students pieced together a story of unbroken
woe. The 8th of 12 children, Williams grew
up with a mother who was a binge drinker.
She pimped out Williams and his brothers to
men she knew. A social worker wrote,
"These men paid the boys money to perform
anal intercourse on the boys and they. ..
gave the money to their mother for wine."
As an adult, Williams became a cocaine
addict and lived on the streets of Long
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Beach.
Romano's students laid out this mitigating
evidence, which hadn't been introduced at
trial, in a 56-page habeas brief before the
state court in Long Beach last year. They got
back a one-sentence order denying their
claim.
Frustrated, Romano took the habeas petition
to one of Cooley's deputies, Brentford
Ferreira. Would he agree that after 12 years
in prison, Williams had done enough time?
Would he say so to the judge?
Ferreira, a 24-year veteran prosecutor, fired
back with questions of his own. "I said,
O.K., what you've really shown me is that
all this guy knows how to do is steal," he
remembers. "So why should I let him out?
What are you going to do for him?" Romano
knew that Ferreira was right. If just one of
his clients got out and hurt someone the
whole project would look menacing rather
than crusading. Defense lawyers don't
usually act like social workers, but it was
vital for Romano and his students to come
up with a plan and a home for Williams,
from the moment he walked out of Folsom.
Romano's efforts to help Williams succeed
on the outside led him to Eileen Richardson.
Once the C.E.O. of Napster, she now runs a
$500,000 program, the Downtown Streets
Team, which contracts with the city of Palo
Alto and local nonprofits to provide
janitorial services. The work is done by
former offenders and homeless people.
Richardson pays them in rent subsidies and
Safeway and Wal-Mart gift cards. They
attend a weekly support meeting and wear
different colored T-shirts as they move up a
"ladder of success."
With Richardson's promise to give Williams
a try, Romano persuaded Ferreira to go with
him to see the judge in Long Beach. The
prosecutor's support made the difference:
Williams was resentenced to time served.
Shortly after he left Folsom a year ago, he
started on the Streets Team mopping and
waxing the floors of a local shelter.
Richardson says Williams hasn't missed a
day of work since.
If Steve Cooley wins the Republican
primary for attorney general, on almost
every issue-most visibly the death
penalty-he'll run to the right of his
probable Democratic opponent, the San
Francisco district attorney Kamala Harris.
But on three strikes, Cooley will run to
Harris's left. (She didn't support his 2006
proposal, though she is one of the
prosecutors who, on a case-by-case basis,
refrains from seeking a life sentence for
some nonviolent three-strikers.) It's a
reminder of how far the prosecution of
Gregory Taylor, the homeless man who
broke into the church, has taken Cooley
from the expected comfort zone of a
prosecutor.
Cooley is couching his support for amending
three strikes statewide more carefully during
campaign season. "Any changes to the
three-strikes law will have to be in the
context of overall prison reform," he told me
in March. At the same time, Romano and
Families to Amend California's Three
Strikes, the group that fought for Proposition
66, are increasingly interested in using
Cooley's Los Angeles policy as the basis for
a new statewide reform effort in 2012,
because it suggests a way to reserve life
sentences for the three-strikers who have
committed crimes of violence.
Between 2001 and 2008, the Los Angeles
D.A.'s office automatically sought life
sentences for about 5,400 repeat offenders
whose third strike was violent or serious.
The office also screened 13,900 cases in
which the third strike crime was neither
violent nor serious, to find out whether the
defendant had a past record of hard-core
crimes. During these years, prosecutors
asked for life in only 25 percent of these
cases. The other 75 percent are the
nonviolent three-strikers whom the law
could safely be amended to spare, Romano
argues. "Those are the folks who shouldn't
be doing life," he says. If Cooley becomes
attorney general, he'd have more clout to put
behind a 2012 reform initiative, if he chose
to.
Norman Williams will soon move into his
own apartment in Palo Alto. None of the
other clients for whom the Stanford clinic
has won release have gotten in trouble. And
Romano and his students recently started
representing Gregory Taylor, who is still
serving life in San Luis Obispo prison.
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Skinner v. Switzer
09-9000
Ruling Below: Skinner v. Switzer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3998 (2010), cert. granted, 2010 U.S.
LEXIS 4231 (2010).
Plaintiff Henry Skinner was convicted of capital murder as a result of his having committed
multiple murders during one criminal episode. The jury sentenced Skinner to death. Skinner filed
a federal habeas corpus action, but a district court determined that his conviction and death
sentence were constitutional and federal habeas corpus relief was denied. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of federal habeas corpus relief, and the Supreme
Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari. Skinner filed an additional suit in district court
invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Skinner claims that state officials violated his constitutional rights by
denying to him access to biological evidence recovered from the scene of the murders for
purposes of conducting DNA testing. A district court held that Skinner failed to state a claim in
his § 1983 complaint upon which relief may be granted and dismissed Skinner's complaint. The
Supreme Court issued a stay of execution to hear the case.
Question Presented: May a convicted prisoner seeking access to biological evidence for DNA
testing assert that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or is such a claim
cognizable only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus?
Henry Watkins SKINNER, Plaintiff,
V.
Lynn SWITZER, District Attorney, 31st Judicial District of Texas, Defendant.
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
Decided January 15, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO DISMISS § 1983
COMPLAINT
Before the Court is plaintiffs complaint,
alleging a cause of action under Title 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and asserting that defendant's
refusal to allow him access to biological
evidence for purposes of forensic DNA
testing violates his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process and his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. For the reasons set
forth, the undersigned recommends to the
United States District Judge that defendant's
motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that
plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, defendant, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals have adequately set forth
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the procedural background of this case. For
the purposes of these findings, conclusions,
and recommendation, however, the
following summation is provided.
Plaintiff Henry Skinner was convicted in the
31st District Court of Gray County, Texas,
of the offense of capital murder as a result of
his having committed multiple murders
during one criminal episode. The jury
sentenced plaintiff to death. He is currently
scheduled to be executed by the State of
Texas on February 24, 2010.
Because of procedural issues not relevant to
this § 1983 proceeding, the merits of
Skinner's state habeas claims were never
addressed during state habeas corpus
proceedings. Skinner did present claims in a
federal habeas corpus action filed in this
Court, which resulted in a determination that
his conviction and death sentence were
constitutional and federal habeas corpus
relief was denied. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed this Court's denial of
federal habeas corpus relief. Plaintiff filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the case on
November 23, 2009, which is pending
before the Supreme Court.
By this lawsuit, plaintiff seeks, for purposes
of conducting DNA testing, access to
biological evidence recovered from the
scene of the murders and never before
tested. Although the evidence has not been
previously tested, it is not newly discovered
evidence, but was available to plaintiff at the
time of trial. Plaintiff does not contend the
results of any DNA testing would in fact be
exculpatory, but contends the results might
be exculpatory. In seeking this evidence
post-conviction, plaintiff filed two motions
in Texas courts, in 2001 and in 2007, for
DNA evidence pursuant to Article 64.01 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The
state trial court denied both of those
motions, and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals (CCA) affirmed both denials.
Plaintiff did not seek relief from either of the
CCA's denials of the Article 64.01 motions
by petitioning the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari.
II. THE ALLEGATIONS
By his complaint, plaintiff asks the Court to
require defendant to release certain items of
biological evidence for DNA testing.
Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to obtain
certain biological evidence, which he lists
with specificity, for DNA testing and that
the withholding of the evidence violates his
due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment to the United State
Constitution. Less than one month after
filing his complaint and motion for
preliminary injunction, plaintiff filed a
Notice of Recent Relevant Authority, in
which he acknowledged relevant Fifth
Circuit caselaw that appears to require this
Court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for
failing to raise a cognizable § 1983 claim.
By his Notice, plaintiff suggests the Court
dismiss the case pursuant to the screening
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act.
In response to the complaint, defendant has
filed a motion to dismiss, urging four
grounds for dismissal:
1. The Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to rule on
plaintiff s claims and should
therefore dismiss the complaint
under rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. The Court is bound by Heck v.
Humphrey as interpreted in Kutzner
v. Montgomery County and should
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therefore dismiss the complaint
under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure;
3. Plaintiffs complaint presents
claims that are essentially identical
to several prior claims decided
against plaintiff at the state and
federal levels and should therefore
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1738; and
4. The complaint is in essence an
improper, successive petition for
habeas corpus relief and should
therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3-4).
III. JURISDICTION
Notwithstanding plaintiffs notice of Recent
Relevant Authority, this Court must, prior to
discussing the merits of the case, determine
if it has jurisdiction. Defendant contends the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this
Court from obtaining jurisdiction over this
case. That doctrine bars federal district
courts from exercising "appellate
jurisdiction over state-court judgments,
which Congress has reserved to [the
Supreme] Court." The Court clarified the
scope of the doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. In that case, the
Court established "[t]he Rooker-Feldman
doctrine ... is confined to cases of the kind
from which the doctrine acquired its name:
cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those
judgments."
Research has not uncovered any Fifth
Circuit guidance directly on point. The
Second Circuit, however, has discussed
Rooker-Feldman in the context of a case
where a prisoner sought access to DNA
evidence via a § 1983 claim. In that case, the
court, relying on Exxon, determined the
state-court decision denying plaintiff access
to DNA evidence did not cause injury to
constitutional rights. Rather, the injury
existed before the state court entered its
judgment and was "simply ratified,
acquiesced in, or left unpunished by the state
court."
The Sixth Circuit, however, in evaluating a
factually similar situation, reached a
different conclusion. In In re Smith, an
unpublished decision, the court, likewise
relying on Exxon, held a § 1983 plaintiff
was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
from seeking DNA evidence. The plaintiff
in In re Smith complained the state trial
court incorrectly denied his motions for
access to DNA evidence. The Sixth Circuit
concluded this was a complaint of an injury
caused by the state-court judgment and
which sought review and rejection of that
judgment, and, as such, was barred by
Rooker-Feldman.
Plaintiffs claims for relief are limited to
those asserted in his complaint and the only
causes of action asserted in his complaint
are that defendant Switzer violated his
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights.
The issue is made more difficult, however,
because it is not clear from plaintiffs
pleadings whether he is attempting to assert
other claims. It may be that plaintiff is
attempting to assert at least two different
theories of relief: (1) that defendant's
actions violated his constitutional rights (as
contained in his complaint) and (2) that the
state court's actions in applying the state
DNA testing statute violated his
constitutional rights (not asserted in his
complaint). The first of these claims is
similar to those in McKithen, while the
second is more similar to those in In re
Smith. As such, the first of these claims is
not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
but the second, if in fact it is being asserted,
very well may be barred.
A. Issues Not Precluded by the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine
"A claim which is not raised in the
complaint . . . is not properly before the
court." Thus, the Court's analysis must
begin with and is determined by the
particular causes of action plaintiff brings in
his complaint. In his complaint, plaintiff
identified two causes of action, i.e., that
defendant deprived plaintiff of (1) his right
to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment and (2) his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. Critically, plaintiffs
complaint does not challenge the
constitutionality of Article 64 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure nor does it ask
this Court to review the application of
Article 64 by the CCA's judgments denying
him access to the DNA evidence. While
plaintiff does, in various other pleadings,
complain about the decisions of the CCA, he
has not set out a specific cause of action
challenging those decisions, as discussed in
detail infra.
Any injuries caused by defendant's refusal
to release DNA evidence predate and are not
caused by the CCA's decisions to not grant
plaintiff access to the biological evidence.
As in the McKithen case, the state-court
decision denying plaintiff access to the
evidence did not, in fact, cause the injury of
which plaintiff initially complains.
Moreover, plaintiff affirmatively disclaims
he is claiming any injury caused by the state
court judgment. Because plaintiff is not
"complaining of injuries caused by [the]
state-court judgment[]" and does not seek
review of those judgments, review of the
claims for relief set out in the complaint is
not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
B. Issues Likely Precluded by the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine
Ordinarily, the Court would not address
claims which the plaintiff has not properly
pled. As set forth above, the undersigned
finds plaintiff to only have alleged those
causes of action set out at paragraphs VII
and VIII of his complaint. Since these
findings, conclusions, and recommendations
will be subject to review by the District
Judge, the undersigned has included a
review of the additional arguments plaintiff
has set out in his pleadings even though such
claims were not identified as specific claims
for relief. The reasoning in In re Smith
would seem to apply to the arguments
plaintiff makes that the state court's actions
in applying the state DNA testing statute
violated his constitutional rights. In his
Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
plaintiff contends Article 64 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure is
unconstitutional as applied to his case.
These allegations appear to directly
challenge the state court action, and by
making them, plaintiff includes an argument
that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
violated his due process rights by incorrectly
applying the state statute. By directly
pointing to a state court's actions as a source
of injury, and by asking the Court to review
such state court actions, plaintiff raises
claims likely barred by Rooker-Feldman. If
the CCA did indeed incorrectly and
unconstitutionally apply Article 64 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the
proper relief for plaintiff would have been to
appeal the judgment directly to the United
States Supreme Court.
Those claims, however, are not further
addressed because plaintiff has not raised
them as a claim for relief and has not sought
to amend his complaint to assert them. For
purposes of this Report and
Recommendation, the undersigned finds no
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such claims to be asserted.
The undersigned also finds that paragraph
31 of the complaint, in which plaintiff states
"[a]s a result of the decisions of the CCA
denying Plaintiff post-conviction DNA
testing under Art. 64, the Defendant has
refused and continues to refuse to make
available to Plaintiff any DNA material for
testing," not to state an additional cause of
action or claim for relief. The Court notes
this paragraph is not under the paragraphs
plaintiff identifies in his complaint as claims
for relief. (Paragraphs VII and VIII).
Moreover, paragraph 31 appears merely to
be a chronological statement that defendant
has continually refused to release this
evidence both before and following the
CCA's denial of plaintiffs Article 64
motions. To the extent plaintiff contends
otherwise, the Court does not believe this
singular, vague statement can properly be
read as directly challenging the CCA's
decisions because if it were so read, plaintiff
would be taking mutually exclusive
positions, i.e. as set forth in footnote 1,
plaintiff, in response to the motion to
dismiss, affirmatively states the injury of
which he complains existed prior to any
state court decision and that he does not
complain of injuries caused by a state court
judgment.
Consequently, if the undersigned is correct
in the determination of the claims presented,
no Rooker-Feldman bar is present. If,
however, the undersigned is incorrect and
plaintiff is asserting any additional claims
that the application of Article 64 by the
CCA deprived him of due process, then it
would appear he is complaining of an injury
caused by the state court judgment and
defendant's motion to dismiss based upon
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has
considerable merit and the issue would have
to be revisited. At this stage, plaintiff has not
formally asserted these other claims in his
complaint as causes of action and the Court
will not further address plaintiffs contention
regarding the improper application of
Article 64 by the Texas courts.
IV. Application of Kutzner
Defendant next contends plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Citing the Kutzner decision, issued
by the Fifth Circuit in 2002, defendant
contends plaintiff s claims are not
cognizable under § 1983 and must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff agrees the Kutzner decision is
binding upon this Court.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court
emphasized that a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a
state prisoner challenging the fact or
duration of his confinement. In evaluating §
1983 suits, the Court instructed district
courts to "consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence
has already been invalidated."
Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit evaluated a §
1983 claim seeking to compel the
production of biological evidence for DNA
testing. In that case, the plaintiff contended
that state officials refused to release
biological evidence for DNA testing and
thereby prevented him "from gaining access
to exculpatory evidence which could
exclude him as a perpetrator" of the offense
for which he was convicted. Applying Heck,
the court held such a claim was not
cognizable in a § 1983 action. Rather, the
court pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as the
proper statute for bringing such a claim:
claims seeking to attack the fact or
duration of confinement, as well as
claims which are "so intertwined"
with attacks on confinement that
their success would "necessarily
imply" revocation or modification of
confinement, must be brought as
habeas corpus petitions and not
under § 1983. Under Martinez, a
prisoner's request for DNA testing of
evidence relevant to his prior
conviction is "so intertwined" with
the merits of the conviction as to
require habeas corpus treatment.
Three years after the Kutzner opinion, the
Supreme Court issued Wilkinson v. Dotson.
In that case, the Court evaluated its caselaw
regarding the difference between claims
cognizable under § 1983 and claims
cognizable in habeas corpus.
The Dotson court found the § 1983 action,
involving parole proceedings, should be
allowed to proceed as a § 1983 action.
Although Dotson did not involve a request
for evidence for DNA testing, circuit court
of appeals have interpreted the language in
Dotson to allow a prisoner to bring a claim
for biological evidence for DNA testing as a
§ 1983 claim, as opposed to the Fifth
Circuit's approach requiring a prisoner to
bring such a claim as a habeas corpus
petition. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit's
position, established before Dotson was
issued, is in agreement with that taken by
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
The Fifth Circuit has not ever discussed the
Dotson decision in the context of its
application to post-conviction requests for
DNA evidence. It has, however, cited the
Kutzner case after Dotson was decided in a
case involving a post-conviction request for
DNA evidence-indicating Kutzner remains
the law in this circuit. Even were this Court
to question the validity of Kutzner after
Dotson, it recognizes that only the Fifth
Circuit may overrule its own law, and even
though there is an intervening Supreme
Court decision in this case, there is also a
latter Fifth Circuit decision.
Based upon the foregoing, there is no reason
not to apply Kutzner. In considering whether
Kutzner applies, the undersigned notes that
the Supreme Court expressly left the Heck
issue open when it decided Osborne. In fact,
the Supreme Court, while acknowledging
that the Courts of Appeals had applied
Dotson to allow § 1983 DNA lawsuits,
specifically declined to address the issue of
Heck v. Humphrey. It now appears the Fifth
Circuit will address the viability of Kutzner
in light of Dotson and Osborne.
This Court must follow the law established
in Kutzner and hold that plaintiff Skinner's §
1983 claims are cognizable only in habeas
corpus. As such, plaintiff fails to state a
claim in his § 1983 complaint upon which
relief may be granted and his complaint
should be dismissed on such grounds.
Because the Court recommends the
dismissal of the case for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, it
foregoes further discussion of other grounds
for dismissal at this time.
Although the Court declines further
discussion of other grounds for dismissal
urged by the defendant, there are two issues
which the undersigned identifies in the event
the District Judge finds them to be
cognizable. First, there is no freestanding
substantive due process right to DNA
evidence. Were the District Judge to find
Kutzner did not bar this lawsuit, then that
issue would be presented as to any
consideration of the merits.
Second, defendant's res judicata arguments
have not been addressed. If the undersigned
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is correct in the determination that plaintiff's
claims are limited to those identified in his
complaint, then neither res judicata nor
Rooker-Feldman bar the consideration of the
case. If, however, plaintiff is in fact
asserting the additional claims as discussed
in section III of this Report and
Recommendation, res judicata would be an
issue.
V. RECOMMENDATION
It is the RECOMMENDATION of the
United States Magistrate Judge to the United
States District Judge that the 42 U.S.C. §
1983 filed by plaintiff HENRY WATKINS
SKINNER be DISMISSED for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and that the motion to dismiss filed
by defendant LYNN SWITZER be
GRANTED.
"U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Texas
Death Row Case"
CNN
May 24, 2010
Bill Mears
A Texas death row inmate will get a hearing
before the Supreme Court over his claims of
"actual innocence" and demands authorities
conduct more thorough DNA testing of
evidence gathered at the crime scene. At
issue [in Skinner v. Switzer] is whether
capital inmates have a basic federal civil
right to have forensic evidence reviewed late
in the appeal process.
Supporters of Henry Skinner, convicted of
the murders of three acquaintances, say if he
loses this appeal, an innocent man could be
put to death.
The state says he is not entitled to testing of
evidence that was not analyzed before his
1995 trial.
The justices had issued a stay just before his
scheduled March 24 execution. The court
will now schedule oral arguments for the
fall, to decide the larger constitutional
questions. Federal appeals courts have split
on the issue in recent years.
Skinner, 47, was convicted of the New
Year's Eve 1993 killings of his live-in
girlfriend and her two adult sons. He
strongly denies any involvement, and claims
retesting would prove his innocence and
determine the real killer.
His lawyers welcomed the high court's
decision to intervene. "We look forward to
the opportunity to persuade the court that if
a state official arbitrarily denies a prisoner
access to evidence for DNA testing, the
prisoner should be allowed to challenge that
decision in a federal civil rights lawsuit,"
said attorney Rob Owen.
Prosecutors maintain forensic evidence
gathered at the scene and witness statements
point to Skinner.
A female friend of Skinner's who lived four
blocks away testified at Skinner's trial that
he walked to her mobile home and told her
that he may have kicked Twila Busby to
death, although evidence did not show she
had been kicked. The neighbor has since
recanted parts of her testimony.
Authorities followed a blood trail from the
crime scene to the female friend's home and
found Skinner in the closet, authorities said.
He was "wearing heavily blood-stained
jeans and socks and bearing a gash on the
palm of his right hand," according to the
Texas attorney general's summary of the
case.
Also found stabbed to death were Elwin
"Scooter" Caler, 22, and Randy Busby, 20.
In addition, authorities said cuts on
Skinner's hand came from the knife used to
stab the men. The onetime oil field worker
said he cut it on glass. Some DNA testing
was done that implicated Skinner, but not on
the items he now wants examined, including
vaginal swabs from Busby, fingernail
clippings, two knives, and items of clothing.
"DNA testing showed that blood on the shirt
Skinner was wearing at the time of his arrest
was Twila's blood, and blood on Skinner's
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jeans was a mixture of blood from Elwin
and Twila," state officials said.
However, Owen wrote in the Supreme Court
filing, "the victims' injuries show that
whoever murdered them must have
possessed considerable strength, balance and
coordination." Skinner claimed he had been
passed out on a couch from a combination of
vodka and codeine, and that he was
physically unable to commit the crimes.
An expert testified at trial that Skinner
would have been too intoxicated to commit
the crimes, and a review of the evidence
suggests that Skinner might have been even
more intoxicated than initially thought,
Owen wrote.
Texas Gov. Rick Perry had received more
than 8,000 letters from Skinner's advocates
urging a new trial, according to the
Innocence Project and Change.org, whose
members and supporters have sent the letters
through their Web sites.
Evidence presented at trial suggested that
Twila Busby's uncle, Robert Donnell-who
is now dead-could have been the killer. At
a New Year's Eve party she attended for a
short time on the last night of her life,
Donnell stalked her, making crude sexual
remarks, according to trial testimony. A
friend who drove her home from the party
testified she was "fidgety and worried" and
that Donnell was no longer at the party when
he returned.
"The defense presented evidence that
Donnell was a hot-tempered ex-con who had
sexually molested a girl, grabbed a pregnant
woman by the throat and kept a knife in his
car," according to Owen's letter to Perry.
Sandrine Ageorges-Skinner, who married
Skinner in 2008, told CNN in March that
she began writing to Skinner in 1996 and
they began visiting in 2000.
"I'm convinced of his innocence not because
I love him and he's my husband, I'm
convinced of his innocence . .. [because]
there is scientific forensic evidence to prove
that he was not even in a state to stand up at
the time of the crime let alone murder three
people that he loved," Ageorges-Skinner, a
French woman, said on "Larry King Live."
"There is absolutely no motive."
Texas has executed more prisoners than any
state since 1976. Ten condemned inmates
have died by lethal injection since January.
Recently, questions have swirled in Texas
regarding the 2004 execution of Cameron
Todd Willingham for a fire that killed his
three daughters, and allegations he was not
guilty of the murders.
On March 19, Perry issued a posthumous
pardon for Timothy Cole, who was serving a
25-year sentence for aggravated sexual
assault when he died in prison from an
asthma attack. After his death, DNA tests
established his innocence, and another man
confessed to the crime.
The Supreme Court case is Skinner v.
Switzer (09-9000).
"U.S. High Court to Consider DNA
Access in Texas Execution Case"
Bloomberg
May 24, 2010
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider
broadening the ability of convicted
murderers to seek new DNA testing, [in
Skinner v. Switzer,] agreeing to consider an
appeal from a Texas man whose execution
the court halted in March.
The justices will hear arguments from Henry
W. Skinner, convicted of the 1993 murders
of his girlfriend, Twila Busby, and her two
adult sons in the north Texas town of
Pampa. Skinner, 48, says DNA testing could
exonerate him and might implicate Busby's
uncle as the perpetrator.
The case will test whether condemned
inmates who say they didn't receive a fair
trial can use a federal law to seek DNA
testing that might prove their innocence. The
high court considered that question, but
didn't resolve it, in a 2009 case.
"This is a life-or-death case brought by a
possibly innocent man whose guilt or
innocence can be determined by DNA
testing," Skinner's appeal argued.
More than 250 people have been exonerated
after conviction through DNA evidence,
according to the Innocence Project, which
investigates cases and represents inmates.
Forty-seven states, including Texas, give
convicted criminals in at least some
circumstances the right to conduct post-trial
DNA testing.
Prosecutors said in court papers that Skinner
didn't meet the requirements for DNA
access under Texas law. They argued that
the state statute "contains all of the key
elements that the Innocence Project
recommends should be in a good DNA
access law."
Holiday Murder
Twila Busby was choked and bludgeoned
with an axe handle and Randolph Busby and
Elwin Caler were stabbed to death in the
home they shared with Skinner on New
Year's Eve 1993. Skinner says he had
consumed so much alcohol and codeine that
he couldn't possibly have committed the
crime.
Skinner is seeking DNA testing of seven
sets of items, including vaginal swabs taken
from Twila Busby, her fingernail clippings
and two knives that were found at the house.
His lawyers say his inability to get testing of
those items shows the inadequacy of the
Texas DNA procedures.
Skinner is invoking a provision in federal
law known as Section 1983, which lets
individuals sue over violations of their
constitutional rights by state or federal
officials. A New Orleans-based federal court
barred his suit.
Last year, the high court ruled that inmates
don't have a "freestanding right" to demand
access to DNA evidence for testing. That
ruling left open the possibility that inmates
could use Section 1983 to seek DNA access
when their rights haven't been adequately
protected by state procedures.
The Supreme Court halted Skinner's
execution March 24, issuing an order less
than an hour before he was scheduled to die.
"High Court to Review Skinner's
Request for DNA Test"
The Houston Chronicle
May 24, 2010
Allan Turner
Acting on a petition from condemned killer
Henry W. Skinner, the U.S. Supreme Court
today announced it will consider whether
inmates' requests for DNA testing can be
considered as civil rights claims [in Skinner
v. Switzer]-a question that has split the
nation's top federal courts.
Skinner, 47, was sentenced to die for the
1993 murders of his Texas Panhandle
girlfriend and her two adult sons. The high
court stayed his execution on March 24, just
one hour before Skinner was to have been
put to death.
After deliberating last week, the Supreme
Court announced its decision to review
Skinner's DNA case without further
comment.
Skinner, whose case has become a cause
celebre among capital punishment
opponents, has requested that DNA testing
be conducted on bloody knives found at the
murder scene, material found beneath his
victim's fingernails, rape kit samples and
other items previously not tested.
Skinner's request, filed as a Section 1983
civil rights claim, was turned down by the
U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.
The issue of whether such requests can be
considered as civil rights claims or must be
presented as habeas corpus claims has split
the nation's federal courts of appeal. Five
allow civil rights claims; five are undecided;
and two, including the 5th Court, do not.
At the heart of the controversy is whether a
prisoner simply is seeking DNA testing of
evidence or is demanding to be released
from prison. An effort to be set free
typically would be presented as a habeas
corpus petition.
Skinner was convicted of the 1993 New
Year's Eve murders of Twila Busby, who
was strangled and battered with an ax
handle; and her sons, Elwin Caler and
Randy Busby, who were stabbed.
Skinner, who worked as a paralegal before
his arrest, consistently has claimed
innocence.
His case gained international notoriety after
journalism students from a Chicago
university reviewed the case, located
potential new witnesses and drew attention
to evidence that had not been DNA tested.
Earlier, the Supreme Court declined to
review a 5th Court ruling that dismissed
Skinner's claim of insufficient trial counsel.
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"Top Court Halts Skinner Execution"
The Associated Press
March 24, 2010
Michael Graczyk
The U.S. Supreme Court on Wednesday
stopped the execution of condemned
prisoner Hank Skinner about an hour before
he could have been taken to the Texas death
chamber.
Skinner asked the court and Gov. Rick Perry
for the delay for DNA testing that he
insisted could clear him in a triple slaying.
The brief order grants him the delay but
does not ensure he will get such testing.
Perry had not decided on the delay.
Skinner, 47, faced lethal injection for the
bludgeoning and strangling of his girlfriend,
40-year-old Twila Jean Busby, and the
stabbings of her two adult sons. The slayings
occurred at their home in the Texas
Panhandle town of Pampa on New Year's
Eve in 1993.
The court order came as relatives of Busby
were climbing the steps of the Huntsville
prison to prepare to witness his punishment.
In the order, the justices said they would put
off the execution until they decide whether
to review his case. If the court refuses the
review, the reprieve is lifted, according to
the order, and that would make Skinner
eligible for another execution date.
'I'm greatly relieved'
Skinner, in a small holding cell a few feet
from the death chamber, expressed surprise
when was informed of the reprieve in a
phone call from his lawyer.
"I had made up my mind I was going to
die," he said. "I'm eager to get the DNA
testing so I can prove my innocence and get
the hell out of here.
"I'm greatly relieved. I feel like I really won
today."
Rob Owen, Skinner's lead attorney and a
University of Texas law professor, said the
court action suggested the justices believed
"there are important issues that require
closer examination."
"We remain hopeful that the court will agree
to hear Mr. Skinner's case and ultimately
allow him the chance to prove his innocence
through DNA testing," he said.
Skinner, splattered with the blood of at least
two of the victims, was arrested about three
hours after the bodies were found. Police
found him in a closet at the trailer home of a
woman he knew.
The former oil field and construction worker
said he was present when the three were
killed but couldn't have committed the
murders. Skinner said a combination of
vodka and codeine left him passed out on a
couch and physically incapable of clubbing
Busby 14 times with an ax handle and
stabbing her sons, Elwin "Scooter" Caler,
22, and Randy Busby, 20.
"I've been framed ever since," he said last
week. "They're fixing to kill me for
something I didn't do."
Prosecutors argued Skinner wasn't entitled
to testing of evidence that wasn't analyzed
before his 1995 trial. Courts over the years
since his conviction have agreed, rejecting
his appeals.
Similar appeal to Perry
Skinner's lawyers want to pursue in federal
district court a civil case against the Gray
County District Attorney, whose office
prosecuted Skinner initially. That suit seeks
to make evidence available for testing.
They'd made a similar appeal to Perry.
Skinner's attorneys want DNA testing on
vaginal swabs taken from Busby at the time
of her autopsy, fingernail clippings, a knife
found on the porch of Busby's house and a
second knife found in a plastic bag in the
house, a towel with the second knife, a
jacket next to Busby's body and any hairs
found in her hands that were not destroyed
in previous testing. Only the hairs were
tested previously and those results were
inconclusive, according to court documents.
Skinner's trial lawyer, Harold Comer, chose
not to test all the evidence because he feared
the outcome would be more damaging to his
client.
Comer said he now favors the testing but
defended his trial strategy.
"I would make the same decision with the
same circumstances again," he said.
Trial prosecutor John Mann, who has since
died, also did not have all the evidence
tested. Current District Attorney Lynn
Switzer, now the defendant in Skinner's
lawsuit, declined to comment about the case
as Skinner's execution neared. Lawyers
representing her office challenged the suit as
improper.
Skinner would have been the fifth person
executed this year in Texas, the nation's
most active capital punishment state.
Twenty-four people were put to death in
Texas in 2009.
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"In Death-Penalty Cases, Innocence
Has to Matter"
Time
May 25, 2010
Adam Cohen
Hank Skinner, who is on death row in
Texas, had a simple request. Before the state
took his life, he wanted to test DNA
evidence from the crime scene that could
prove he was wrongly convicted. Texas
prosecutors, whose love for the death
penalty is legendary, refused.
Skinner then sued, claiming that federal civil
rights laws gave him a constitutional right to
do the testing. A federal appeals court ruled
against him.
On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
to hear Skinner's case [in Skinner v.
Switzer]. That's good news. The Justices
should use the case to expand the right to do
DNA testing. But Skinner's case also gives
the court a chance to confront a disturbing
aspect of the nation's approach to the death
penalty: the fact that the legal system does
not always seem to care whether the people
it executes are actually guilty.
There's no denying the crime Skinner, now
48, was convicted of in 1995 was a vicious
one. Skinner's girlfriend and her two
mentally challenged sons were stabbed,
strangled and bludgeoned to death. But
Skinner has always insisted he is innocent.
The evidence against him is largely
circumstantial, and his lawyers argue that
the girlfriend's uncle, who they say had been
harassing her that night and acted
suspiciously after the crime, was likely the
real murderer.
When students from Northwestern
University's Medill Innocence Project
investigated, they found evidence that raised
serious questions about the prosecution's
case. A toxicologist who testified for the
defense said he had "never known a verdict
of the jury to be so at variance with what I
believe to be scientific fact."
It's not hard to believe Skinner could have
been wrongly convicted. With the rise of
DNA evidence, we now know that people
are falsely convicted of crimes, including
capital crimes, all too often. According to
the Death Penalty Information Center, 138
people have been released from death row
since 1973 with evidence of innocence.
Skinner has tried for 10 years to get access
to key pieces of biological evidence-
including his girlfriend's rape kit and two
knives that may have been used in the
killings. After prosecutors turned him down,
Skinner sued, arguing that the refusal
violated due process and constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, one of the most conservative courts
in the country, rejected his claim in a brief
decision. The judges focused on legal fine
points without engaging the larger injustice
of the situation-that Texas was seeking to
execute a man while denying him access to
evidence that could exonerate him.
Skinner's case never should have gotten this
far. When someone facing the death penalty
asks for relevant evidence for DNA testing,
the state's answer should simply be yes.
After all, the government's interest is not in
seeing people put to death or in reflexively
defending criminal convictions. It is in
making sure that the guilty are punished and
the innocent go free.
Prosecutors do not always see it that way.
They defend all sorts of practices that call
into question the reliability of the
convictions they obtain. A while back, in an
infamous case, Texas fought to execute an
inmate even though his lawyer slept at his
trial-repeatedly, and for long stretches of
time. The Fifth Circuit ultimately ruled that
the defendant was entitled to a new trial.
This callousness about death-penalty cases
is not limited to states like Texas-or to
prosecutors.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia set
off a firestorm last summer when he wrote a
dissent-joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas-that the highest court in the land
is not necessarily concerned with whether a
person facing execution had actually
committed the crime. The court "has never
held," Justice Scalia wrote, "that the
Constitution forbids the execution of a
convicted defendant who has had a full and
fair trial but is later able to convince a . . .
court that he is 'actually innocent."' Scalia
was taking issue with the court's ruling that
a lower court give Georgia death-row inmate
Troy Davis a new hearing.
This idea that the Constitution allows
innocent people to be put to death should be
abhorrent to anyone who cares about justice.
As Harvard Law School professor Alan
Dershowitz pointed out, Justice Scalia
seemed to be saying that if a man was
convicted of murdering his wife and then
showed up in court with the wife, who was
still alive, seeking a new trial, it should not
matter. As long as the man's conviction was
procedurally proper, Justice Scalia
apparently believes, he should still be
executed.
The Supreme Court-which will take up
Skinner's case in its next term-should rule
that people accused of capital crimes can use
federal civil rights laws to obtain the DNA
evidence they need to prove their innocence.
And the Justices should use the case to
underscore that we, as a nation, care whether
people facing the death penalty have
actually committed the crimes they were
accused of.
"Certain Knowledge"
Slate
June 8, 2010
Radley Balko
Texas Gov. Rick Perry The state of Texas
was 47 minutes from executing Henry
"Hank" Skinner in March when Justice
Antonin Scalia gave him a last-minute stay.
Last month, the Supreme Court as a whole
agreed to hear Skinner's case in the fall [in
Skinner v. Switzer]. At issue is whether
Skinner should be given access to crime-
scene evidence and DNA testing that he and
his lawyers say will prove his innocence.
However the court comes out, Skinner's
case raises a fundamental question about
how police and district attorneys investigate
and prosecute crimes: Why wasn't this
evidence tested before Skinner's trial? And
why hasn't it been tested since?
The answers lie in the adversarial nature of
our criminal justice system. There are times
when neither the prosecution nor the defense
is particularly interested in discovering the
truth. That's where policy makers need to
step in. In cases like Skinner's, they should
establish a common-sense rule: When there
is biological evidence at the crime scene, all
of that evidence should be sent for DNA
testing. No exceptions.
The details of Hank Skinner's case illustrate
both the problem and how such a rule would
solve it. Skinner was convicted in 1995 for
the 1993 murders of his girlfriend Twila
Busby and her two adult sons.
Skinner doesn't dispute that he was in the
house when his girlfriend and her sons were
murdered. He claims he was unconscious at
the time, knocked out by a near-lethal mix
of alcohol and codeine. Back in 1995, the
evidence against him seemed formidable. He
was present at the crime scene. He had
smears of blood from two of the three
victims on his shirt. Andrea Reed, Skinner's
neighbor and ex-girlfriend, says Skinner
came to her home shortly after the crime and
first implicated himself, then told Reed a
number of other implausible and
contradictory stories about who committed
the murders.
But Skinner has always maintained his
innocence. In 1999, Northwestern
University's Medill Innocence Project began
looking into Skinner's conviction. As
professor David Protess and his student
journalists began interviewing witnesses and
reviewing evidence, the state's case against
Skinner started to unravel. Reed recanted
her testimony and now says she was
pressured by police investigators to
implicate Skinner. Toxicology reports
showed the amount of codeine and alcohol
in Skinner's blood at the time of the murders
would have likely have rendered him
unconscious or put him in a hazy stupor. His
defenders say he couldn't have killed three
adults in that condition. The students also
found that Busby had been stalked by an
allegedly lecherous uncle named Robert
Donnell, whom witnesses said had
approached her at a party the night of her
death. She left frightened, and he appeared
to have followed her. Friends say Donnell
had raped Busby in the recent past. Days
after the murders, a neighbor saw Donnell
cleaning and repainting his truck.
There are other problems with Skinner's
conviction. His court-appointed attorney,
Harold Lee Comer, was a disgraced former
prosecutor who left office after pleading
guilty to siphoning off asset forfeiture funds
in a drug case. The judge, a friend of
Comer's, appointed him to represent
Skinner, then ordered Corner's pay in an
amount roughly equal to what Comer still
owed for his own criminal conduct. Worse,
Comer had previously prosecuted Skinner
on a minor assault and theft charge. At
Skinner's sentencing trial, the prosecution
argued that those two crimes were
aggravating factors that should be
considered in Skinner's sentencing. Comer
didn't object.
Most of these flaws have been litigated, and
the courts have found that none of them is
enough to win Skinner a new trial. But the
most troubling aspect of Skinner's case is
the biological material collected from the
crime scene. Law enforcement officials
tested the small blood smears on Skinner's
shirt, and those matched two of the three
victims. But given that Skinner admits he
was at the crime scene and says he awoke to
find the victims' bodies, it isn't surprising
that he'd have some of their blood on his
shirt. The blood on the murder weapons has
never been DNA tested. Nor has any
material from the rape kit taken from Busby.
The state also never tested skin cells taken
from under Busby's fingernails, or a blood-
stained windbreaker left at the scene that
witnesses say matched one often worn by
Donnell. "They only tested the material they
thought would implicate Skinner," Protess
told me via phone. "They fixated on their
suspect, and once they thought they had
enough for a conviction, they stopped."
Actually, it's worse than that. In 2000, on an
episode of the Nancy Grace Show, Protess
publicly challenged Skinner's prosecutor to
test the remaining biological evidence, even
offering to pay for the testing himself. "He
agreed, and I actually sent him an e-mail
complimenting him," Protess says. But
when mitochondrial DNA testing of the hair
Busby was clutching in her hand at the time
of her death didn't match Busby or Skinner,
the state halted the testing of any more
evidence and has refused to run any tests
since. As Skinner's execution neared in
March, Texas Gov. Perry again declined to
grant Skinner a stay so the evidence could
be tested, even after a lab in Arizona offered
to conduct the tests for free. Never mind that
all of this comes amid continuing
controversy over Texas' 2004 execution of
Cameron Todd Willingham, a man many
believe was innocent, as well as allegations
that Texas Gov. Rick Perry subsequently
undermined an investigation into the
dubious forensic evidence used at
Willingham's trial.
For the prosecution, refusing to test the
crime scene evidence is about establishing
finality and closure, regardless of justice.
But Skinner's defense counsel wasn't
interested in discovering the truth either. At
trial, Skinner could have asked for DNA
testing of the remaining evidence. Skinner
actually told his attorney Comer, in writing,
that he wanted the tests. But Comer declined
on his behalf. Comer says he feared the test
would have confirmed Skinner's guilt.
That's possible, Corner's shortcomings
aside. Criminal defense attorneys often
represent guilty people, and they wouldn't
be doing their jobs if they allowed for
testing that may confirm a client's guilt. Of
course, Comer also seems to have been
incompetent. But Skinner's request for the
tests doesn't mean his attorney would have
been obligated to ask for them.
Nor does Skinner have a constitutional right
of due process to DNA testing following
conviction. In a case last year, the Supreme
Court rejected exactly this proposition, and
so Skinner is asking the court to revisit the
question under federal civil rights law. In
District Attorney's Office for the 3rd
Judicial District v. Osborne, last year's case,
Justice Alito argued in a concurring opinion
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that guilty people could refuse to request
DNA testing at trial, then prolong the appeal
process (and stave off execution) by
requesting DNA testing afterward. To find a
right to post-conviction testing in the
Constitution's protection of due process,
Justice Samuel Alito wrote in his
concurrence, "would allow prisoners to play
games with the criminal justice system."
That's precisely why the testing should be
done before trial. Arguing over which
evidence gets tested shouldn't be part of
either side's strategy. The prosecution and
the defense should begin knowing that all of
the evidence has been tested or will be. For
old cases like Skinner's, if there's
significant doubt about the defendant's guilt
that testing could resolve, legislators
shouldn't wait for the courts-they should
make sure themselves that testing is done. A
typical DNA sample costs about $1,000 to
analyze, with a usual turn-around time of
about 30 days. Innocence Project spokesman
Eric Ferrero told me that his organization on
average pays about $8,500 per case for DNA
testing, since most cases have multiple
samples of evidence.
No less a death penalty supporter than
George W. Bush said in 2000, when he was
governor of Texas, "Any time DNA
evidence can be used in its context and be
relevant as to the guilt or innocence of a
person on death row, we need to use it."
Bush then granted a stay of execution to
accused killer Rickey Nolen McGinn to
allow for such testing. It confirmed
McGinn's guilt. Did McGinn game the
system to buy extra time? Probably. Does it
matter? McGinn got an extra month of life.
Everyone else in Texas got certainty that the
state didn't execute an innocent person-
and that the actual killer wasn't still running
free.
DNA testing may well confirm Hank
Skinner's guilt, too. But the incriminating
DNA may also match Robert Donnell (or
someone else). In which case Skinner would
become the 252nd person to be exonerated
by DNA. Either way, we'd know. By
refusing to answer the question, Texas
officials are acting as if preserving a
conviction is more important than knowing
for certain who killed Twila Busby and her
sons.
"Hank Skinner Death Penalty Case:
Texas Jurors Reconsider Verdict"
Politics Daily
June 9, 2010
Rachel Cicurel, Gaby Fleischman, Emily Glazer & Alexandra Johnson
In March 1995, a jury left a Fort Worth,
Texas, courthouse having unanimously
decided that DNA testing and compelling
testimony led to an inescapable verdict:
Henry "Hank" Skinner deserved to die for
the murders of his live-in girlfriend, Twila
Busby, and her two adult sons in their home
on New Year's Eve 1993.
Twila was bludgeoned to death; her sons
were stabbed. The jury primarily based its
decision on evidence that showed the
victims' blood on Skinner's clothes and the
testimony of a neighbor. They deliberated
for less than two hours, and Skinner has
been on Texas' death row ever since.
But the jurors were never presented with
complete DNA results of the physical
evidence, nor could they have imagined that
the prosecution's star witness would recant
her testimony and that subsequent
developments would strengthen the case that
another man may have been responsible for
the murders.
Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court
announced it would take Skinner's case and
determine whether he can bring a civil rights
action to seek DNA testing of the remaining
evidence found at the scene. The untested
evidence includes vaginal swabs, bloodied
knives, fingernail clippings, hair clutched in
the female victim's hand, and a blood-
stained windbreaker strikingly similar to one
worn by the alternative suspect.
In April of our senior year, the four of us-
22-year-old journalism students from
Northwestern University's Medill Innocence
Project-arrived in Texas in search of the
jurors. (The trial had been moved to the Fort
Worth area from rural Gray County in the
Panhandle because of massive pre-trial
publicity.) The Medill Innocence Project
investigates possible wrongful convictions
in homicide cases. In the five days allotted
for our reporting trip, we hoped to get in
touch with at least one juror. We were
pleasantly surprised, however, when more
than half the jury opened their doors and
memories.
In light of new developments that have
surfaced in the 15 years since Skinner's trial,
several of the original jurors are no longer
sure of his guilt. Five say they might have
had reasonable doubt at the time of the trial
if they had known then what they know
now. Seven are calling for DNA testing of
all the evidence so they can be certain they
convicted the right man. An eighth juror we
contacted declined to comment.
Some jurors had followed developments in
the case, searching the Internet and Texas
newspapers for Skinner's name; others
avoided it, hoping never to revisit this
traumatic experience. In kitchens, livings
rooms, garages, and eateries across Fort
Worth and suburban Arlington, the jurors
recalled the experience of being
sequestered-how detached they felt
watching "Forrest Gump" rather than the
news of the day.
But plugged back in 15 years later, they
considered statements by two of Twila's
friends that the alternative suspect-Twila's
uncle, Robert Donnell, who died in 1997-
allegedly raped her on two occasions and
stalked her at a party the night of the
murders, as well as those by neighbors who
said they had seen him tearing the carpeting
out of his truck the morning after the crime
and repainting the vehicle within a week.
They also took into account a new medical
report indicating the likelihood that Skinner
was barely conscious from drinking a
mixture of alcohol and codeine at the time of
the crime, and sworn statements by the
prosecution's star witness, Andrea Reed,
who repudiated her testimony. In the
original trial, Reed, Skinner's ex-girlfriend
who lived nearby, had testified that when
Skinner came to her trailer shortly after the
murders, he made incriminating statements
and demanded that she not call the police.
But in 1997, she recanted her testimony to a
private investigator, claiming that law
enforcement had intimidated her into falsely
testifying. In 2000, she repeated that claim
to another group of Medill Innocence
Project students.
"I had no idea that she recanted her story,
her testimony; that brings new light," said
Tiffany Daniel, the youngest member of the
jury. "That puts a lot of questions in my
mind."
Sitting at her kitchen table, Daniel slowly
reintroduced herself to an experience she
had closed well over a decade ago. "We
were responsible for sentencing," she said.
"If we weren't presented with all the
evidence that could potentially free a man or
convict a man ... if [he's put to death] and
if this man didn't do that, that would be
something I have to live with."
Many of the jurors interviewed were taken
aback by the amount of untested evidence,
stunned that even the blood on two of the
murder weapons had not been analyzed. The
seven jurors agreed that all the evidence
should undergo DNA analysis. "That's the
only way you can come to the right
conclusion of if he's innocent or guilty,"
said Danny Stewart, the jury's foreman. "I
would hate personally to put a man to death
if he's innocent."
Lynn Switzer, the current district attorney of
Gray County who is being sued by Skinner
in the case before the Supreme Court, has
refused to test all the remaining evidence.
"If defendants are allowed to 'game the
system' then we will never be able to rely on
the finality of the judgments entered in their
cases," Switzer said in a statement following
the court's decision to take Skinner's case.
"Mr. Skinner has been given plenty of
opportunity to show that additional testing
could prove his innocence, but he could not
show that."
Texas courts have repeatedly denied
Skinner's requests for DNA tests, ruling that
he should have had the testing done at the
time of the trial, a position Switzer supports.
Switzer was appointed district attorney by
Texas Gov. Rick Perry after District
Attorney Richard Roach was convicted of
stealing and abusing methamphetamines. In
January 2005, the FBI arrested Roach in the
Gray County courthouse-a place where he
had both injected meth in front of an
employee and made a career of prosecuting
constituents for using the same drug. Roach
had ousted the late John Mann, who served
Gray County during Skinner's trial in 1995.
At his trial, Skinner was represented by
Harold Comer, another former district
attorney of Gray County. In that role, Comer
had earlier prosecuted Skinner on charges of
theft and assault. Although Comer resigned
from office in 1992 before pleading guilty to
criminal charges of embezzling cash
confiscated in drug cases, he was later
appointed by the judge to represent Skinner
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at his capital murder trial. To many jurors'
current dismay, however, Comer didn't
request DNA tests prior to trial, saying he
did this to protect his client from potentially
damaging results.
"All of it should have been tested," juror
Stewart said. "All the DNA evidence should
be tested. Period."
Some additional tests were done following
Skinner's conviction. After being confronted
on CourtTV in 2000, Mann had a change of
heart. He ordered additional tests on head
hairs clutched in Twila's hand, bloody gauze
on the front sidewalk of her home, a cassette
tape in the bedroom, and other items.
While some results put Skinner in the
home-where he indisputably was at the
time of the crime-the tests on one of the
head hairs, the blood on the sidewalk, the
cassette tape, and an unmatched fingerprint
found on a plastic bag containing a bloodied
knife all excluded Skinner. At that point, the
district attorney's office-led by Richard
Roach when he took over from Mann-
halted further testing and returned the
evidence to a storage locker, where it sits
today.
It was this most recent round of DNA tests
that prompted five jurors to say they could
have reached a different verdict if they had
known at the time of the trial what they
know today. The two others said they really
didn't know if the tests would have changed
their minds.
"It would have been reasonable doubt,"
Daniel said, wiping away tears. "Especially
if we had all that evidence, and another
person's fingerprints was on it, or if
someone else's skin was underneath Twila
Busby's fingernails. That's reasonable doubt
that it could be somebody else."
Douglas Keene, a jury expert and president
of Keene Trial Consulting in Austin, said it
is "not at all common" for jurors to question
their original verdict. "Over time, they
become more cemented into that original
view because they can't even tolerate the
view that they might have made a mistake
on something so serious," he said.
Keene emphasized that jurors might feel
anxiety that they may have come to the
wrong conclusion, regardless of whether it
was their fault. "Even if they didn't have an
opportunity to know the exculpating
evidence, jurors could become distraught
that a man's life might have been taken in
error."
But in Skinner's case, information
suppressed during the trial and developed
over the last 15 years has caused five jurors
to contemplate their guilty vote in light of
the high stakes Keene described. With
someone's life on the line, Keene said,
jurors take the burden of their responsibility
very seriously.
In worn-in jeans and a T-shirt, juror Jerry
Williams perched on a stool in his garage.
He wonders now if DNA results could put
the case to rest.
"What's right is right and what's wrong is
wrong," Williams said. "It should have been
tested before. . . . Somebody's life is at
stake."
Meanwhile, Hank Skinner remains on
Texas' death row, within 47 minutes of
execution on March 24 until the Supreme
Court issued a stay. He has maintained his
innocence since the night in 1993 that Twila
Busby and her sons were murdered, and
hopes the high court will give him the right
to prove it.
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"In Texas, Defense Lapses Fail
to Halt Executions"
The Washington Post
May 12, 2000
Paul Duggan
Like a vast majority of inmates on Texas's
death row, Calvin Jerold Burdine could not
afford a lawyer for his trial. So the court
paid a lawyer named Joe Frank Cannon to
represent him. Today, 16 years after Burdine
was convicted of murder and sentenced to
die, no one disputes that Cannon did a
lackadaisical job. In fact, during important
stretches of testimony, he was asleep at the
defense table.
Yet despite Cannon's documented
incompetence, Texas authorities argue that
Burdine should be executed. He remains on
death row, facing lethal injection as his
appellate lawyers fight the state's attempt to
deny him a new trial.
A review of the state's death penalty
files show that Burdine is one of many
capital defendants whose legal proceedings
were poorly handled by lax, inept or
inexperienced lawyers.
With few public defender offices in Texas,
most indigent defendants must rely on court-
appointed lawyers. Interviews with lawyers
and other experts, as well as a review of 16
Texas death penalty cases, revealed
instances in which lawyers in capital trials
slept through key testimony, failed to file
crucial legal papers correctly or on time, or
had been cited for professional misconduct
repeatedly in their careers.
Since Jan. 17, 1995, the day [Gov. George
W.] Bush took office, 127 prisoners have
been put to death in Texas, an average of
one execution every two weeks for 5 1/2
years. As of today, 465 inmates, almost all
of them indigent, are awaiting lethal
injections. No one has yet produced
incontrovertible evidence of an innocent
person being put to death. However, at least
one prisoner has been executed during
Bush's tenure despite the fact that his
attorney slept through significant parts of his
trial. And besides Burdine, at least two other
death row inmates whose lawyers snoozed
in court are seeking new trials.
Other dead or condemned prisoners were
represented by court-appointed lawyers with
extensive disciplinary records for
professional misconduct, usually for
negligent handling of previous clients'
cases....
Leading in Executions
Texas has the busiest death penalty system
in the Western world. Since 1982, the state
has executed 214 inmates, including one last
night. The next highest total is Virginia's 76.
Only a few states have reached 25.
Harris County, which includes Houston, is
the epicenter of the death penalty in Texas.
No jurisdiction in America imposes more
death sentences. If Harris County had a
death row, it would be bigger than the death
rows in 29 states.
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The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant
to "the assistance of counsel" at a trial, and
the U.S. Supreme Court has said that such
assistance must not be "ineffective." But in a
1984 case, Strickland v. Washington, the
court ruled that when an appeals court
weighs a claim like Burdine's, it must start
with a "strong presumption" that the trial
lawyer's conduct was reasonable and require
the appellant to prove otherwise. Even when
an appellant makes that case, he must
convince the appeals court that if not for the
attorney's inadequate work, the outcome of
the trial most likely would have been
different.
Partisan Patronage
Texas's 400-plus trial judges run in partisan,
often hard-fought campaigns for their four-
year terms. Advocates for indigent
defendants contend that in courthouses
across the state, judges frequently dispense
court-paid cases-including capital cases-
as a form of patronage to lawyers who help
them politically. Bush, they say, has blocked
reform of the system, also for political
reasons.
The case of death row inmate Henry
Watkins Skinner is an extreme example of
cronyism in the appointment process,
according to Skinner's appellate attorney.
Skinner, now 38, went on trial in a small
Texas Panhandle city in 1995, charged with
strangling his girlfriend and fatally stabbing
her two grown sons. The judge, M. Kent
Sims, appointed a longtime political friend,
lawyer Harold Lee Comer, to defend
Skinner. Comer had been the local district
attorney before resigning in 1992 amid an
investigation of his handling of seized drug
money. After leaving office, he pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor in a deal that
allowed him to keep his law license.
Comer had twice personally prosecuted
Skinner for other crimes, which created a
potential conflict for him in defending
Skinner. State law required the judge to hold
a hearing on the question, then give Skinner
the option of a new lawyer if it became clear
in the hearing that Comer had a conflict. But
according to the trial record, Sims, who was
aware of Corner's history with Skinner, did
not hold such a hearing.
Sims later approved $86,000 in legal fees for
Corner's work in the case, one of the biggest
sums ever paid to a court-appointed attorney
in Texas. At the time, Comer was in debt to
the Internal Revenue Service for about the
same amount, according to court documents.
In an interview, Comer said the fee and his
debt "had nothing to do with one another."
Although "there are a lot of lawyers in
capital cases who are incompetent," Comer
said, he is not one of them. Sims, who is no
longer a judge, also has denied any
impropriety.
The bill Bush vetoed last year would have
given county officials control over the
appointment process. Supporters said the
measure was meant to promote the creation
of independent appointment commissions, if
not public defender offices.
But Bush, agreeing with judges who lobbied
against the bill, said it "inappropriately takes
appointment authority away from judges,
who are better able to assess the quality of
legal representation."
Problems on Appeal
The problems Texas capital defendants have
had with court-appointed lawyers extend to
the appellate level. Mistakes and failures by
court-appointed attorneys have jeopardized
some inmates' chances for any meaningful
review of their convictions and sentences,
according to trial records and legal experts.
Advocates for indigent defendants say the
problem results from a law Bush signed in
1995 that was meant to speed the death
penalty appeals process. They say Bush's
support for that law is at odds with his
promise of "full access to the courts" for
death row inmates.
A condemned inmate's state appellate
lawyer routinely files what is called a
"habeas corpus" petition, asking the Court
of Criminal Appeals to throw out the
conviction and sentence based on
constitutional violations-including
"ineffective assistance" of trial counsel.
Before the 1995 law, inmates often waited
on death row for years until experienced
appellate attorneys volunteered to prepare
their habeas petitions, as David Dow did in
Carl Johnson's case. And in some cases,
they were allowed to file second petitions if
their initial ones failed.
But under the 1995 law, a habeas lawyer is
court-appointed for a newly condemned
inmate, and has 180 days to file a petition.
The law forbids the filing of "successive"
petitions except in rare cases. So any issues
the lawyer neglects to raise in the initial
filing are usually lost forever-because
later, during the federal appeal, under
federal law, judges are allowed to consider
only claims that were made at the state level,
except in rare cases.
For defendants, the new law places a heavy
weight on the quality of their appellate
attorney. But in several recent cases,
untrained or careless state habeas lawyers-
approved by the Court of Criminal Appeals
to represent indigent death row inmates-
have filed cursory petitions, occasionally
late, containing claims that were poorly
researched and sometimes garbled.
The court, after receiving thin petitions, has
upheld several death sentences in recent
years, even though the appointed habeas
lawyers later attested that they were
unqualified to handle such complex cases.
Texas's Road to Execution
Trial
A capital murder defendant has a trial before
a state judge in the county where the killing
occurred. He is constitutionally entitled to a
defense attorney who isn't "ineffective" as
the law defines the word. If he is indigent,
the trial judge appoints a local lawyer to
represent him. If the jury convicts him, the
panel then decides whether he should be
sentenced to life in prison or death.
Direct Appeal
If sentenced to death, the defendant
challenges his conviction before the nine-
member Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
in Austin, the state's highest court for
criminal matters. The direct appeal is limited
to issues that arose during the trial, such as
the judge's decision to admit certain
evidence or testimony over the defense's
objection.
State Habeas Corpus
A death row inmate whose direct appeal
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fails may begin another stage of appeals
called "habeas corpus" proceedings, aided
by a new lawyer. The new attorney's job is
to search the trial record for constitutional
violations. A state habeas appeal often
alleges, among other things, that the
inmate's trial lawyer was "ineffective,"
depriving him of a constitutional right. The
state Court of Criminal Appeals rules on this
pleading.
Federal Habeas Corpus
If his state habeas appeal fails, the prisoner
may file a similar appeal with a U.S. District
Court judge in the area where the killing
occurred. After the federal judge issues a
decision, either the inmate or lawyers for the
state may ask the New Orleans-based U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit to
reverse the ruling. The decision by the 5th
Circuit panel may then be appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court. But the high court
agrees to hear such appeals only in rare
cases involving what it thinks are important
constitutional issues.
Clemency
After all appeals fail and the execution is
imminent, the inmate asks the 18-member
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to
recommend a sentence commutation to life
in prison. The members, who are scattered
across the state, do not meet as a group, but
review clemency petitions individually, then
fax their votes to Austin. The governor may
commute a death sentence only if a majority
of the board recommends that he do so. But
the board, appointed by the governor, almost
always votes unanimously against clemency.
When that happens, the governor may only
grant a one-time, 30-day stay of execution.
Execution
At 6 p.m. on his final day, the inmate is
strapped to a gurney in the death chamber at
the state prison in Huntsville. After he is
given a chance to make a final statement
into a microphone dangling a few feet above
his head, the lethal chemicals begin to flow.
